Ockham's Razor and Ding an sich

We only have to drop it for the duration of the exploration, of ourselves. I am not saying we should - whatever that would mean - permanently adopt phenomenology as our ontology, but rather I took a little detour into phenomenology to show what I think some of the resistence to really facing the problem with blithe reference to Ding an sich may be coming from. IOW perhaps someone would read what I said and think
you know, it's true, I did come to my dismissal via a route something like that.

(naive, I know, but still, I also found it interesting to examine myself)

Ah, so ethics do not guide your behavior.

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I am not bringing in ethics, please note, as a guide to ontology, but rather saying that if someone is claiming 'this is the system I use' period, then they must apply it even where it makes them uncomfortable, not simply where they think it makes other uncomfortable. You could see this as slightly aggressive cheerleading.

But we do not restrict ourselves to that system, even the empiricists. We are multi-system creatures. And I am referring the all members of the set of homo sapians, not merely saying that in the set we have exceptions.

I actually see people precisely NOT deciding. They may say they have decided and put one set of commitments on the pedastal. But if you follow them around you see them flitting from brain in a vat, idealism, materialism, empiricism, rationalism and this is just amongst the non-theists. Of course some people put more effort to be totally consistent in their lives, but they are insufferable and Sisyphus.

Oh, good. I'll take a look at that and respond later.

 

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Fair enough.
Myself, I just don't see any need to even posit such a thing [or class of thing...].

lol
Of course it does [within context], I just don't see how it's relevant here...

Ah; now I see.
I just wouldn't call that ethics, as opposed to simply intellectual honesty...

We don't have to restrict ourselves as such [and I don't think we do...]. And yes, I agree that we're multi-systemed creatures, and that there is often domain overlap, but certain systems are more useful in particular domains...

I agree with all you say [damn those fence-sitters].

How did you know I'm insufferable and Sisyphean???

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The Wiki article just barely touches the surface, as the actual article itself is pretty heavy stuff. Yet, in it, Quine hit pretty hard at what some call the 'unexamined' a priori assumptions of those who might be loosely described as being anti-Rationalist.

 

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Then you are 'safe', so to speak.

Ah, so you are not trying to win. An exception.

I agree.

Ah, but you are very cautious about what you post, so it is hard to tell. This can also be some protection - if carried out in general social contexts - from being insufferable. The Sisyphus role seems unlikely by the way you acknowledge the problems with Empiricism, but then say it is the best we have. This is Sisyphus near the top, watching the stone roll down and deciding to watch the sunset.

.I cannot imagine an empiricist not being some kind of rationalist. I mean, they have to take something as given. Like memory, not that it is perfect, but that it about the past,for example. And they cannot claim this is given empirically, because you cannot test this. I am sure there are other problems. I will give the Quine a read.

 

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Moi?? Cautious?? Never.

hehe

I think it behooves one to not so easily commit to anything.
I imagine from that comment, you'll see me for the skeptic I truly am.

I was careful when i said "Rationalist". Note the capital R.
By that I meant it in its classical philosophical sense: Rationalist a la Descartes, or Plato; one who is prepared to assert some sort of ontological a priori within their overall philosophical system.

Contrast with the Empiricist who can, as you note, take something as 'given', but need not commit to the certainty, or essential nature of that thing...

The Quine article can be found in his "From A Logical Point Of View".

Quine FOLPOV

 

Yes, I took it as the capital R. I just think empiricists, especially those not trained in philosophy, but really all of them, when push comes to shove, earn that R also.

But that just drives the certainty into their epistemology and ability to self-evaluate, etc. 'We can only speak in terms of liklihood' is a statement of certainty.

I'm procrastinating the quine which will no doubt require some focus, but I'll get there.

 

Practically, I'm sure you're right. Of course, we all do this.....
The difference being, the Rationalist asserts the a priori, seeing no need (or reason..) to question it. The empiricist on the other hand, can do such.

I disagree.
The probabilistic nature of the notion in question intrinsically makes it a different thing; revisability is the hallmark of good reasoning.

As for the 'reification' of that probabilistic nature, well, I think that's just another semantic game [ though, as you'll see from Quine, he thinks you're right here...].

cool
No rush of course, as that article could easily warrant a thread of its own....

 

If the latter does. To me it seems the axioms the empiricist cannot test or will not is where the rationalist is perhaps more honest.

One an revise statements of certainty also. But the empiricist considers his or her epistemology correct and to some degree ontology, because they accept certain things like memory is about the past, belief does not create reality, I am not built up from scratch each morning and so on. If they consider all their assumptions to be probablisitic, how do they multiply the odds to come up with liklihood? 98% on this one times 99% on the second times......

It seems to me an empiricist, with no axioms, can say 'as far as I can tell, it seems to be working' in reference to empiricism. I can see no way for them to universalize this with axioms. Basically they are satisfied with how it is working for them, to the best of their judgment. And, of course, empiricists are trusting other processes, all the time, when they trust the work of others and the implications of others. But this latter point is moving more into 'how the individual empiricist actually lives.'

We all batch together experiences into wholes. For all of us some of these are axiomatic. It is true an empiricist could try to test some of his or her axioms. I think some elude testing.

Ah, now there's a way to seduce me to read it.

 

Ah, but then one wasn't certain....

I don't understand what you mean.
The term liklihood is synonymous with probability. All one needs is some sample data sets, and to then generate an inductive 'rule'.

Correct. And that's all they do say.

Again, correct. For the empiricist, there are no axioms.

Ahh, but that's where we make a mistake..

 

I disagree. One was incorrect, by one's own reckoning. Just as an empiricist would be if it turned out his or her epistemology was not the best or incorrect.

How can you come up with probabilities for those things?

I think you need to cruise the other forums. I never see the word seems in relation to the system itself. Occasionally in relation to certain conclusions, yes, but empiricism as a whole, hardly.

I think they have an axiom that memory, if inaccurate, relates to the past. IOW they can follow through on testing, logical analysis, etc.

Including the empiricists then. If you truly react to experience without batching in wholes, you cannot begin to test. You must take certain kinds of stability for granted. And all of them do.

 

So you're saying that the state of being correct is contingent???

Easily; as we do, all day, for everything...

Empiricism, as a system, is not beholden to those who [poorly] practice it.

Fair enough, if you choose to call "memory" [or the appeal to] an axiom.
I wouldn't.

No.
Empiricists proper, would not assent to any axiom..

 

No, but I did mean what I said.

via intution?

Actually, it is literally. If it makes no assumptions, it is beholden to all those who did, who gave it a starting point. An empiricist, if you are correct, cannot begin.

'I can trust, generally, the context, as presented by my memory of other days and my expectations,' seems like an implicit axiom of empiricism.

Well, they would say they don't have any, but I notice, for example, they are not solipsists. So some axioms, made by others, are not challenged. Though this gives me the interesting idea of looking at empiricists as coming of age in the Abrahamic family and whittling away at many of the assumptions and ideas of those religions, but not others, yet at least, and only 'at work' as opposed to at play.

But I still think an empiricist cannot really speak with much certainty at all, over even come up with some probability, for what other people MUST have as their best epistemology. The empiricist awakes in situ, and given the problem of other minds, can only generalize at risk, especially given his or her claimed lack of assumptions.

 

mmm
Well then you're stuck with a contradiction.
Certainty, by definition, means that it cannot be amended...

lol...no, I'm not heading into that one again....

Via inductive reasoning.

I disagree. By definition, the only starting point is one's experience.
One's experience, by definition, cannot be axiomatized...

Seems like, but cannot be. See above.

Right. Perhaps we're encountering a semantic issue here.
Empiricists deal in 'Laws' and 'Principles'; while seeming close to axioms, they are not.

Totally correct. Moreover, they need not, nor do seek to.

Alas, this is all they can do.

There's always risk, to be sure. Thankfully, as time goes on, we can minimize those risks of error. Thus, as Hume noted, though we cannot be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow, we can quite confidently assert that it will.

 

I could go in a couple of directions here. 1) If we take all language as scientific statements, rather than as behavior that elicits specific experiences in others and ourselves. 2) Then your statement

Empiricism is the best system we have

is really

It seems very likely to me that empiricism is the best system we have.

And I would further quibble that it would be harder for you to know about what is best for others than yourself.

You must run with a very...how shall I put this....rigorous crowd if they do this every day.

Oh, one can have a passive starting point, sure. But to act, test, one needs assumptions. And one always has them. Or, at least, so far.

If they don't make this assumption, then they must begin again every day when they wake up. They must calculate, via some unknown method, the liklihood of all sorts of ontological ideas that have built up over time. Or is there some way to test and show the lack of need of this? I can't imagine one that would be relevent the next morning, given the issue.

Then an empiricist would have no stand on solipsism.

They certainly seem to when they speak about rationalists, theists, intuition, etc. For example. And see my first response in this post at top.

Which certainly seems like a statement of certainty, and one with implications about those who do more.

And this may seem like me being picky and demanding all your speech reflect your philosophy. Which is true. But speech or writing, rather, is acting in the world. We are not what we say we are. The empiricist is fully committed to beliefs, whatever he or she writes down. Empiricism is currently taking up a great deal of space in the world. I know we read about theists and corporations and battles over resources and warlords and the like. But the truth is that empirical studies are justifying a more and more pervasive transformation of the world. And to stop specific portions of this transformation, it is generally demanded in the West that one counter with empirical studies, otherwise one is too emotional or superstitious. Somehow a lack of certainty is physically transforming the planet, and since the precautionary principle is very hard to prove necessary and intuition however expert is not considered rational, what seems obvious to some carries no weight.

Just to digress further, from my perspective, it is as if one group decided that vision was too untrustworthy, and so they run their tests blindfolded. I do believe this leads to very accurate results, within the parameters. But sometimes the only objection I can raise is from what I can see, but this is dismissed by the negative assumption of empiricism.

I do so hope this gets caught on to before everyone is half computer and my forests are made of collapsable nano-tech trees
and my sorrow is considered irrational based on qualia like nostalgia
and my 'problem' is treated with Zoloft
and future generations are protected from my gametes by gene manipulation.

There is, in fact, a tiger in the house, even if many members of the family cannot see it

to pull in Julio Cortazar's short story.

Sorry about the rant, but I realized this is what drives my concern here. I will stay within the frame, at least for a while, from here on.

 

Well, now you're just playing language games.
The point is, certain words have certain meanings. "Certain" means definite.

I suppose so.

I agree. But all those assumptions are contingent upon our own experiences.

Fair enough, but my point was that these assumptions need not be axioms.

Oh, they can have any stand they want.
However, as I do see what you're getting at, strictly speaking, yes, an empiricist must tend to support solipsism.

Again, there's a world of difference between an operational 'axiom' of fiat [law, principle, etc.] and an axiom per se.

Nope; it's a probabilistic statement. One built upon an inductive support.
Again, what may seem to be, or may operate as, an axiom, need not necessarily be such.

 

Wait a minute. You want to focus on the meaning of the word 'certain'. I point out the implications on how you are using language and this is 'playing language games'. I think you will have already found that much of philosophy is precisely this kind of serious play. If you are saying that everything you assert is actually assertions of probablity, then it seems perfectly valid for me to point out you are not communicating this way. This is not simply anal pettiness, but because I do not think the pure empiricist exists. It is clearly an inadequate philosophy for the empiricists I have come in contact with since they 1) communicate and act with certainty, both about epistemology, but also in relation to a wide range of issues. 2) regularly use intution to draw conclusions.

I have never encountered an exception to this.

Using induction or intution, I draw the same conclusion: tacitly - iow by their actions - and openly by their communication, empiricists resist the limitations of empiricism. Why are they dissatisfied with their philosophy as a rule? Could it be that they too sense it is unnecessarly limiting?

 

positively eerie. i had NOT seen this when i had posted my little "joke" (about my invisible tiger friend) in the "funny things theists and atheists say" thread (or something like that).

 

i think we all (most?) agree upon this since the linguistic turn, but:

don't know what to make of my nagarjuna/madhyamaka obsession of the past few days--other than my conviction that nagarjuna was the wittgenstein of his day, and the "linguistic turn" in asian thought took place nearly a couple thousand years ago--but again, it seems relevant here.

he (they) by no means denies things empirical reality, apart from the standpoint of "ultimate truth," but rather grants them a provisional empirical reality: things do in fact exist, for they are indeed, heh, there, but all things are product of dependent co-arising (causally related) and are therefore "empty"--denuded of self-nature, or lacking specifically defined characteristics and properties. this seems a denial of noumenon (ding an sich), but an acknowledgement of provisional phenomenon--or a limited sort of empirical epistemology. is this not unlike phenomenalism?

but insofar as empiricists acting and communicating with certainty, with regards to their epistemological claims and methods: i wonder, do they in fact do this; or do they speak and act more in this "provisional" sense? (insofar as there is consistency amongst empiricists) again, it does seem to come down to "language games": empiricism is the best -or- it seems most probably that empiricism...

certainly, i've encountered the absolute certainty--crunchy cat's "100 percent absolute certainty" that wes posted a certain response--but from the same i've also encountered the probablistic, as though there is some hidden provisional clause in the sense of "certain," and likewise the acting upon assumptions and intuitions.

meh. i'm not sure that what i just wrote makes any sense at all (still suffering "language issues," though perhaps that little scar on my right temporal lobe is trying to tell me something), but i'm not so clear as to whether the ... complications and inconsistencies arise from hubris or limitations in language, as much as the limitations of empiricism.

EDIT: anyhows, it would seem that this is starting to veer in the direction of matters of qualia...

 

Indeed it is. You're right; but these 'games' have a variety of uses.
Perhaps it will simply come down to a matter of interpretation, but I maintain that statements of "certainty" cannot be revised. If they are revisable, then they were not "certain".

Note that this is not the same as revising one's Laws or Principles so as to accommodate new information. To tell the truth, I was confused as to why you introduced the term "certainty" at all [back in post#27].

Again, there is a distinct difference between promoting, 'advertising' or referring to something as being "certain", and its actually being so. In the former case we are taking liberties with the concept so as to ease communication, whereas in the latter case we are speaking precisely on the content at hand. One is a procedural amenity, and the other is an analysis.
To invoke Hume again, while we may speak of the certainty of the sun rising tomorrow, it is in fact not certain.

[Not that I was speaking for myself but...]
With select exceptions yes, any assertion by an empiricist is indeed one of probability.
[As for myself, yes, with select exceptions, all statements are probabilisitc.]

See my first response above [and the content of the quoted parmalee material below, and my comments thereupon].

Nor do I.
[And I didn't mean to imply that you were being petty; I was thinking more along the lines of splitting hairs..]

But this says less about Empiricism than it does the human mind. I would venture to say that the "pure X" does not exist [X being a variable that can accept any school of thought].


I think that parmalee has a fine interpretation here:

I agree with all of this almost without exception, as it has captured the 'essence' [hate that word..] of what I've been trying to say.

Cheers parmalee.

My exception is a minor quibble:

I agree that the empiricist POV definitely overlaps that of the phenomenalist. In fact, I would place the empiricist under the 'umbrella' grouping of phenomenalism. The difference to me seems to be that the empiricist is willing to go a bit farther, to stretch the rules so to speak, than the phenomenalist would [should]. For example, strictly speaking, a phenomenalist shouldn't be able to even discuss the 'dark side' of the moon....

 

egads.

There's a nasty topic in itself....

 

Are you certain of that? I am being rather annoying, I am sure, but there seems to be a few kinds of cake and eat it too going on with empiricists, if you are correct about them. How can an empiricist be certain that other people cannot be certain? I would assume this would also be something they must think of in terms of probability. (actually I would go so far as to say they should also be unsure about themselves, but I'll keep the easier issue on the table). Nevertheless empiricists makes statements, without qualitification, that empiricism is the best system we have. Note the 'we' and 'best'.

I think it actually is necessary in philosophical arguments to then present the statements in terms of probability.

Yes, but we are talking about 'the best system' for human minds. This implies that the best system's bestness is independent of those minds.

Which is, in one sense, part of what I am getting at. The empiricist really needs to stick with what they are capable of reexperiencing in controlled conditions and be very careful about venturing out into interpreting what cannot be and what is not experienced (BY THEM).


I'll respond to the Parmalee quote elsewhere.