Interesting points.
I was actually tossing a jibe at one noted poster here, but you do raise some interesting considerations. I do think it's possible to maintain an inductive justification without an appeal to an a priori, but ultimately this becomes more of a question of justification methodology as opposed to epistemology.
I was just about to comment on how we might be moving away from Ham's focus. I'm not entirely sure, but I suspect Ham is growing concerned with the seeming inescapability of solipsism....
Let me try to bring it back to Ham's OP, mixing in what I am getting at.
Descartes chose to do a thought experiment. He doubted, radically - but not as radically as he might of. We end up with his cogito thingy.
After this experiment, given the social impact of it in certain circles, it can seem like one must somehow extricate oneself from this thought experiment - show that I think therefore I am is logical and build from there - get oneself back in the world, so to speak, and feel all rational about it.
But if one feels this pressure, then one has accepted the premises of the thought experiment - along with some not articulated neo-moral and certainly practical injunctions about what one should do.
One could, the moment one is approached by the 'thought experiment gestalt' - for example someone who challenges you with 'for all you know your brain is in a vat, etc. - challenge/doubt/be skeptical about all the presumptions involved - ethical, epistemological, social (yes, even with certain thoughts in one's own mind - presumed by such an approach.
It is as if one must automatically 'entertain' the radical doubt and claw one's way up from it.
Really?
Hams' position seems to be that Descartes was not radical enough. I think in a way he feels contrained by the thought experiment, limited by it. He was more freedom to doubt. Whereas most people reacting to Descartes are seeking less doubt and hope to build from I think therefore I am to more.
So, socially, I want to be careful NOT take away from Ham's freedom to doubt because I think he is using doubt as a tool, not necessarily to ascertain truths, but to be free from them. Whereas another person approaching me with radical doubt might very well be trying to undermine my freedom - to make certain assumptions, for example.
I think there is a lot of curling up around conservative, less assailable epistemological positions, where one claims to hold ideas as likely or useful SO FAR. I am thinking partly of you and also Wes who seems to have risen from the dead.
Far be it for me to want to take these positions away, as long as they are not seen as right in a universal sense.