Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

I would hazard that the "unless..." means that you are no longer considering "if A then B" but "if C then D". I.e. you're still limited to the notion of "if A then B"... you're just referring to a different input, but that input would still have its determined output.

 

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Can "movement in the direction of greatest satisfaction" in the extreme result in action against long-term self-interest?

Addiction?
Greed?

 

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It depends on who is the universe...
It makes the issue of who is using the will very important to the question of freedom.
The human body is a "partitioned" universe in it's own right.
it is the causality with in the human body that determines the choice outcomes.
and the human body is the self.
To suggest that the will is governed by external forces with out being mitigated by the human body is incorrect thinking. IMO

Imagine a small circle inside a larger circle.

• The larger circle is the whole universe of causality.
• The smaller circle is the human body.
• The smaller circle is impacted upon by the outer causality.
• The smaller circle then takes possession of all those causes and transforms them in to self identity, self owned, self possession.

then makes use of all that stuff to form decisions and make choices.

this is the nature of self determination IMO

The idea of the greater universe of causality having direct and unrestricted access to the human will is fundamentally incorrect.

 

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The choice is there until the choice is made - as noted, information and influences coming in a split second before the actual decision can alter it to the point of complete reversal.
Once the choice is made, of course, there is no more choice - and rerunning the exact same event will indeed rerun whatever happened. But that doesn't mean there wasn't one.

That's easy. Change the color of the flash of light, provide them with different information a second before they decide, and record the difference in their choice.

 

I like your reasoning, but what causes you to think that the human body, being part of the universe, has any more "freedom" to act than the rest of the universe?

 

One only has to show how self determinism is acheived and incorporate that into a universal determinist perspective and one can satisfy both determinism and freewill simultaneously.

The freedom to self determine, that is fully determined by causes with in the human body, that have evolved through out the life time of that body to take ownership or possession of external influences.
Example:
Joe is infected with a mild head cold. This mild illness effects his choices, by narrowing the range but in no way diminishes his ownership of the will involved. Over time his body recovers by adapting via his immune system and as such his range of choice increases.

Perhaps the greatest cognitive phenonema and clue is our ability to determine that we are the source of our reflection in a mirror and not the reflection itself.
Why?
Blame anthropological evolution if you want....
(M)

 

That being said, one could argue that is a big part of growing from a new born to adulthood to learn by experience and education ect. to become increasingly self determined (independant) until in later years the capacity to self determine eventually reduces then finally ends with death.

 

All you're advocating here is that different inputs can lead to different outputs. Is that all you're saying "choice" is? The difference in output from one set of available information to another? If a thermostat is set to switch on below 18C, then if you give it input of 10C it will switch on. Provide it with different information, say 20C, and lo and behold another result. Is this what you would consider a choice? If not, and I strongly suspect it isn't, then what is a choice to you? How can you show that a choice has actually been made, between options that are possible with a given set of inputs rather than simply appear/feel possible?
If we are railroaded down a single path, even if we think that we have all the freedom to make choices, can we? Even if it feels as if we are free, are we? Sure, our sensation of making choice appears to govern where the track goes. But which leads which? Does the track lead the train along its preset (or probabilistic) path, or does the train decide which way the track goes?

 

Sorry to butt in but:
Notes:

Probable results are not determined results...
It is only deterministic if viewed in hindsight.
Example: The probability of the planet Earth being as it is is 100%, because it is indeed as it is.

A suggested earlier perhaps it is the "probably" bit that affords self determination of the result. ( given infinite regression)
In other words what isn't determined is what we make use of to self determine.
Example choice Prediction:
Corn flakes 40%
Weeties 40%
Neither 20%
What would be the probability of either choice when considered together when only one choice has been taken (past tense) The only answer is 100%. but it is our self determination that chooses.
Say we choose Cornflakes even with only a probability of 40%.
Perhaps one could consider that that 60% unaccounted for is our freedom. (our discretion)

 

What about, "both?"

 

hee hee...

 

I would see A as referring to the entire set of inputs.
Effectively the entire state of the universe (or at least that part of the universe that has an influence) at a given moment is A, and the resultant state is B.
But in essence, if you were to take A as a single interaction, then I'd agree with you.

I'm afraid to say that I'm with Sarkus on the necessity of defining what you mean by free will before one can answer that question.
From a deterministic point of view, and the lack of freedom that is understood by an action being constrained to a single possible option for a given input, then yes, there would be no free will.
From the point of view of what we mean when we more casually refer to free will, then yes, we do, because I consider such understandings to be defined exclusively by how it they appear/feel.

The argument from determinism is what I have put forward, and per the terms as understood in that argument, the conclusion would be that we have no free will.

"Conspires"?
I have tried to imagine what it might be like to have no sense of freewill yet remain conscious.
No sense of freewill yet our bodies doing what they do?
No sense of freewill over what we even think?
The only time I can imagine that in a living body is in the case of the unconscious.
So I think the sense of freewill is a necessary part of consciousness.
Now, why do you think the universe conspires to give us consciousness rather than us simply being more mundane?

From the argument from determinism the weather has the same type of freedom as an object floating in space.

Possibly.

As a necessary part of the benefits of consciousness.
I can't imagine having no sense of freewill.
I can't really even comprehend what this would feel like.
I can imagine an impaired sense, one of being compelled overwhelmingly toward certain courses of action, but I can't imagine a complete lack of the sense, other than when not conscious.
So the use might well be to allow consciousness to arise.
Without one you can't have the other, possibly.
Two sides of the same coin, etc.

 

What kind of response is that QuantumQuack? Is it the bigger Brother of, "kiss kiss, bang bang?"

 

I know what degrees of freedom means, JamesR. Other than that, I am not sure of the point you are trying to make.

I would suggest far more than we could ever be aware of. So what? Are you suggesting free will is just a matter of the degrees of freedom?

I would guess so. But again, so what? What point are you actually trying to make?

And this negates the actual nature of the system that gives rise to what we do? If the system is, as argued, deterministic (or probabilistically so) then if one considers determinism to exclude the interaction from being free, then whether we have a sense of freedom or not does not alter this. What does change is, as expressed multiple times, the need to apply different notions to different contexts.

And again you are just basically repeating the reason I have been asking for clarification on what one means by the terms. If you change the focus you change what the terms mean in that context. So you're really saying nothing that I haven't already suggested.

So all you think free will refers to is the possible number of outcomes if you change the inputs to the system? Even a thermostat has a degree of freedom. Free will? No. Or are you going to wave your hands and go "oh, complexity accounts for the rest?"

If the argument from the movement of atoms is valid, and the premises accepted, and the conclusion is that the human will is not free, how does this not inform one's understanding of whether or not human choice can be free?
Unless, of course, one wishes to assert a priori that free will exists, and the question before us is to examine the way in which its freedom can vary, or something along those lines? That's a very different matter, requiring rather different notions of what free will is, what it means to be free etc. And it is the starting point that I have/had been at length trying to get people on this thread (before you merged it) to define.

The question, JamesR, as you have reminded me previously, is in the thread title. If you honestly think that looking at the fundamental nature of physics, and building an argument from that, does not inform the matter, then, to put it bluntly, you have an agenda, you have an a priori assumption that free will exists, and you are unwilling to actually explore anything else.
But as said, if this thread, this merged thread, wishes to discuss only the compatabilist view of free will, as it seemed about to do, to start from the a priori assumption that free will exists, then I have no issue with that. I never have had.

No, first you have to decide what it means for anything to be labelled "free". If you then wish to apply different criteria to the will, that would be the second step.

Read again, JamesR. The ores misses provided by Baldeee were words to the effect that a deterministic interaction is not free, that a system built from such interactions is also deterministic, and that the will is such a system (built from deterministic interactions).
The conclusion is that the will is thus not free. It is no more a premise than saying that one presumes that Socrates is mortal when saying that Socrates is a man, and that all men are mortal. It is the difference that a number seem to be struggling with between assumption and conclusion,

Even if Baldeee had given as premises: a non-free interaction is not free, a system built from non-free interactions is also non-free, the will is such a system (built from non-free interactions) you would still only be left with the will not being free as a conclusion.

Yes, Different definitions applying to different contexts.

That is the level that both the compatabilist and incompatibilist arguments consider. One does so looking at the underlying workings, the other not so much. Both are looking at the same phenomenon.

I don't need to know what an actual square-circle looks like, do I?

I suggest, then, that you get some glasses to improve your wonky vision. Where is the assumption you suggest? Are you again confusiong conclusion with assumption?

... To be continued....

 

Without getting into "taking sides" (re the OP) is musical improvisation an interesting example of some kind on an interface between predetermined actions and actions with more of a degree of freedom?

The musician will build up a "back catalogue" of musical phrases that he or she can dip into but also seemingly diverges from in what is probably popularly considered to be a "spontaneous" way.

I have also come across the description that there can come a point where the instrument is playing the musician than the other way round (a kind of an ecstatic state ,one might imagine)

Does all that have any bearing on the OP or is it just an interesting detour?

I suppose I am thinking mainly of jazz and Indian music (and general composition no doubt)......

 

Part 2

Exactly the same.

Why would it necessarily be difficult? Why would things such as home environment, medical history, general welfare, financial status etc not have explanatory insight into the resultant action?

And we agreed that randomness does not equate to "free", right?
So we agree that, at least in a deterministic world, the same situation would result in the same action?
Now rewind that one moment. Then another. Then another. Then another....
Where do you see freedom within that?

Then "choice" simply becomes a word to describe the eventual action out of all those modelled within the decision making process and rejected. There is still no freedom in it, per the above. At least no more freedom than an object in space has, able to be anywhere it wants... if only the inputs allow.

Agreed wholeheartedly. In a similar vein, it is amusing when games developers create AI and then discover what initially seem bizarre behaviours, and then try to track down why it occurred.

The focus in this example is not is not on "will" but on "free".
If you wish to argue that the will is something other than just a more complex process, then your issue (from the deterministic argument PoV) would seem be with the premise that says that a process that is built from determinis it interactions is itself deterministic.
If so, what is it about the "will" that should entail such special pleading?

So again "choice" simply becomes a word as I described previously but now limited exclusively to conscious processes? Okay, no problem with any of that. But we're still stuck with the notion of it being "free".

If you are accepting of the definition cobbled together above then yes, you would have made a choice. You are conscious. You modelled possible futures with each. You selected one based upon that model. Yes, a choice has been made in line with that (working) definition.

The "apparent" or "actual" with regard this working definition of choice would now be in reference to whether or not it is free. Previously I was assuming that "choice" implied it was free.
So yes, your choice would be apparently free.
There is no practical way of telling whether it actually was or not, so one uses philosophy.

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From the determinist PoV I have never experienced the ability to make a free choice, and I never will. I can thus not tell what the difference might be. From the compatabilist PoV I have only ever made free choice, and only ever will, thus again can not tell what the difference might be.
Yes, I can tell the difference where the options are limited or many, but still free/not-free (depending on PoV).
So it is somewhat of a meaningless question.

Please don't be patronising, JamesR.

 

Exactly.

When I choose the Wheaties over the Corn Flakes, my physical motions are organized. I reach for one or the other and my hand targets one or the other of the boxes. If my physical motions were random and unrelated to the task at hand, people would say that I was suffering from a neurological problem.

My choice of one or the other (I'm thinking of 'choice' as some kind of neural event) depends on my recognizing that these are boxes of breakfast food that I'm familiar with and have opinions about.

And somewhere in there is my liking one more than the other, along with my being more strongly motivated to eat the cereal that I like.

Yes. They seem to be pretty much hard-wired in lower animals. Insects perhaps, though they do show some ability to learn. But insects do kind of remind me of little biological automatons. But I'm not exactly prepared to deny an animal free will, even if it always chooses the same thing in the same situation. (That's what it chose, on its own account.) This is a problem case which illustrates that the whole topic is a bit fuzzy, based as it is on our assessments of our own and other humans' behavior. It might become less applicable when we apply it to lower animals or to robots.

When we say that Sylvia freely made the choice of breakfast cereal, we aren't denying that the choice was the result of her desires and beliefs, or that it was unrelated to the breakfast situation she was in, the cereals she had on hand, and so on. Real life examples of what we call free-will don't deny those kind of considerations. If you eliminated all the preexisting motivation and situation stuff, you would have something that looks more like epileptic seizures than free will. Just random movements.

The thing with free-will is that it has to be intentional and motivated to count as free will.

When we say that Sylvia freely chose the Wheaties, we mean that she acted as a result of what we might describe in biologistic vocabulary as her own neurophysiological process, that she exercised her own self-steering abilities, and that we might describe in psychologistic vocabulary as being the result of her own desires and choices. Her hand moving to the Wheaties box wasn't the result of electrodes that some mad scientist had implanted in her brain.

I strongly agree.

Some participants in this argument (Baldeee is one) seem to conceive of determinism as being when we know prior state A with absolute precision, along with all of the relevant dynamical equations, we can predict subsequent state B with absolute precision. So 'determinism' seems to reduce to predictability.

So let's accept that idea for the sake of argument.

I have no problem in saying that if we know Sylvia's situation (at the breakfast table with the Wheaties and Corn Flakes boxes) and her precise neurophysiological state, just a millisecond before she chooses, we can predict that choice with great precision. If we move out ten seconds, we can predict it pretty well too, but probably with a bit of uncertainty. If we move out a day, we will encounter more difficulty predicting her choice at the breakfast table, though we still might know what cereals she has on hand and what her preferences in cereal are. But the uncertainties have multiplied.

None of this threatens the free-will idea.

Moving further out and we do start to threaten our free-will ideas. But I'm increasingly skeptical that if we know the precise state of the universe ten years ago, that we can accurately predict Sylvia's choice today (or even that she will make such a choice at this time). 100 years ago and we might be uncertain about Sylvia's existence. Five billion years ago and the existence of Earth might be a leap and the existence of something like life a mere speculation.

And I'm hugely resistant to the idea that if we knew the precise initial state of everything at the 'big bang', along with all of the laws of physics, that everything that happens in all of time, on every planet in every galaxy, including Sylvia's choice of Wheaties today, could be accurately predicted. I'm skeptical that the universe really works that way.

That latter idea, the idea that everything was predetermined (by What?) at the beginning, seem more outlandish to me than Christian theology, to tell the truth. It's a huge statement of metaphysical faith. A weird sort of creationism.

So what is determinism? It looks to me like a giant metaphysical speculation arguably based on 19th century classical physics. My guess is that 1000 years from now it will seem just as bogus to people then as medieval Aristotelian physics seems to people today.