Water The basic point on which we disagree is you will not accept that God can choose not to know something in advance of it happening. I say that he can do this if he wishes. You say that he can not. Let's try and break it down to as simple a comparison as possible. Suppose there are 2 Gods. We'll call them God X and God Y. Both of these Gods have the ability to know all things including future events. God X knows all things and he can not avoid having this knowledge. God X is unable to choose not to know something. God X would sometimes prefer not to know something that is going to happen but he can not do this. He has the knowledge of all future events at all times and there is nothing he can do about it. God Y also knows all things but he has the ability to choose not to know something if he wishes, unlike God X. If God Y would prefer not to know something that is going to happen he can avoid having this knowledge. God Y can have the knowledge of all future events to the extent he wishes. God Y can know every single thing that is going to happen or selected future events at his discretion. Now, which of these 2 Gods is more powerful? Which of these 2 Gods has greater ability? Just answer this question.
Woohoo! You're so great, Marc. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! * * * I don't this modification is necessary, it only complicates everything. Like I say later to Laser Eyes, In each theory, we have to keep to the axioms given. Each derivation and each inference have to be in accordance with the axioms. (See below.) 21. So I find this law at work: When I want to do good, evil is right there with me. 22. For in my inner being I delight in God's law; 23. but I see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my members. This is the burden of free will in practice. If we wouldn't be aware of this doubleness, the two laws that are at work, we wouldn't know we have options to choose from. In other words, we wouldn't have free will. I shall miss you. * * * You suggested that emotions modify our free will. This is what I oppose. To say emotions modify our free will skirts the issue of us actually having full free will, without modifications. That we have full free will seems to be too hard to accept, so modifications of free will are sometimes proposed. This is not what I am saying at all. We don't exist apart from our emotions, neither do they "have an impact on our free will". What they have "impact" on is rational thinking -- but this "impact" is possible only when a person's rational thinking is inconsistent and incoherent. In an argument (where rational discussion is supposed), "emotions take over" when the person's arguments show to be inconsistent and incoherent. You'll see people get angry or frustrated when they find themselves holding contradictory beliefs, and glad when they find their beliefs to be consistent and coherent. I think that the "impact of emotions" as described above is actually about "secondary emotions" (for the lack of a better term), emotions that come as a reaction to specific cognitive states. These emotions have nothing to do with our free will, they do not limit it. They are reactions to cognitive inconsistency and incoherence -- and these are indicative of our limited knowledge and abilities, not of a limited free will. "Primary emotions", like being happy when playing with your cat or being sad when someone close to you has been hurt, they don't affect your free will either. They may affect your agenda of yourself, your how-I-am-supposed-to-be. If a person pereceives a tension between his emotions and his agenda of himself, this is once more indicative of there being a cognitive inconsistency and incoherence between the beliefs he holds. Again, something that is indicative of our limited knowledge and abilities, not of a limited free will. I disagree. As soon as we accept the theory that we have only limited free will, we're on a slippery slope. A prisoner who planned to escape, but failed -- according to the theory of limited free will, he should have probably never even be able to come up with the idea of escaping (if his will is to be determined by his circumstances) -- "If he couldn't escape, he has limited free will." But this is an ex post understanding, and it supposes the identity "If you can't do it, you don't have the will to do it" -- which is false. What is limited is the prisone's field of action, what is limited is what he can do. What is not limited when he wants to escape, is his will to escape. That's just the thing! Peter may not have acted the way he may have wanted. Maybe you aren't able to throw a stone to the Moon. But this doesn't mean you can't have the will to! We should not judge a person's free will (that preceded the action!) by the outcome of the action! It is a false notion of causality. * * * In what sense do you mean this dichotomy? Someone wanting to throw a rock 10 meters far vs. someone wanting to throw a rock to the Moon? Or someone imagining he can lift 50 kilos vs. someone imagining he can lift 500 kilos? No. If my laziness or any other shortcoming or weakness would be part of my free will, then I could have never overcome this laziness, neither could I think that there can be something else beyond my shortcomings or weaknesses. But I can overcome my laziness, and I can see beyond my shortcomings and my weaknesses. This is an odd question, you present an odd dichotomy. If I would believe that the harm my cat can do is more important than the well-being of my cat (her well-being refers to her getting fresh air, exercise etc.), then my keeping my cat in the house would be an act of my free will. If she escaped anyway, then she would have acted against my free will. The key is in what I *believe* -- 1. whether I care more about the well-being of my cat, or for the harm she can do, and 2. whether I consistently keep to my beliefs. This is usually where the confusion with free will sets in. If I merely don't like the cat going out, for she may cause harm in the neighbour's garden, but at the same time believe that the well-being of my cat is important, then I have potentially contraditctory beliefs. And it is due to this contraditction that I have troubles directing my actions and taking responsibility. If I consistently believe 1. The well-being of my cat is more important than any harm she can do. 2. I will take responsibility for whatever harm she may do. then there is no trouble. If I consistently believe 1. The well-being of my cat is less important than the harm she can do. 2. I will put the cat in a place where she can do no harm. If she should escape, I will take no responsibility. then there is no trouble. But people often don't hold such consistent beliefs. Usually, the set looks thus: 1. The well-being of my cat is very important. But it is not more important than a certain harm she can do, there are limits to everything. 2. I will take responsibility for whatever harm she may do, but if she does too much, I will punish her or get rid of her. then there is trouble. The "too much" is defined quite arbitrarily and vaguely, and it is when our beliefs are only vaguely defined that we find ourselves thinking we have limited free will. Similarly, Peter wanted to serve Jesus. But Peter apparently held inconsistent and incoherent beliefs, and this is what directed his actions as it did. We can say his ability to act on his free will was limited -- and it was limited due holding inconsistent and incoherent beliefs. Peter maybe held this set of beliefs: 1. Serve God. 2. Always do the right thing. 3. I have free will. Such a set can lead to an action of betrayal. This is why it is crucial that a person's set of beliefs is consistently and coherently defined, without there being contradictions or possible contradictions -- if one wants to feel like one acts one one's free will. (The problem with the above beliefs is this: 1. Serve God. >> if it is not clear how to do that, one can't consistently do it 2. Always do the right thing. >> implies always speak the truth, no matter what (thus, one would tell anyone any truth they asked for) 3. I have free will. >> if I can choose A, I can also choose something else, if there is choice possible ) Free will is not restricted by these factors. What is restricted is the ability to always act out the free will as one has planned it. If we put a modifying clause on free will itself, ie. if we say we have limited free will, we find ourselves poorly defined, and in possible contradiction with observation. How far does this limitation of free will go? Does this limitation always apply? When does it apply, when not? If I used to be lazy, and this laziness has restricted my free will, but a couple of years later I have overcome that laziness -- how could this happen, if my laziness was restricting my free will?! I think it is more efficient, it offers a more consistent explanation if we say that we have full free will, but our acting it out as we planned is limited by the environment, other people's free will, our own physical shortcomings and by the possible inconsistencies and incoherence of the beliefs that we hold. Such an explanation is in accordance with the observation that people can and do change, and with the ways people employ to change. * * * I did not say He cannot. My point is that you are talking about SOME OTHER GOD, NOT THE GOD OF THE BIBLE. Yet you use Biblical scripture to support your points. Why? How you skirt the issue! You are NOT talking about the God of the Bible, and that's all there is to your argument. Sure, one can make up some generic god, some philosophical construct with the properties one gives to that construct. But such a god is not supported by the Bible. Why refer to it then? In each theory, we have to keep to the axioms given. Each derivation and each inference have to be in accordance with the axioms. Your solution -- if it is to be applied to the God of the Bible -- does not hold, as the axiom "God is loving" is completely disregarded. You have made your solution such that you have modified the axioms "God is omniscient" and "God is omnipresent", and with this modification, you avoided applying the axiom "God is loving". I don't know which god you are talking about, but it certainly isn't the God of the Bible. I find it useless to discuss the concept of a God-given free will (which is a concept coming from Christianity), but without regard to Christianity. I find it useless to talk about generic gods. Anyone can make one up to fit his or her purposes.
But tell me, Jenyar, what do you think of the explanation that the inconsistency and incoherence of one's belief system lead one to think one has limited free will?
Sorry, a bit late into this discussion. Slightly off subject here, but what you are seeing is your son without having his father around for 10 years, because you haven't been there, you just jumped ahead. So it is not really the future is it. Because you are going to go back and hopefully spend those 10 years with him. Sorry, that has no relevance to the subject, but I just thought it was an interesting paradox.
Very true. Personally I don't see how having someone outside of time looking in, seeing everything that has happened, is happening and will happen effects the process of how it is has occured, is occuring and is going to occur. I guess it is all from perspective really.
The belief that one has limited free will is a programmed belief like any other: a deduction from certain compelling observations (like a traumatic experience, long term conditioning, indoctrination or oppression). From such premises, a fatalistic outlook is just as "reasonable" and no different than other deductions, such as that one is ultimately rejectionable, unworthy or beyond hope. At first the belief is a merely a way of expressing a consistency. But soon they can become ideologies - one begins to put more and more faith in them and say "it is so, and because it has never been otherwise it will never be otherwise; must never be otherwise" - and inevitably such reductionistic and stereotypical "labels" come into contact with new experiences and other evidence, forming inconsistencies in the rest of the belief system and creating internal conflict that seems impossible to resolve (because the beliefs had become so ingrained and such a part of one's identity). The belief system can become such a source of security that it vetos any attempt to face the inconsistencies and resolve them. In terms of an ideology it would be called fanaticism, in psychology it is neurosis and obsession. If the belief system (or should I say: our identity) is vetoed like this, it becomes a premise, and from it any deduction could seem logical - hedonism, determinism, existentialism, nihilism. If that deduction is to be held at all costs (in order for the belief to have veto power), it must also somehow resolve any existing inconsistencies, rationally or irrationally. They must be all-inclusive and autonmous, or they cannot be sustained. For that anesthetic purpose, they are sometimes euphemised as "life philosophies", "just my opinion", or "we don't know enough yet". But the faith in them remains. But how would you define an incoherent/inconsistent belief system? Even the most well-adjusted people are walking paradoxes, holding many different beliefs that seem mutually exclusive: reality and myth, knowledge and ignorance, love and fear. This is where relationships come in: with humanity, society, nature, God. I think what makes a belief system coherent or not, is how it integrates all these archetypes, in whatever form or symbolism, visible or invisible, tangible or intangible, into our everyday lives - through words, thoughts and actions. Coherence is all about the relationships between things, and our consistencies and the coherence of our beliefs are a function of how we relate to ourselves, each other and the universe we inhabit, temporal and spatial.
I don’t believe we do actually have full free will and our emotions are one of the factors that influence how we exercise our free will. We have free will but it is not always under full control of the self. Your are saying that your emotions only influence you when you are not thinking clearly and consistently. Anger and frustration are not the only emotions we have, what about peace, contentment, satisfaction, desire, happiness, loyalty, trust, etc. all of these will influence how we exercise our will. If the will is influenced it is not free. In the example you gave they do fit and they may well be ‘secondary emotions’ they have something to do with our free will if they influence our will in some way thus making it influenced will rather than free. Being happy or sad may not effect your free will in a given situation but being happy or sad may effect your free will in another. Granted, identified incongruence is not necessarily indicative of limited free will, but incongruence could influence the will making it influenced will. Limited knowledge and abilities do not(or do they?). I feel the ground shifting beneath my feet. This is we are getting stuck, you are saying that are free will is unlimited uninfluencable (is that a word?) and there is nothing that can sway your decisions or you determination to carry out your decision? So when you say ‘my love, my love I Will never betray', and you mean it so much that it is enblazened in your heart like a cattle brand(sorry). You Will be able to not betray love, even when over come by desire for the tall gentleman with the greasy hair and stubble(just geussing hes your type). If you can then, you have the will you are in tune with your true will, if you cannot resist your will is weak it has been influenced and lead astray. But now I realise a question, what is the true will in that situation above the true will is to meet your desires, the will to not betray love has become secondary for that night, the primary will is satisfaction of desire. I agree, and we have agreed on this before. The example with the prisoner is also about environmental factors knowledge and ability rather than Will. We have said it before and agreed we cannot swim to the moon, etc, it cannot be done no matter how strong our will is. it is unrelated to free will, though i am getting a sense of missing something, in how environmental factors are an influence in some way. We should try not to judge a person full stop. They have their role to play, they have their life to live, they have their lesson to learn. Peters actions where what they where, he done what he was best able to do in that situation. But was his will free from influence? I think not!
water You didn't answer my question. The reason you didn't answer it is because you know where I am going with it and you don't like the answer. The answer to my question was obviously that God Y was more powerful than God X because God Y had all of the abilities of God X plus one more ability that God X didn't have. Why do you say that I am not talking about the God of the Bible? That is exactly the God I am talking about because there is no other God. The God of the BIble is the God of our universe. He is the one true God. My example above was just a little hypothetical based on 2 fictitious gods to try and prove a point. I frankly do not understand why you say that God does not have the ability to choose not to know something. Why do you say that God (meaning the God of the Bible) is like God X in my example and not like God Y?
I would suggest that instead of viewing God as a being apart from humans, look at all of our lives as aspects of a cosmic reflecting process called God. Our choices (free will) create the range of options that we will find (determined), and our choice from among options (free will) produces the range of options that we will find (determined), etc. etc. All of this part of the journey of creation that is continuously re-producing God as a quality, a quality that is also the substance of all.
about me saying it wouldn't be hard for a being that exists out of time to influence events in a way which we would experience as "in" time. I'm sure you guys are past this now (not), but I meant that any event we experienced would be in linear time. And God's experience of it would be as chapter 2531(or whatever #) in a book that can be opened at will to any point at all. P.S. ellion said - to water - "when over come by desire for the tall gentleman with the greasy hair and stubble(just geussing hes your type)" I hope so because that is me to a tee. Ha ha. Oh, except the gentleman part. Damn!
Adstar: Your comment here would completely negate free will. If it's all down to who god 'allows', then there isn't a personal choice in the matter. You argued yourself into a corner.
but that dog will decide which lampost he will piss on, and because he has such limited chance to exercise free will he will piss on probably every lampost he encounters. reminds me a bit of the male sexual instinct, (not my own though).
Yeah, the dog has some free will but the Owner controls the most. He says when they go for a walk and when they return home. In the same way 'God' says when we're born, when we die and what way we walk.
Perhaps it is like a child thinking, "my dad can do anything". In their extremely limited viewpoint they are correct. The father can probably, at that moment do anything the child can imagine - pick the child off the ground, catch a ball, fly them to disneyland, whatever. Perhaps in our world God is unlimited, but in God's "world" God is limited. That wouldn't negate our description of God as being all-powerful, because anything that could be done in this world, God could do. Then, in God's experience, by whatever means (including God's own choices), God could would be limited, and this wouldn't make God any less all-powerful to this world, the only one we have an understanding about. Also, The whole "can God make a rock God can't lift?" is meaningless. Paradoxes don't prove anything. They are just fun to think about. Bertrand Russel knew that, so they had to make some ad hoc rules up, and Godel proved basically that the paradoxes give us the limit lines of what we can "prove".
But I don't believe that there's any future to know about in the first place. We're making it right now. All God can know is what decisions we are likely to make in a given situation and how probable each of those decisions are, if it's possible to quantify that. That's why scientists who theorize time travel also theorize that you can never go forward in time, because that moment in time doesn't even exist yet. o.0! And if you go into the past, the future is being completely rewritten. Kinda like if you go back in time you unravel time backwards, and the only way to rewrap it is to live it out.
Hi. Interesting question. My understanding of omniscience is that God knows what will happen at any time in the way that we know the past. Take the history of the world, for example. We did not cause the events to happen, but we can look back and see what happened. As we can know the past, God can know the past, present and future without causing the events to happen.
Before I begin to dismantle this Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!, would you like to condense it and say 'free will' the ability to choose (or any such variation of your liking centered on choice)? By this way we eliminate the need to talk about not being able to sprout wings on will and so on. As for your previous post, I see nothing to comment on - all good stuff, well done! But. You argue from false axioms... and these we will now inspect for 'consistency' and 'coherence' with the outer circle.
