On the nature of self (a thought experiment)

[Rav]

Imagine that it is possible to make an exact duplicate of yourself, right down to whatever thought you were in the middle of just before you did it. Which you would you be after the duplication has taken place?

Note: It is important that you put yourself in this thought experiment rather someone else. The point is to examine the question from a first person perspective rather than from the perspective of an outside observer.

[Dywyddyr]

I'd both be me, surely?

Edit: the only way to be sure would be, for example, if I were facing a window and stood on a particular patch of carpet or similar, just before the duplication. And then the original would (should?) be in the same place with the "new me" displaced from that position.
But in such a case I assume that that one of "me" would probably argue that the "real me" had moved during the process, and that I was definitely the real one.

[Rav]

I'd both be me, surely?

Edit: the only way to be sure would be, for example, if I were facing a window and stood on a particular patch of carpet or similar, just before the duplication. And then the original would (should?) be in the same place with the "new me" displaced from that position.
But in such a case I assume that that one of "me" would probably argue that the "real me" had moved during the process, and that I was definitely the real one.

Think about which body (or brain) you would feel "attached" to though. Would you be both of you at once, or just one of you?

EDIT: Just to be clear, I said feel attached to. I am not supposing that consciousness is something that is just floating around looking for a body to be in.

[Dywyddyr]

Presumably I'd both be attached to the body "I" was in. I.e. just one of me. Twice.
I'm not quite sure what you're after here, but I can sort of see it.

At some point (presumably shortly afterwards) the two "personalities" would diverge slightly, and increasingly so, due to different experiences. But both would insist they were the "real me".

[Rav]

I'm not quite sure what you're after here, but I can sort of see it.

I grew tired of all the endless religious debates so I thought I'd toss a fresh topic into the mix. I have some other things to add but it will depend on how the discussion proceeds. I'll wait for some more responses to come in. Thanks for yours

[Sarkus]

I'd be the one with the continuity from before the duplicate arose, since you mention that I would be creating this duplicate myself?

The duplicate would also necessarily suffer from a slight confusion at the moment it becomes aware, even if it has all my memories / thoughts up to the moment of awareness... as this duplicate would initially think it was spatially located elsewhere than where it wakes up - i.e. it would think that it should be where I am, whereas I would know I am where I think I should be.
Not sure the confusion would last long though... probably a bit like waking up after being unconscious and having been moved.

But given that I am the one that created this duplicate, I would be the one without this distortion / confusion.



The trickier question is if a duplicate is made while I am asleep / unconscious... which one am "I" when I wake up?

And the only suitable, albeit somewhat trite, answer to this latter question that I can think of is: "I am the one in my body".

[Rav]

The duplicate would also necessarily suffer from a slight confusion at the moment it becomes aware, even if it has all my memories / thoughts up to the moment of awareness... as this duplicate would initially think it was spatially located elsewhere than where it wakes up - i.e. it would think that it should be where I am, whereas I would know I am where I think I should be. Not sure the confusion would last long though... probably a bit like waking up after being unconscious and having been moved.

But given that I am the one that created this duplicate, I would be the one without this distortion / confusion.

Thanks for pointing out a weakness in my formulation. But even if you are indeed able to determine whether you are the duplicate or not, the question is about whether or not you'll be in your original body knowing that you're not the duplicate, or in the duplicates body knowing that you are the duplicate.

The trickier question is if a duplicate is made while I am asleep / unconscious... which one am "I" when I wake up?

And the only suitable, albeit somewhat trite, answer to this latter question that I can think of is: "I am the one in my body".

Good answer. From that I can assume that you believe that although the "other" you may be identical in every other respect, you'll still be consciously distinct from each other, existing as separate entities. Would that be correct?

[Sarkus]

Thanks for pointing out a weakness in my formulation. But even if you are indeed able to determine whether you are the duplicate or not, the question is about whether or not you'll be in your original body knowing that you're not the duplicate, or in the duplicates body knowing that you are the duplicate.

I'll be in my body.
The initial confusion aside, I wouldn't know whether I was the original or the duplicate, but I would know I was distinct from the other, as much as I know I am distinct from you.

Good answer. From that I can assume that you believe that although the "other" you may be identical in every other respect, you'll still be consciously distinct from each other, existing as separate entities. Would that be correct?

Yes - separate entities but with an identical past up to the point of duplication.
I'm sure it would be a strange feeling having someone who effectively was you up to that point... but I can't see any rationale for such things as a shared consciousness after the point of duplication etc.
We would be two distinct people, just with perfect knowledge of the other (up to the point of duplication).

[Rav]

I've been tossing this thought experiment around in my mind for quite a while now. It all started one afternoon at a friends house when we were having a discussion about the fictional technology in Star Trek. I realize that this admission might do some damage to the credibility of this discussion in the minds of some, but I would say that there nothing like science fiction when it comes to exploring future technological possibilities. Being that I am a bit of a technophile (amongst other things) I am naturally interested in such.

Anyway, in particular we were discussing the probability of transporter technology ever becoming a reality, and how it might actually work. My argument was that it was far more technologically feasible to make a blueprint of the original object and recreate it at another location than it was to actually "send" the original matter. Aside from the problems associated with trying to send a collection of atoms through space, if we're going to break something down to that extent anyway, what would be the point? An atom (type of) is an atom, no matter where you get it from, so it makes more sense to just assemble something using raw elements at the intended destination. So in my possible future universe, transporters aren't really transporters at all but are in fact replicators. This is perfect for inanimate objects, but it's a whole lot trickier when we're dealing with people.

Let's say we want to create the experience of instantaneous travel to another location. What we do is "scan" a person and transmit a block of data detailing their precise molecular composition and use that information to assemble them somewhere else. Because no-one wants two of themselves running around we ensure that part of this process involves the molecular decomposition of the original. Once you "arrive" at your destination, you go about whatever business you have there. But the question is, of course, whether or not it is actually you.

If you believe, as I do, that even if you are duplicated "you" remain attached to your original body (in spite of the fact that your duplicate will claim to be you as well), then "you" haven't traveled anywhere. You have in fact actually been killed instead. While one might reasonably argue that this simply counts as evidence that transporter (or replicator) technology is ludicrous (rather than serving to demonstrate something that is possibly more profound), I disagree.

Not so long ago I was surfing Wikipedia and stumbled onto the Quantum mind–body problem article. In it I discovered that a philosopher and cognitive scientist by the name of Daniel Dennett had posed a thought experiment that was very similar to mine. From the article linked to:

"Daniel Dennett talks about the situation where a conscious Newtonian observer is duplicated, by having a second system store all the information in the brain. Once the second system is built, the two systems make two separate observers which contain the same information. The two observers start out exactly the same and receive the same sensory input, but eventually diverge. The divergence could be due to randomness, or glitches, or because the sensory input is slightly different, the reason is not important. The important thing is that one observer has been copied into two systems, and in such a situation it is not clear to this observer into which of the copies their experiences will continue."

This particular quote is in the context of discussion about whether or not classical physics, by itself, can account for internal experience.

Just so everyone understands where I am coming from, I am not attempting to explore the idea that consciousness may exist beyond the physical but rather that even though the brain itself is obviously a classically deterministic machine there may be an underlying quantum component that is specifically related to the most basic and fundamental aspect of self (that which is tied to experiences throughout time). Most importantly, understand that this is just a philosophical exploration of "possibilities" and that I am simply interested in gaining additional perspective. If anyone can provide a compelling purely classical explanation for example, go right ahead.

[Yazata]

Imagine that it is possible to make an exact duplicate of yourself, right down to whatever thought you were in the middle of just before you did it.

Let's imagine that the process of creating a duplicate required the original to be anaesthetized. And let's imagine that the laboratory got confused about which was which after the duplication. So both the original and the duplicate wake up in hospital beds, and nobody knows which is which.

Which you would you be after the duplication has taken place?

Does the question really have an answer? It kind of presupposes that there's some...what?... located in one of the individuals but not in the other. Some essence of me, perhaps.

But does such a thing exist?

Note: It is important that you put yourself in this thought experiment rather someone else. The point is to examine the question from a first person perspective rather than from the perspective of an outside observer.

The most fundamental aspect of our subjectivity is the sense of 'I'.

Traditionally, it's been treated as a name and thought to refer to some kind of supernatural or mental substance. (Soul, mind, self) As for me, I'm more inclined to see it as more of a grammatical function that arises in self-referential systems of suitable strength.

I think of myself as 'I'. I assume that Rav does too. So does everyone else that reads Sciforums, presumably. We are all 'I'. Everyone is.

So first off, we notice that bare subjectivity, the fundamental first-person-intuition, isn't personalized and identified with any single one of us.

Our duplicate in the thought experiment is almost certainly going to have it too - that sense of subjective being, of self - just as strongly as the original.

Now what is it that connects the 'I' in my life with the phenomenal identity that I believe that it has? That's the result of all of the 'name and form' that's associated with this particular personality.

The strongest and most persuasive of this identifying information is probably going to be my memory, along with my habits and predispositions perhaps. There's the rest of my bodily continuity. And there's all of the social roles that I fit into, the ways that other people identify me and who they tell me I am.

In this thought experiment, both individuals are equal in these regards. There's no way to tell them apart. So both of them would seem to equally qualify as being the same particular individual.

Obviously their lives will start to diverge soon after, as each one has experiences that the other doesn't and starts to generate unique memories.

I guess that in this thought experiement, the spatial-temporal 'life-line' of this individual bifurcates into two branches, each of which has equal justification for identifying itself as a continuation of the original person before the line split.

[Enmos]

I'd be the one with the continuity from before the duplicate arose, since you mention that I would be creating this duplicate myself?

Wouldn't that go for both of you? Right up to the 'split' you were one and the same.


In my opinion there is no way to establish which one is the duplicate and which one is the original, because both are the original and the duplicate.

[Rav]

In this thought experiment, both individuals are equal in these regards. There's no way to tell them apart. So both of them would seem to equally qualify as being the same particular individual.

This is certainly a conclusion that I would agree with if we look at the situation from the perspective of an outsider. But really put yourself into the situation. Imagine standing next to your duplicate. He has the same body, the same personality and the same memories (up to the point just before the duplication took place) as you do, but something is still different. You are you, and not him. Your consciousness is not equally attached to both of you simultaneously.

Your duplicate can, of course, make all the same claims that you can, but it doesn't change a thing. "You" are in your body, and not in his.

What I am driving at here is the idea of the self as the fundamental entity that is attached to everything else one might normally identify as something that makes them unique. For example, you are the same self now that you were when you were 10 years old, even though you might have changed (or evolved) somewhat as a person.

[Enmos]

But really put yourself into the situation.

Which self?

Imagine standing next to your duplicate. He has the same body, the same personality and the same memories (up to the point just before the duplication took place) as you do, but something is still different. You are you, and not him.

That goes for both of me.

Your consciousness is not equally attached to both of you simultaneously.

Huh? Why not? Each has his own consciousness.. It duplicated along with the body remember?

Your duplicate can, of course, make all the same claims that you can, but it doesn't change a thing. "You" are in your body, and not in his.

Again, that goes for both of me.

What I am driving at here is the idea of the self as the fundamental entity that is attached to everything else one might normally identify as something that makes them unique. For example, you are the same self now that you were when you were 10 years old, even though you might have changed (or evolved) somewhat as a person.

You said the following in your opening post:
"Imagine that it is possible to make an exact duplicate of yourself.."

[Yazata]

This is certainly a conclusion that I would agree with if we look at the situation from the perspective of an outsider. But really put yourself into the situation. Imagine standing next to your duplicate. He has the same body, the same personality and the same memories (up to the point just before the duplication took place) as you do, but something is still different. You are you, and not him. Your consciousness is not equally attached to both of you simultaneously.

Ok, I agree with that. After the duplication, they are two separate people.

But having said that, each of them would have equal justification for believing that he/she is a continuation of the single individual that existed before the split.

I guess that the problem of individuating people consists of at least two sub-problems.

1. The problem of counting how many distinct individuals there are. In this case, is there just one individual or two? That seems to be your point.

I'd speculate that subjectively, that's going to be a matter of privileged-access. If I can introspect the memories, ideas and feelings of A but not B, I'm going to conclude that I'm A and not B. B is a separate person and he isn't me.

2. The problem of determining who A and B are. What are their names? What are their ages and histories? Where do they live and work? Who are their families? What are their hobbies and personal preferences?

That's where these two individuals are going to appear to be one and the same, at least initially. All of the identifying-informaton, the information that ties the generic subjective 'I' to a concrete personality with a particular name and life-history, will be the same for both of them.

Your duplicate can, of course, make all the same claims that you can, but it doesn't change a thing. "You" are in your body, and not in his.

But both have equal claim to being "Joe Jones'. It's just that there's two of him now, each with its own newly-distinct subjectivity that's become closed to the other.

It's possible to imagine another sci-fi thought experiment where two entirely different individuals somehow become linked by perfect telepathy. Suppose that two distinct people's brains are transplanted into a third body cloned from both of their DNA in such a way that both brains experience the other's perceptions, memories, thoughts, impulses and feelings as its own. After the merging, the body is driven by the actions of both brains in concert.

That might represent a reverse-bifurcation situation where two people and two life-lines have merged into one.

[DeeCee]

Let's do a thought experiment! (Whatever happened to Gendanken BTW?)

If you set up a video cam and taped the duplication you could spot who was who because the duplicate would appear in a different location. You could point bat the screen and say "I'm the real Dee Cee 'cos I was there first."

Thinking your Napoleon don't make you short and French.
Anybody here seen Moon? Or read Morgans woken furies?
These are not new ideas.
Dee Cee

[Enmos]

Whatever happened to Gendanken BTW?

She's in a better place now.

If you set up a video cam and taped the duplication you could spot who was who because the duplicate would appear in a different location. You could point bat the screen and say "I'm the real Dee Cee 'cos I was there first."

The other you will be saying the exact same thing.

[Dywyddyr]

If you set up a video cam and taped the duplication you could spot who was who because the duplicate would appear in a different location. You could point bat the screen and say "I'm the real Dee Cee 'cos I was there first."

Er, post 2?

Thinking your Napoleon don't make you short and French.

Napoleon was taller than average.

Or read Morgans woken furies?

Start with Altered Carbon, then Broken Angels THEN Woken Furies.

[cosmictraveler]

I'm taken aback for I'm beside myself!

[livingin360]

Did you just get done watching multiplicity?

[GeoffP]

Imagine that it is possible to make an exact duplicate of yourself, right down to whatever thought you were in the middle of just before you did it. Which you would you be after the duplication has taken place?

Whichever one of us draws his pistol the fastest.