Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

False. There is no mention of supernatural anything in there. Argue in good faith, iceaura.

 

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And so it goes.
Or as noted above, emphasis added:

or from my first post on this thread:

 

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So, can we move on now? Or would you like to continue beating that ex-equine?

 

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Any time.

No more "Newtonian determinism" irrelevancies, no more materialism requiring miracles, no more bottom up substrate determination of patterns, none of it - a good start, that would be.

Although the OP question would thereby have been answered in full - so the entire discussion would be an emergent phenomenon.

 

False.

We have eliminated your introduction of supernaturalism. That is all.

I notice you have introduced a new word, again: miracles.

This thread is really just you, arguing with straw men of your own creation.
Virtually all of your posts have been ploys to refute the words you insert in other peoples' mouths.

You do not argue in good faith.

 

But no one has raised the possibility of it being supernatural. Both you and DaveC have dismissed this possibility. However, because you have different views of what free-will is (in terms of where it is meaningful) you are at loggerheads for seemingly no reason.

It's like you've both been to see a performance by a magician. DaveC is looking at the fundamental physical laws which give next to zero chance of large objects spontaneously disappearing, and saying therefore that "magic", the ability to make things disappear, does not exist.
You are looking at the magic show and saying that "magic" exists because to you "magic" is the ability to make it appear as though things have disappeared.

Okay, the analog isn't perfect, but it gets much of the issue of your disagreement across, I think.
You both accept that things appear to disappear. You both accept that we appear to have causal agency over things, that we can make choices.
However, DaveC sees no "magic", he sees no "free-will" and that the causal agency we appear to have is an illusion, everything giving rise to it behaving in a (probabilistically) determined way that leaves no scope for actual freedom. We are bound by that chain of cause and effect, and our conscious "choices" are merely part of that chain. Any freedom we think we have, any freedom we act within, is illusory.
You do see "magic" because to you the "magic" is defined it appears, not what is actually going on under the hood. The appearance is interpreted by other such patterns and each give meaning based on appearance.

Neither side is actually wrong.
It is just two different interpretations of the same performance. But because you have different views of what is meant by "magic" you will be at loggerheads.
This is why you need to define what you think free-will is.
To one it may be the ability to make conscious choices, to the other it may be the ability for actions not to be just a matter of (probabilistic) determinism.
The former definition can exist out of (probabilistic) determinism (although for me it would require definition of "choice" as well). The second can not, but to someone holding to the latter definition, what arises out of that determinism is an illusion of what they consider to be free-will.

Or something like that.

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So?
They have used the impossibility of it's being supernatural to question its existence - even, as in the "Newtonian determinism" argument, holding that the impossibility is a barrier to its existence for which no way through has been made visible.

The argument that reruns of physical events necessarily coming out the same is in conflict with freedom of will is wrong. Its flaw is in its assumption of supernatural agency being necessary for "freedom" - that unless one can by an act of will contravene physical law, i.e. produce different effects from given causes in given circumstances, there is no freedom of will.

Seeing no possibility of freedom of will because one sees no magic is a fundamental error. Until past that, talking about defining freedom of will is a waste of time.

That misses the point completely.
Again: dreams are causal here. Any "chain of cause and effect" includes dreams. It does not include neurons. So let's drop the word "merely", and take a look at what that implies.
Or put another way - damn straight our conscious choices are part of that chain. Don't forget it.

The word "illusion" has no clear meaning in this context. We are acting in accordance with our will as influenced by our dreams, memories, past decisions, immediate information we attend to, etc. What is the illusion, exactly? Unless one is assuming that people think their acts of will are supernatural somehow, there seems to be no illusion involved.

That definition will be the end product of a long, successful, heavy, complex discussion. If it ever arrives.

 

Sorry to be so blunt, but you're simply not listening, are you.
The two of you are using the same words (free will) to describe different ideas of the same observation. You are claiming his argument is false based on your idea. Yes his argument is not false for his idea. And yours is not wrong for your idea. But you're arguing against him as if he is using your notion of free-will. He isn't.

"Magic" was simply part of the analogy, and was not referring to your previous issue with the supernatural. Apologies if this has confused you.

Alas it is you who misses the point, because you are refusing to acknowledge that there might be two different notions of what constitutes free will. You are arguing from your notion, and dismissing as wrong what is actually to your notion a red-herring. You see dreams as causal. DaveC would see them merely as an illusion of causal, something that is actually just the result of a causal chain.
Your notion of free-will starts at that level of pattern, whereas his does not. Hence your disagreement, because you're not talking about the same thing when you refer to "free will". Your "free will" is his "illusion of free will".

It has the same meaning i think it usually has: appears to be that which ultimately it is not.
From your perspective there is no illusion, and from your perspective that is correct.
From his perspective there it is illusory, and from his perspective that is correct.

From your notion of free-will, where it only has meaning at the conscious level etc, there is no illusion. There is no hood to look under, as the patterns at play (dreams etc) are the fundamental blocks that interact.
But from the notion of free-will as being ultimately arrived at through (probabilistic) determinism, every action we take, whether we think it caused by dreams, desires, etc, is (probabilistically) determined. Those dreams are the result of such processes, those desires, even consciousness itself. Just because a system is complex does not alter this. The output of every interaction continues to be (probabilistically) determined. There is no more "free-will" (so the argument goes) than there is in a snooker ball in motion.

This makes what people casually refer to as "free will" an illusion - to those that look beneath the hood of "free-will".
Thus what you refer to as "free will" and claims exists is what DaveC would claim to be an "illusion of free-will" and he would claim that this illusion also exists, in the same way that a mirage exists, even if it is not what it might appear to be.

Not really. You've almost defined what you think it is by your arguments. You are looking at the will as having ultimate causal agency over other patterns at that level. You are seeing that as a causal agency it is free to do what it wants (within practical constraints), to choose, to decide etc.
This is not where DaveC is starting from, though.
He starts from the bottom and works up, not top down.
Somewhere in the middle we get the arrival of the emergent preoprty of consciousness and free-will. From the view from underneath, anything above this level is illusory with regard what is actually going on. From the view from above there is no meaning below, and so the level of emergent property is taken as fundamental with regard what goes on at that level.

Hence you are in disagreement, when actually there is probably no disagreement with regard what is going on, just a difference in perspective.

 

No, I'm not. "Ultimate"? what does that even mean?

I am. You are in error - misreading, for some reason.

I am not using that term at all. I am repeatedly recommending it not be used. And no, it's not the "same observation" - partly, in my opinion, due to the influence of that term.

You are wrong about that. It did, in fact, reference that issue. You can't use it without referencing that issue - that's what the analogy does. There is no analogy to magic here, and drawing one is a mistake.

The opposite.
I am specifically and explicitly pointing out that he was not using my notion of freedom of will. I am repeatedly and in the face of some hostility pointing out that he was instead making arguments that only work with respect to a supernatural "free will".

I just spent a half dozen posts on that topic, the differences between the different notions here of - your term - "free will".

No, I'm not. Nowhere in anything I've posted is there any such nonsense as a will floating around loose with "wants" of its own, choosing among them.

Something I have repeatedly, explicitly, and specifically posted about, right here. That's been a major point of mine, for pages now. I regard it as a mistake, and I posted the reason(s) four or five times now.

Not in the middle. Freedom of will - if any - would emerge at or near the top of the logical (pattern) hierarchy.

The word "illusory" is essentially meaningless in that context. The patterns at the top physically exist - they are not illusions. Machines record their presence.
And they are not determined by their substrates.
- - -

Yes, that is indeed what I am pointing out is a wrong-headed approach. You have accurately recapitulated what I have been dealing with for all these pages. But you seem to think you are informing me of something.

Part of the problem seems to lie in the suggestive nature of words like "ultimate", "free-will", etc. Consider what the cause of a snooker ball's motion would be, whether or not one has carefully totted up all the atomic interactions. The "ultimate" cause. The "determining" factors. Is the cue an illusion? The cushions - mere fantasies? The shape and solidity of the ball? That just drains the meaning from the words "illusion" and "fantasy".

It simply makes no difference whether or not one can perform the impossible - the theoretically impossible - and trace the cause and effect chains in the atomic substrate of the "brain" back a million years or so and into all the rocks and air and so forth all those atoms came from and continue to come from, day by day and minute by minute slotting into the pattern: what we have now, after all that, is a mind, emergent from that brain, comprising patterns of patterns of activity - patterns of patterns of electrical and chemical events in time and space, ephemeral - that includes what we name "will". It is not driven by biochemistry, or determined by neurons - that's all substrate. Ok?

 

P1: if something is determined then it can not do other than it must.
P2: systems built from determined interactions are themselves determined.
P3: the mind and will are systems built from determined interactions.

Conclusion: the mind and will can not do other than they must.

Is this valid?
Are any of the premises disputed?
If it is valid, and the premises not disputed, where is the freedom, other than in veiled illusion only, masking the determined nature of our actions?

NB: reading the previous posts I should also state that "determined" can also be probabilistically determined
(I.e. same inputs to the same system always lead to the same probability function of outputs, even if the actual event is picked at random in line with that probability function).

 

No it isn't. It's an assertion.

Because this:

is apparently how you define free will. That is not granted as the definition. Therefore, what you are observing is not necessarily free will.

You can modify a paramecium's path by poking it with a needle. It's the definition of life - not free will.

Of course responses to stimuli are observable. No one argues that. They're electro-chemical in nature.
The contention is over what "they" are.
It sounds like you don't even question that response to stimuli are no extant proof of free will.
Yet how is that electro-chemical response qualitatively different than the paramecium, above?
Would you argue that the electro-chemical changes in a paramecium - or a moth - are free-will?

(Finally, after 50 or so posts, you're back to arguing in good faith.)

This is getting closer to establishing a working definition of free will.

Would you say that these traits are criteria for free-will or that they are hints that free-will is present? The reason I'm asking is because:

Dolphins, chimps and some birds can recognize their likenesses.
Most dogs and cats cannot.
Pretty much all mammals and even simpler life forms can learn new behavior.

An Afghan can change its behavior, but cannot recognize itself in the mirror.

So there's definitely grey area.

Those tests seem to be more of a look behind the scenes that there's something there, rather than an overt litmus test.
Is free-will a continuum then?

 

Wow. Incredibly elegant summation of the point I was trying to make. Seriously, wow.

 

You do not know that the machines are recording free will. You are interpreting the actions as free-will.

If a clockwork machine were given a million options to choose from (enough that it rarely repeated), and you gave it some sort of input that changed its internal state, would you declare that it had freedom of will? Why not? The patterns (or anti-patterns) physically exist, and are recorded by other machines.

No. Its apparent free-will is an illusion, pulled off by having a large set of outputs that make it look like free will - to the perfunctory observation.

 

I agree...

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Choices do not necessarily indicate free will at all. If we have a superposition of several outcomes, then regardless of choice we can only choose from among pre-existing superposed deterministic outcomes.....

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The problem is, it's no more informative than the term itself.

Does a dog make choices unimpeded except by physics?
Does a paramecium make choices unimpeded except by physics?

Now we have to define 'choices', and perhaps 'unimpeded'.

 

I believe that the universal law of "movement in the direction of greatest satisfaction" provides the opportunity of choice between degrees of satisfaction or "state of comfort".

A rock will roll downhill until it comes to "rest" at the bottom of the hill, unless on the way down it encounters an impediment (obstacle) and comes to "rest" at that point.

1/2 inch difference in trajectory can be the difference between rolling all the way down or getting stuck halfway down the hill.
Mathematics are deterministic in eventual outcome of superposed probabilities.....

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1. There is no law of movement in the direction of greatest satisfaction, let alone a universal one.
2. Rocks do not experience satisfaction or states of comfort.

Evoking such an antiquated rationale as 'greatest satisfaction' actually obfuscates the issue: So now you want us to broaden our search for free will to consider rocks?
I think I'm comfortable assuming being alive is a minimum requirement, thanks.

 

Ummmm sigh

Choices mean NOTHING. They are options you have been given

There can be two to a million

IT DOES NOT MATTER

Free will is a ABILITY to choose

Not the number of CHOICES

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Is a clockwork claw machine able to choose which marble to pick out of a hat?

 

Is it alive?

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