View Full Version : Is there such a thing as chance?
hockeywings
12-05-01, 08:37 PM
I have come to beleive that there is a less likely possibility of such a thing as chance.
Chance is defined as The unknown and unpredictable element in happenings that seems to have no assignable cause.
Lets take one of the popular happenings of chance with the flip of a coin. A flip of the coin is a supposed 50-50 chance. Well when you flip the coin, the coin doesnt magically choose a side. you flip it with some much strength, spin, arc, velocity, direction. Then the coin comes into contact with other factors such as wind, tempature and other things. Well, if you were able to determine those other factors wouldnt it be possible to determine whether or not it will land on heads or tails?
Where is the chance in that?
I beleive that for any circumstance this is true, so what is this real value of "chance"? Any feedback would be appriciated.
Hockeywings
James R
12-05-01, 09:02 PM
What you said about flipping a coin is correct. <b>If</b> you knew the exact strength of the flip, the amount of spin imparted to the coin, the air resistance characteristics and so on, in principle you could predict which way the coin would land. However, there is some <i>sensitivity to initial conditions</i>. Vary one thing slightly and you might get a tail where previously you would have had a head. Due to the inaccuracy with which we can determine the initial conditions for a coin flip, it is fair to say that it has a 50-50 chance of landing one way or the other.
At a deeper level, you could say that the motion of the coin is determined by the laws of physics. In the Newtonian sense, the coin acts completely deterministically, and is, in principle, if not in practice, predictable. However, our best theory of the motion of objects is no longer Newtonian mechanics, but quantum mechanics. Quantum theory seems to introduce complete randomness into some aspects of motion. According to the theory, some things can exist in certain states which, when measured, collapse to other states in a completely <b>random</b> and unpredicable way. Quantum mechanics, at least so far, seems to rule out the possibility that the universe is completely deterministic. It seems God does play dice, after all.
Welcome to Sciforums.
Re. Chance
Let's just say that any occurrence that has more factors than can be conceived and/or measured is considered to be 'chance'. Just the example you gave, flipping a coin, resulted in you mentioning seven factors that could affect the flip. And remember, each of those factors are quite variable for a whole bunch of other reasons. One hell of a lot of data needed to 'maybe' figure out which side ends up facing up.
Take care.
hockeywings
12-05-01, 09:19 PM
I guess i was just confounded by how un-random it seems to be. if you take it as chance is something were your brain power and/or mechanics are to small at the time to find enough things out to know for sure, i guess that would be a correct definition.
On the other hand taht wouldnt be the known t ype of chance would it?
I dont know anything about quantum mechanics but it may just be random because we dont know enough about it yet.
On the side note, god playing dice would be irrevelant for a current difinition of god(which is a whole new subject, long long subject, undeterminable subject) for he would know all those tiny variables being omnicient.
Hockeywings
Porfiry
12-05-01, 11:35 PM
Perhaps God does not play dice. Rather, the dice are God.
PROFOUND!
Question now remains: What color die? ;)
Take care.
hockeywings
12-06-01, 03:39 PM
would make sense, using god as the things we dont know about (i.e. the randomness of quantum physics) or the things that we cant explain (i.e. all the variables needed to be known for tossing a coin, or on a larger scale the origins of the universe)
All the science we know cannot predict with absolute certainty how the coin would land, no matter how much information you gather. All our scientific theories are "perturbative." That means all of our equations etc., are really only approximations. When we calculate the path of the earth, for example, we use equations that give an approximate value for the path of the earth around the sun, and then figures in the affect of the moon, and other planets, etc, etc. But if all the masses were the same, we would not be able to make predictions. This is known as the perturbative method. String theory is the first nonperturbative theory that actually predicts exactly, but we don't understand it enough to derive the equations necessary. One of the problems in string theory has been that we have been trying to use perturbative methods to find these equations.
Now you may think that once we have these equations figured out we'd be able to predict anything if we could get all the info we need. But part of string theory says that we can never get all the variables. In quantum mechanics there is the uncertainty principle. In string theory it states that we can never probe distances shorter than the Plank length. In other words there is chance.
All the science we know cannot predict with absolute certainty how the coin would land, no matter how much information you gather.
The big emphasis is in "We know"...
You could cheat...and put on your future glass to take a peak at the future? :D
James is right, chance is too many variables to count with both hands that God gave you...that is also stock market for you.
And that is your 401K going up in smoke if you are an ENRON employee....
machaon
12-09-01, 04:52 PM
How could there possibly be such a thing as chance? Is the way things are now, in this moment in time, merely a bottleneck through which all of the possible past must be filtered? How can the future be less resistant to change than the past? One might like to think that he/she can control future events via free-willed decisions. Fine, but where do the decisions originate? Perhaps the decisions we make are really just thoughts that are being sucked out by the vacuum of what will be. The present time is only big enough to contain what is. It is always the present time somewhere down the road.
hockeywings
12-09-01, 08:20 PM
exactly how i was thinking, now if you believe that to be true, then what follows from that is that we dont have free will, for all your present decisions denote is that of what your past desicions have led up to.
machaon
12-10-01, 04:16 AM
then what follows from that is that we dont have free will
Does it really mattter as long as we FEEL like we have free will?
Captain Canada
12-10-01, 08:52 AM
Illusion of free will is vital. The idea is, however, an inevitable concept that filters into the causal chain - assuming there is no such thing as chance.
But if there is chance, then free will as we know it is in fact that random element. How can that be 'will'?
Conclusion. No one is responsible for their actions - it is either pre-determined by a vast causal chain (for which we cannot be held responsible) or random (for which we cannot be held responsible). ?
I think God prefers Russian roulette to dice...
All the science we know cannot predict with absolute certainty how the coin would land, no matter how much information you gather.
The big emphasis is in "We know"...True so far...
You could cheat...and put on your future glass to take a peak at the future? :DWhat happens if you look and it turns out the other way?
Hockeywings,
None of the replies you've received have touched on the fact that probability is a measure of knowledge, not of some randomness, or "chance," that exists in the world. It would be very hard even to say what it means to say that there is or is not randomness in the world, so the question that you pose is hard, but perhaps you wouldn't have asked it, if you understood probability.
When we say that the probability that a given flipped coin will come up heads is 0.5, all we mean is that we are utterly without information about which way it will come up. Another way of saying this is that we have no information about which flip, among all possible flips, we are dealing with. If someone else did know something about it, he would assign a different probability, and if he knew for sure that it would come up heads, he would assign 1.
Suppose that person A is like us; he has no information; so he says the probability is 0.5. Person B, however, has some information and says that the probability is 0.7. Both A and B are right; there is no "objective" probability; probability is a measure of what you know. It doesn't matter for assigning probabilities whether there is randomness in the world, and it would be very hard even to say what "randomness in the world" could mean.
Captain Canada,
>> But if there is chance, then free will as we know it is in fact that random element. How can that be 'will'? <<
It can't, of course.
>> Conclusion. No one is responsible for their actions - it is either pre-determined by a vast causal chain (for which we cannot be held responsible) or random (for which we cannot be held responsible). ? <<
You're overlooking the fact that some causes are nearby in the causal chain, and some are very far away. Suppose you were to ask me for the cause of my going to the store today, and I said, "Because the universe was created," or "Because my parents met," or anything remote from the fact that I needed some milk. My answer would be uninformative. Now, surely, I am more responsible for the fact that I went to the store than my parents meeting is, so of course I can be held responsible. You can only say that I am not responsible for going to the store if you don't care whether a cause is near or distant.
If you still object that I am caused, so I can't be responsible, then you're going to have to explain what "responsible" means if it is not about proximate cause.
Captain Canada
01-21-02, 09:40 AM
Bagman,
The concepts of 'free will', 'cause and effect' and 'responsibility' have always been interesting to me for the reason that the ideas are central to our understanding of the world and yet also so ill-defined and poorly understood (in my view). It's intersting that the ideas of 'free will' and 'responsibility' are (I would say) necessary for society to function. However, as commonly understood (or at least as I beleive them to be commonly understood) the concepts make little sense to me.
Now, surely, I am more responsible for the fact that I went to the store than my parents meeting is, so of course I can be held responsible. You can only say that I am not responsible for going to the store if you don't care whether a cause is near or distant.
I think that this depends entirely upon your definition of responsibility. You have adopted an understanding of it as 'proximate cause'. This certainly resolves the problems of 'free will' (or lack of it), but I don't think it's an understanding of responsibility that many of us would recognise morally.
Are we talking about 'responsibility' only in the sense of causation or are we also talking about the moral implications? If we're only talking about causation then I presume animals as well as rocks, trees and other such objects are 'responsible' for certain events.
If we're speaking morally then is it fair to (assuming we both agree on causal chains) hold people responsible for actions in which they had no choice or control over (in the sense of 'willing an action'). Regardless of how far back the chain goes, if we accept that there is one, the responsibility must be equal at all times in the sense of choice or will. They may be physically responsible in the sense of 'proximate cause', but in this they are equally as responsible as an asteroid falling from the sky or a tree that is blown down.
Of course regardless of all this the concept of responsibility (linked to free will) is one that is vital for society to function.
But to me, responsibility morally depends upon free will. If we are speaking of responsibility as a 'proximate cause' then I have little problem with it, apart from the fact I believe that to be a definition few would commonly recognise.
Is chance an accident or an accident is the result of chance?
Captain Canada,
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The concepts of 'free will', 'cause and effect' and 'responsibility' have always been interesting to me for the reason that the ideas are central to our understanding of the world and yet also so ill-defined and poorly understood (in my view). It's intersting that the ideas of 'free will' and 'responsibility' are (I would say) necessary for society to function. However, as commonly understood (or at least as I beleive them to be commonly understood) the concepts make little sense to me.
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"Free will" has a sensible meaning that has nothing to do with any alleged fiction that is "necessary for society to function." Examples: (1) If I take you somewhere at gunpoint, you are acting less freely than if you went there on your own initiative, and clearly you are less responsible. (2) If you move your arm in your sleep and strike your wife, you are not acting from free will, even if you move it to smite an enemy in your dream, because it is not of your will that you strike your wife. If you had been awake, it would be.
You may object that this type of free will is merely relative, but so far I'm only addressing the question of a fiction that is needed for society to function. This relative free will is needed for society to function, but it is not a fiction. However, you may object that when I blame you for striking your wife while you're awake, I assume that you are entirely free, not just more free than when you're asleep. But that's not true! I don't require you to be entirely free, in order to blame you. I would blame you even if you had struck her because you were upset or slightly drunk or were being coerced in any other way that was not extreme. All I require is that you be __free enough__ to make and act upon a morally informed decision whether to strike her. If you make the right decision, I infer that you were free enough to make it. If you make the wrong decision, I look for a reason of self-interest that is in conflict with the moral rule, and if I find one, I infer that you were free enough. I only infer that you were not free enough if I can't find a reason. For example, you may be mentally ill.
So far, I have not found any assumption of complete freedom that is necessary for society to function. Perhaps you'll say that this "necessary" is not crucial to your position (such as it is), since even without "necessary," you can still say that free will makes "little sense"; but I think it's important, because I've just shown that free will does make sense. You've spoken of our having "no choice or control" over our actions, but it is impossible that we could have no choice or control while also having degrees of choice or control, because "nothing" doesn't come in degrees.
This doesn't necessarily mean that I've won, but it does mean that, whatever you mean by "free will," it is not what we ordinarily mean by it. For us to have "no choice or control," the degrees I've shown must be mere appearances of degrees of something that does not exist; the evidence is not evidence; it counts for nothing; we are being deceived.
This raises the question of how there appear to be degrees of something that does not exist. There are such things, e.g., degrees of elevation of the sun, when actually the sun does not move, but the degrees correspond to something that does exist, the rotation of the earth. So this example, at least, does not suggest an answer to the question. Besides, it is not true in any absolute way that the sun does not go around the earth every day; we could recalculate all the motions of heavenly bodies on the basis that it does, and no one could say we were wrong; they could only say that our description of the universe was unnecessarily complex. (Galileo was wrong about this; he claimed that the sun __really__ stood still.)
Now let me get to your idea that general responsibility is not the same as moral responsibility; i.e., that you may be responsible for your acts in some sense, but not necessarily the moral sense.
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I think that this depends entirely upon your definition of responsibility. You have adopted an understanding of it as 'proximate cause'. This certainly resolves the problems of 'free will' (or lack of it), but I don't think it's an understanding of responsibility that many of us would recognise morally.
Are we talking about 'responsibility' only in the sense of causation or are we also talking about the moral implications? If we're only talking about causation then I presume animals as well as rocks, trees and other such objects are 'responsible' for certain events.
If we're speaking morally then is it fair to (assuming we both agree on causal chains) hold people responsible for actions in which they had no choice or control over (in the sense of 'willing an action'). Regardless of how far back the chain goes, if we accept that there is one, the responsibility must be equal at all times in the sense of choice or will. They may be physically responsible in the sense of 'proximate cause', but in this they are equally as responsible as an asteroid falling from the sky or a tree that is blown down.
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A person is not a falling asteroid. If an asteroid fell by calculating its path, taking on fuel, starting an engine, and propelling itself toward the earth, this would be nearer to what a person is, but it would still not be the same (since the asteroid might contain a computer). A person's actions depend more on the particular person than an asteroid's falling depends on the particular asteroid; any object in the same circumstances as the asteroid will fall the same, even if its mass is vastly different from the asteroid's mass.
So a human is more responsible for his actions than an asteroid is for its actions, even if he is not morally responsible; the calculation occurs in the human. In your view, this is not sufficient for moral responsibility. You admit that a human can perform acts that are called moral or immoral, as an asteroid can not, but you deny that he should be called morally responsible for them. This is odd, because it denies that a human is responsible for something for which only a human could be responsible, so it implies not only that he is not morally responsible but that the notion of moral/immoral makes no sense in the first place; morality is nothing without responsibility.
Now, clearly it does make sense to speak of moral and immoral. For example, if you take something from me without paying and against my will, this is immoral. We're able to make the distinction. Then how does it not make sense? Perhaps you'd say that your act was not "ultimately" or "absolutely" immoral. I would reply that this only means that the act is not moral or immoral once it is divorced from its context of ownership and so forth. But no one would deny this, because when we say "moral" or "immoral," we are not divorcing the act from context.
If it makes sense to speak of moral and immoral, it must make sense to speak of moral responsibility. Provided that "moral" makes sense, you are the moral cause of your acts. This is like saying that, provided that "physical" makes sense, you are the physical cause of your acts. The fact that there are causes antecedent to you does not change this. Just as it would be uninformative to say that I stole your money, not because I wanted the money, but because my parents met, it would be uninformative to say that I stole it, not because I made a moral consideration, but because my parents met.
To deny this, you must say that assigning moral responsibility to me gives me a heavier burden than is indicated by what it means to say that I made a moral consideration. But that is precisely what it does not do. For example, we do not assign moral responsibility to a person who harms someone by accident, since the moral consideration was not involved. The same goes for crazy people, drunk people, unconscious people, etc.
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Of course regardless of all this the concept of responsibility (linked to free will) is one that is vital for society to function.
But to me, responsibility morally depends upon free will. If we are speaking of responsibility as a 'proximate cause' then I have little problem with it, apart from the fact I believe that to be a definition few would commonly recognise.
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The reason few would recognize it is as moral responsibility is that it's broader; it includes moral responsibility. Furthermore, moral responsibility is even narrower than that might suggest; e.g., a crazy person is the proximate cause of his acts, but he is not morally responsible.
Suppose that someone's being morally responsible for a bad act did not entail a requirement to punish him in any way, nor even for him to feel badly. Would you still say that he was not morally responsible for it, or would you admit "proximate cause" (plus his having made the considerations) as sufficient for saying he was morally responsible? I think you'd have to admit it, but this would mean that your issue was punishment. You'd be saying that "morally responsible" was good enough as a description of the relationship between him and the act but not good enough to justify punishing him for it.
Bagman
Captain Canada
01-24-02, 09:48 AM
I thank you for a full and admirably detailed account of the various issues we have touched on relating to 'free will', but, no doubt to your eternal exhasperation, must confess to still having trouble with the concepts.
I found it a little difficult to follow the specific line of argument you took, so perhaps we can clarify the positions.
My first suggestion was that 'free will' and 'responsibility' are necessary concepts for society to function. I suggest that without 'free will' 'responsibility' has little meaning, and that consequently society is no longer able to function.
If I understand correctly you first argue that 'free will' is not necessary for society to function. This is because we can have a sensible understanding of freedom that does not depend upon the assumption of 'complete freedom', but rather in degrees of freedom. The very fact that we can speak of degrees of freedom proves that freedom must exist.
If I have misrepresented or misunderstood this argument then please correct me.
My problem is with the concept of 'free will' which I still don't understand. You did your best to explain it to me, but I'm still confused.
Examples: (1) If I take you somewhere at gunpoint, you are acting less freely than if you went there on your own initiative, and clearly you are less responsible. (2) If you move your arm in your sleep and strike your wife, you are not acting from free will, even if you move it to smite an enemy in your dream, because it is not of your will that you strike your wife. If you had been awake, it would be.
I would say to this:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
Of course we have further, perhaps infinte causal chains which go further back, but for the moment we'll stick to the basic cause.
But why is (1) less of a free choice than (2)? This is what I want to know. They were both caused by something you had no control over. Let's even assume that (2) occurred whil I was awake. What is the difference? Regardless of why I struck her there would be a cause and ultimately one which had nothing to do with me. Now if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on?
Of course I understand that most people will view (1) as less free than (2), but why? Essentially, what is this freedom you speak of?
I suspect that you must mean choice. But what does this mean? To do otherwise? Thus far, no one has. So if we look at the empirical evidence, we have absolutley no basis for believing in choice as the ability to do otherwise. If we cannot do otherwise, ever, then what does freedom possibly mean?
To recap:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
So
if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on (why should we say the closer the proximate cause, the more freedom you had)?
But if we could not do otherwise in either case, why should we say we were more free in one example than the other?
I don't want to confuse the issue further so I will limit myself to this for now, but if there's any specific argument of yours you'd like me to respond to let me know.
hockeywings
01-24-02, 02:31 PM
It looks like you two are having a hard time connecting, and i think i know why. Bagman it seems like you are taking this free will issue on a lighter note then captain wants. It seems as you are assuming that actual "free will" exists(ability to choose something, or another way to look at it, no out side influences is causing your actions now) And it seems that captain canada is trying to argue the topic of actual "free will". hope that helps of course correct me if i am wrong
Hockeywings,
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It looks like you two are having a hard time connecting, and i think i know why. Bagman it seems like you are taking this free will issue on a lighter note then captain wants. It seems as you are assuming that actual "free will" exists(ability to choose something, or another way to look at it, no out side influences is causing your actions now) And it seems that captain canada is trying to argue the topic of actual "free will". hope that helps of course correct me if i am wrong
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I'm aware of what Captain Canada wants, and I didn't write with the idea that I was ending the argument, but I do think that what I wrote is highly relevant to Captain's concerns. What you mean by "actual free will" is the free will that might seem to be excluded if the universe is "deterministic." I'm sure that's what Captain has in mind, too. You merely assume that it is categorically different from the kind of free will that I talked about. If your assumption is true, then I'm not talking about "actual free will," but how do you know that it is true? How do you so easily accept that there are two kinds of free will? The fact that I am more free typing this letter than if I were being forced to type it at gunpoint should be giving you a problem: Either there are two kinds of free will, or facts like these are evidence of the only thing that "free will" could refer to.
There's no third way, no saying that I am merely deceived about the difference between my present situation and the situation of being forced to type at gunpoint. Here, I'll prove it. Consider a gunman who doesn't want me to stop typing until I'm finished, else he'll shoot me. Since that gunman is not here, I just got up and stretched before I began typing this sentence.
So there are two ways, and either way, you've got a problem. You can say that I didn't talk about determinism and so forth, but you've still got a problem. I'm not evading. I've just chosen to begin with this problem.
Unfortunately, I don't have time tonight to continue or to reply to Captain Canada.
hockeywings
01-25-02, 04:29 PM
I hope i am correct in assuming that the freewill issue captain was mentioning was the deterministic v. free will issue and not the one you were providing, else this is a big waste of time lol. I'm aware of what Captain Canada wants, and I didn't write with the idea that I was ending the argument, but I do think that what I wrote is highly relevant to Captain's concerns. What you mean by "actual free will" is the free will that might seem to be excluded if the universe is "deterministic." I'm sure that's what Captain has in mind, too. You merely assume that it is categorically different from the kind of free will that I talked about. Well i guess what i will say is that if he is arguing the deterministic v. free will issue your concept of free will would be irrevelent. if it is adeterministic world then you only have the concept of having your "free will" and if it is that we have as i put it "actual free will" then you have it. See how in both cases you can seem to have your "free will"?If your assumption is true, then I'm not talking about "actual free will," but how do you know that it is true? How do you so easily accept that there are two kinds of free will? The fact that I am more free typing this letter than if I were being forced to type it at gunpoint should be giving you a problem: Either there are two kinds of free will, or facts like these are evidence of the only thing that "free will" could refer to.
Well free will as in free will v. deterministic refers to whether or not you ACTUALLY have free will in your decisions and they are not influenced by previous causes and the free will you refer to is whether or not a present cause is affecting you or not, it isnt attending the issue of whether or not past causes are the reason for present situations and will be forever, you gunman may be gone tomarrow but if you were talking about the deterministic v. free will issue there would be millions of previous causes, and i am COMPLETELY UNDERESTIMATING lol. Hope that answers that. There's no third way, no saying that I am merely deceived about the difference between my present situation and the situation of being forced to type at gunpoint. Here, I'll prove it. Consider a gunman who doesn't want me to stop typing until I'm finished, else he'll shoot me. Since that gunman is not here, I just got up and stretched before I began typing this sentence. I dont understand what you mean, maybe i inadvertantly answered it up top, but if i didnt then please restate it more clearly. So there are two ways, and either way, you've got a problem. You can say that I didn't talk about determinism and so forth, but you've still got a problem. I'm not evading. I've just chosen to begin with this problem. But with starting with this you are assuming that you have free will in the free will v. deterministic sence, which I beleive is what captain is arguing.
Hockeywings,
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Well i guess what i will say is that if he is arguing the deterministic v. free will issue your concept of free will would be irrevelent. if it is adeterministic world then you only have the concept of having your "free will" and if it is that we have as i put it "actual free will" then you have it. See how in both cases you can seem to have your "free will"?
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If you can't describe or characterize "actual free will," your statements are meaningless; you might as well substitute "zubnix" or any other meaningless word for it. The same goes for "non-deterministic world." No, of course I don't see how one can seem to have free will in "both cases," because I don't necessarily see that there are two cases, and even if I did see it, this would not necessarily show me that in the non-deterministic case I would have free will or even seem to have it. I suppose, a non-deterministic world is something like this: A world in which at least some events are uncaused or only partially caused. I think I might __not__ have free will in such a world, since perhaps I would not be the cause of my actions. On the other hand, if all events are caused, then I probably am the cause of my actions, even if I myself am caused. So free will seems to be compatible with causation, not incompatible.
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Well free will as in free will v. deterministic refers to whether or not you ACTUALLY have free will in your decisions and they are not influenced by previous causes and the free will you refer to is whether or not a present cause is affecting you or not, it isnt attending the issue of whether or not past causes are the reason for present situations and will be forever, you gunman may be gone tomarrow but if you were talking about the deterministic v. free will issue there would be millions of previous causes, and i am COMPLETELY UNDERESTIMATING lol. Hope that answers that.
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It is absolute nonsense to suggest that if my actions were not influenced by previous causes, this would correspond to my having free will. For example, suppose that the gunman is here, but this has no effect on my decision to get up and stretch. I would not be deciding whether to be shot. Since it does have an effect, I am deciding. If you don't think that example is fair, make one up that is. Show me how I would be more free if my actions were not influenced by previous causes.
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I dont understand what you mean, maybe i inadvertantly answered it up top, but if i didnt then please restate it more clearly.
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I had said that either (1) there are two kinds of free will, the kind I was talking about, and your "actual free will," or (2) the things I was talking about, such as in the example of the gunman, constitute evidence for free will. Then I said, "There is no third way..." The third way would be (3); I am not more free when the gunman is absent; I only think I am. Obviously that's not true; it's much easier for me to get up and stretch if no one is threatening to kill me if I do. If you say I'm not, since my getting up and stretching would have "previous causes," I reply that that's already covered by (1). In other words, (3) is just (1) in disguise, so there's "no third way." Of course, you can say that the free will in (2) is not free will, but then you'll be saying that "free will" has no meaning whatever, not even my meaning; which would mean you were talking about absolutely nothing; you might as well be talking about "zubnix."
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But with starting with this you are assuming that you have free will in the free will v. deterministic sence, which I beleive is what captain is arguing.
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Nope. I'm offering evidence that I have free will. You're the one making an assumption; you're assuming that "actual free will" means something. I don't think you can characterize it. I don't think you can show that if the world were non-deterministic, this would give you something that sensibly deserves the name "actual free will." The free will that I'm talking about is the only one on the table. If it's the only conceivable free will, it deserves the name "actual free will."
Imahamster
01-26-02, 06:59 PM
Suppose that “free will” contributes to a person’s actions. Now videotape the person. As you play back the video you might think, “This person has no free will. No matter what he thinks he can’t change the outcome on that videotape.” Yet the videotape has captured that person’s “free will” in action. Each taped event represents the choice that person made. Viewing the universe as a videotape that may be played and replayed doesn’t change that the events portrayed represent a person’s free will in action.
In a deterministic world one might predict a planet’s orbit or might predict the “free choice” a person will make. That prediction doesn’t change that the choice itself was free. With more and more information predictions might become better and better. In the limit one might feel that one could predict with total certainty a person’s actions. (That is, more information leads to better predictions that seem to reduce that person’s choices until in the extreme limit there is no choice.) All one has accomplished is understanding a person so well that they are predicting where that person’s “free will” takes them. It does not mean the person isn’t exercising free will.
People’s choices are constrained. At times very constrained. And different people have different constraints. A great runner may choose to run a four-minute mile. This hamster can’t choose to run that fast. (Law recognizes that different circumstances and mental states affect one’s freedom to choose.) But having little choice is not the same as having no choice.
Understanding leads to awareness of many actions one might take. Free will is the selection of one path from many.
In this hamster’s opinion “Free will” responds to and interacts with its external and internal environment. It is not independent of environment and is not determined by environment. “Free will” is the surfer riding the wave.
The mechanical model that gives rise to a deterministic universe does not seem to match with modern physics. Non-linear “butterfly” effects mean even small initial differences may lead to vastly different outcomes. More information may not significantly aid one’s ability to predict. The “limit case” of predicting everything may not exist.
At the quantum level determinism disappears. Chance rules. The emission of an individual photon is a random event. Only in the aggregation of many such events does “determinism” appear. Yet such macroscopic “determinism” is only highly probable, not certain. Add the “butterfly” effect on top of this quantum uncertainty and the universe is far from predictable. Replaying the universe could lead to very different outcomes.
Scientists may someday map out a process of “free will”. Perhaps observe it in action, measure it as varying brain waves, or even simulate it on a computer. Understanding how or why a choice is made does not mean a choice wasn’t made. “Free will” still typed this sentence.
(In case this hamster's meanderings aren't clear, to the extent that this hamster understands Bagman’s explanations, this hamster agrees with his presentation of “free will”.)
From hockywings'
I have come to beleive that there is a less likely possibility of such a thing as chance. Chance is defined as The unknown and unpredictable element in happenings that seems to have no assignable cause.
to a discussion of 'freedom of choice' i.e. 'free will'.
Oh well. I've ignored my clattering bladder long enough and since I'm not
yet wearing Pampers, I'll head for the toilet.
Take care ;)
Imahamster,
Your videotape analogy is pretty good, but you need to make some argument about the nature of causation, since predicting and forcing are two different things. Those who say that causation precludes free will probably unwittingly assume that causation is a phenomenon of some kind, like gravity, electromagnetism, or even far less well measured phenomena, such as the behavior of Mr. Gomez who lives down the street. We can have theories of all these things. We can't have theories of causation, so far as I know; i.e., we can't have theories of it as a phenomenon.
Captain Canada,
I apologize for replying to the shorter messages of others before replying to your longer and earlier message. I'm getting to you.
Captain Canada,
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My first suggestion was that 'free will' and 'responsibility' are necessary concepts for society to function. I suggest that without 'free will' 'responsibility' has little meaning, and that consequently society is no longer able to function.
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That's true, but it's only important if "free will" is a fiction. However, if you think they are fictions, you shouldn't take it as obvious that they are necessary for society to function. Don't you find it surprising that a fiction would be __necessary__?
The question of moral responsibility is far too narrow. If I can't hold you simply responsible for your acts (including your speech acts), we can't make any kind of sense at all. E.g., if you say you think it will rain tonight, I can't say, "Captain C. thinks it will rain tonight," because this would be holding you responsible for the statement. I'm not, just yet, speaking to the question of whether distant causes forced you to make the statement; I'm merely pointing out that you are responsible for it in the simple sense that you made considerations that led you to it; this is true regardless of whether you were forced to make the considerations. Similarly, if you steal or refrain from stealing it, you made moral considerations, and this is what we mean when we say that you are morally responsible.
I wondered if you were singling out moral responsibility because it involves punishment. If so, I say that makes no sense, because there is no relevant difference between punishment and any treatment I might give you, e.g., grading your ability to predict rain. Any treatment I give you would affect you, and that's what's crucial; if I can't punish you, I can't do anything else to you, either; I can't even __say__ that you predicted rain, not because I would be "blaming" you for predicting it, but because I would be holding you responsible in any sense at all.
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If I understand correctly you first argue that 'free will' is not necessary for society to function. This is because we can have a sensible understanding of freedom that does not depend upon the assumption of 'complete freedom', but rather in degrees of freedom. The very fact that we can speak of degrees of freedom proves that freedom must exist.
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No, I don't argue that your version of free will is not necessary for society to function, because I don't even accept that your version is free will. Similarly, I would not argue that "zubnix" is or is not necessary for society to function, unless I knew what zubnix was. You can't assume that we do or do not have "complete freedom," or "actual free will," unless you know what those phrases mean, but I don't think you do, if you say that your being caused precludes free will. If you were not caused, how would this make you free? Your actions would be senseless, and you yourself would not understand them or will them; they would be absolutely unpredictable, because there could be no theory to account for them, not even a vague, weak theory. If you were to say, "I'm going to buy some milk," I would have no reason to believe you, no reason to think that buying milk was even slightly more likely than any other action.
You might say, "You're only showing that there's no free will, which is what I suggested in the first place." But that would be wrong, unless by "free will" you meant something that would exist in the senseless world I just described; it would be a technical term having nothing to do with anything that anyone understands by "free will." The fact that you connect free will with moral responsibility shows that you don't mean that, because that world would be incompatible with all responsibility, not just the moral kind.
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My problem is with the concept of 'free will' which I still don't understand. You did your best to explain it to me, but I'm still confused.
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It means that you are free to make considerations determining your actions in the same sense as a computer is free to compute, a wheel is free to roll, and so forth. A computer may or may not be free to compute; I can unplug it, I can foul it up in various ways. A wheel may or may not be free to roll; I can place a block in front of it. Similarly, I can give you drugs, I can hold you at gunpoint, and so forth.
This is the only thing that "free will" could mean. It is not in any way inferior to that other, senseless "free will," because that other does not make sense. Unless you can make it make sense, you have no basis on which to say that it's the "actual free will" which, alas, we do not have.
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I would say to this:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
Of course we have further, perhaps infinte causal chains which go further back, but for the moment we'll stick to the basic cause.
But why is (1) less of a free choice than (2)? This is what I want to know. They were both caused by something you had no control over. Let's even assume that (2) occurred whil I was awake. What is the difference? Regardless of why I struck her there would be a cause and ultimately one which had nothing to do with me. Now if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on?
Of course I understand that most people will view (1) as less free than (2), but why? Essentially, what is this freedom you speak of?
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I didn't say that (1) is less a free choice than (2). I said that striking your wife (2) while you are asleep is not a free choice, since it is not made in consideration of striking your wife; you were not free to decide whether to strike her. Actually, (1) is freer than (2), since the choice in (1) is made in consideration of being shot, which is freer than not having a choice at all. In (2), you don't choose whether to strike your wife; you know nothing about the problem.
The reason we should "draw a line under cause 1" is that has more to do with you in particular than the more distant 2,3,4. A nearby cause forces you more than a distant cause does. Distant causes are responsible for lots of things, but there are nearby causes that are more specifically responsible for you. That's the only difference I know of. A cause is no less a cause for being near.
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I suspect that you must mean choice. But what does this mean? To do otherwise? Thus far, no one has. So if we look at the empirical evidence, we have absolutley no basis for believing in choice as the ability to do otherwise. If we cannot do otherwise, ever, then what does freedom possibly mean?
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Do I understand this correctly? You seem to be saying that a person only has free will if he does other than what he does. That's a contradiction, so you're saying that free will does not exist unless a contradiction is true. I think you're trying to say that free will implies a contradiction.
All right, then. (1) How does free will imply that a person is doing other than what he is doing? (2) How does the fact that a person is doing whatever he is doing constitute "empirical evidence" for lack of free will? The fact that a person does whatever he does can not be empirical evidence for anything, and there's no such thing as empirical evidence for a logical implication, anyway.
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To recap:
(1) Your action is caused by the threat of being shot.
(2) Your action is caused by a dream.
So
if we accept that everything is cause and effect, why should we draw a line under cause 1 rather than 2, 3, 4, and so on (why should we say the closer the proximate cause, the more freedom you had)?
But if we could not do otherwise in either case, why should we say we were more free in one example than the other?
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Ah, when you say 1,2,3,4, are you talking about (1) shot, (2) dream? If so, I didn't realize this. But you misunderstood me as saying that (2) involved more free choice than (1), and now you're understanding the reverse, in the same message. So maybe your 1,2,3,4 do not refer to (1), (2).
It is not true that "we could not do otherwise." When we say, e.g., that we could have either spaghetti or steak for dinner, we only mean that it makes sense to speak of these possibilities, e.g., because both are on hand, and that we can deliberate on the question, because we have minds, and we know that we deliberate. These are facts. "Could" does not refer to any real eating of steak in the case where spaghetti is eaten. You seem to be confused about this when you say that a person does not have free will unless he does other than what he does, i.e., unless a contradiction is true.
The fact that you misunderstand "could" does not mean that you're wrong about free will, but it does impact your argument, because it leaves you without a way to say "we could not do otherwise." When we say that something could not happen, we mean that we know of reasons why it could not happen. We do not know of reasons why we could not choose (say) spaghetti for dinner - it happens every day that people choose spaghetti, and besides, we have some.
Of course, you say that there is no choice; one or the other has been ordained from the beginning of the world. That may be true, but it does not mean that you have no choice, because clearly the alternatives of steak and spaghetti are on hand, and clearly you perform some calculation that results in one or the other. Suppose you say, "I think I'll have spaghetti," and you proceed to cook and eat it. Now someone comes along and says, "Captain C. did not choose spaghetti." What would that mean, except a falsehood?
Certainly your parents didn't choose it so many years ago. Certainly the inventor of spaghetti didn't choose it. As for inanimate causes, they don't choose; "choose" means what a person does, and you did it.
I agree that spaghetti may have been inevitable from the beginning of the world, but I do not agree that this means you don't have free will, because "free will" does not mean something that is uncaused. As I argued earlier, if your actions were not caused, they would make no sense at all, so you can't set up "free will" as something that you would have in that case, unless you're using it as a technical term for something bearing no resemblance to the normal understanding. You yourself have made moral responsibility contingent on free will, so you've shown that you assume the normal understanding. If your actions were not caused, moral responsibility would make no sense at all.
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I don't want to confuse the issue further so I will limit myself to this for now, but if there's any specific argument of yours you'd like me to respond to let me know.
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I think I've given you a lot to work on in this message.
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