Self and personal identity

[pharmakon]

What can personal identity consist in if there is no self?

This problem posed by this question may have been one reason for positing a self (or a unitary, enduring essence within us). The problem in doing so is that should such an entity exist, we are unable to locate it. We can neither be any one of our parts - brain, heart, etc. - nor their sum, for there is nothing enduring (from the atomic level up) about any bit of us. No one unit of us is essential to our existence (thanks to modern medicine, even people without functional brains or hearts can be kept alive for quite some time). Any attempt to equate the self with the whole runs into the Paradox of the Heap - when we start subtracting from the whole, shouldn't the self cease to exist (e.g. if the self = the whole, the self not = the whole - an arm)? Since there is no unitary, enduring essential nature to us, we must - at very least - discard this definition of self.

However, recent work in metaphysics and phenomenology has provided interesting alternatives for how to conceive of personal identity without a self as defined above. In the former, philosophers like JJC Smart have proposed person-stages. Using this definiton we can consider people (indeed, any object) to be the sum of their three spatial dimensions extended through time. Phenomenologists - and other recent Continental philosophers - have a multitude of ways to think of people. Generally, however, most conceptions rely on a notion of "the fold." As I understand it, this is a nonstatic, malleable entity we create within ourselves (a construct of the mind, perhaps). This could also be considered the origin or seat of personality, an integral part of our being-in-the-world (to borrow from Heidegger).

Do such notions of personal identity resolve the initial difficulty (outlined above)? Can cognitive science offer any insight on these problems and their origins? To both of these questions my first response would be no. We are still left with a fundamental metaphysical and epistemological issue that science may be incapable of disspelling and that philosophy has not, to my mind, satisfactorily addressed.

Any comments or suggestions for further reading would be much appreciated.

[AndersHermansson]

Whats your point?

[pharmakon]

My point is to generate discussion on self and personal identity. To do so, I asked what I see as relevant questions: what can personal identity consist in if there is no self? do recent notions of personal identity resolve this difficulty? can cognitive science offer any insight on the problems I've outlined? Furthermore, are the details I mention correct? Do they support the conclusions I've reached?

[AndersHermansson]

Well I don't think there's any question that our self is a product of our physical body. :)

[pharmakon]

So you're defining self = the physical body. In other words, the physical body is what gives us our personal identity, right? But from year to year, day to day, and even instant to instant, the (atomic hence overall) composition of our body changes. Thus, by your definition, the self that started writing this reply not = the self writing this sentence. Because I see no reason for "believing" in the self, I offered alternative formulations for personal identity that didn't rely on it. If we claim that only the self can provide us with a stable, enduring identity, the above should make it clear that we have neither.

[AndersHermansson]

You need to understand that it is not the atoms or molecules one by one that produces your self. But the whole collection of molecules is patterned in such a way that you is created. It doesn't require the exact same molecules, only identical molecules to make up the same pattern. Take the strawberry for example. There are lots of strawberries. They are not all made by the exact same molecules, only other molecules patterned in a nearly identical way. They all taste strawberry! :)

So when you piss, shit, breathe or secrete the molecules that make you, others just like them will take their place. :D

[pharmakon]

You need to understand that it is not the atoms or molecules one by one that produces your self.

So you're denying that the whole = the sum of its parts. While I acknowledge that the whole can take on different functions than those of the individual parts, that gives us no reason to believe we are anything more than the bits of matter we are made up of.

Take the strawberry for example. There are lots of strawberries. They are not all made by the exact same molecules, only other molecules patterned in a nearly identical way. They all taste strawberry!

Of course all strawberries aren't exactly the same. What they have in common - an ester (a particular molecule) whose name I forget - is what allows us to identify their taste as strawberry. This is the essential part of the strawberry that gives it its identity (in terms of taste). Yet this molecule is composed of atoms and electrons that change over time. Unless we have reason to believe that the strawberry has some essential nature - other than the molecules that make it up - we have no reason to assert that a strawberry in front of us at one minute is exactly the same one as the one in front of us five minutes from now (the problem of locating a self - or unitary, enduring, essential nature - is why I suggest we adopt a different way of talking about identity).

But the whole collection of molecules is patterned in such a way that you is created. It doesn't require the exact same molecules, only identical molecules to make up the same pattern.

So when you piss, shit, breathe or secrete the molecules that make you, others just like them will take their place.

How can we talk about an overall pattern if growth or change are to be possible? In neither of those cases do we have identical molecules forming the same thing that was there before, but instead something that is different both microscopically and macroscopically.

Again, what part of us that gives us a self (or unitary, enduring, essential nature)? Just like finding a soul - if we indeed have one - the problem of locating a self seems to me insoluble. Therefore we must use methods like those I outlined in my first post to make sense of what identity consists in without a self.

[pharmakon]

Have I said anything incorrect in my above posts? If anyone disagrees or spots a problem, let me know!

[DefSkeptic]

But from year to year, day to day, and even instant to instant, the (atomic hence overall) composition of our body changes.

Yes this is true, but the genetic composition of an individual will persist. You can say we are not the same as when we were infants, which would be true in one sense, and false in another. Our molecular composition will change dramatically, but our genetic composition will remain the same. This is what I would consider our "self identity"

[Allahs_Mathematics]

First a little theory of Self :

Self is nothing more than an illusionairy (not outside our minds except as a physical being) identity concept created by our consciousness . Self is not necesarry to be alive if we speak of mental self (consciousness created identity) , physical self is the only necesarry thing to define self in the first place . Changing of the cells doesnt matter as the physical self remaines within the same structure .

I think a good understanding of self is what seperates man from his future existence (epistemological God) , followed by the acting intenioned from his self controlling his physical self in unphysical ways (ontologic God) , think of warping yourself around in space (lol) .


(the problem of locating a self - or unitary, enduring, essential nature - is why I suggest we adopt a different way of talking about identity).


Self can be located but on different levels . Mentally self is where my consciousness is , Physically self is where I as a living creature am . This can be brought back to an ontological and epistemological self . Identity is simply the synonim for all bullshit we make up to belong together . As our concept of it differs (forget-learn etc) , identity differs as well . Identity starts and ends with the mind (conscious or not) , it is about recognition of matters .


How can we talk about an overall pattern if growth or change are to be possible? In neither of those cases do we have identical molecules forming the same thing that was there before, but instead something that is different both microscopically and macroscopically.


But the overal pattern is only relevant in matters where we are able to identify . For instance , man has wooden leg I dont see it I assume normal leg I identify normal man .


Again, what part of us that gives us a self (or unitary, enduring, essential nature)?


Our mind


Just like finding a soul


I never believed in a soul untill I disconnected the confusion of mental souls or spiritual souls : Id say the soul is nothing more than whatever makes us live . If its alive it has sould , it is sould that makes it be alive .


Yes this is true, but the genetic composition of an individual will persist. You can say we are not the same as when we were infants, which would be true in one sense, and false in another. Our molecular composition will change dramatically, but our genetic composition will remain the same. This is what I would consider our "self identity"


I would consider that just our physical self

[proteus42]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by pharmakon
What can personal identity consist in if there is no self?


However, recent work in metaphysics and phenomenology has provided interesting alternatives for how to conceive of personal identity without a self as defined above. In the former, philosophers like JJC Smart have proposed person-stages. Using this definiton we can consider people (indeed, any object) to be the sum of their three spatial dimensions extended through time.


Isn't this solution begging the question? In other words, how do you collect those person-parts that together make a particular self's "four dimensional" body without already knowing the answer? My left arm and the right ear of my neighbor's dog can also be summed up though they won't give you an object after all. It seems to me that you have to possess the knowledge of what it is for something to be a person to even start the process Smart describes...

[sparkle]

The self is in my opinion the point where the sensual impressions of all organs meet. Therefore, possibly animals and plants may have a “self”. When a wolf spots prey he refers to it as in relation to SELF (where the smell, optical, tactile, etc. impressions meet). He will “calculate” the distance to run, to jump in relation to his SELF, he may anticipate it’s taste on his tongue and not of the tongue of his pack mate.

The identity, that is connected to the mind (see Allahs Mathematics above) is more feeble. It depends on the mental image we have of ourselves. In that sense I would doubt that animals (don’t dare to mention plants here) have a personal identity to the same degree as humans. For my wolf in the example above the identity would refer to his standing in the pack. Alpha? Underdog?

The self is in my opinion more stable than the identity.

[pharmakon]

Just wanted to clarify what I've said earlier. Firstly, if you don't accept the definition of a self as a unitary, enduring essence, then I have no quarrel with you. My point was to demonstrate that this definition - which often is/was assumed in discussions of personal identity - is inadequate.

I must admit, my bias in the discussion of the self is towards the Zen Buddhist assertion that there is none. Indeed, the simplicity of their argument is amazing: if there is a self (a unitary, enduring essence), we should be able to find it. Considering everything I've said in previous posts, it seems obvious to me that we cannot (both the mind and physical body change over time, so there is nothing unitary, enduring, or essential about them). Therefore in order for us to make sense of our identity through time, we must adopt a different method than attributing it to the self.

Any ideas?

-----------------

In a related but tangential matter, what do you all think is more important, useful, etc. to philosophy: clarity and logical arguments or linguistic devices like metaphors? I think using both is the best solution, as each on its own is limited (in some way) in its ability to get us to any kind of truth.

[proteus42]

Originally posted by pharmakon

I must admit, my bias in the discussion of the self is towards the Zen Buddhist assertion that there is none. Indeed, the simplicity of their argument is amazing: if there is a self (a unitary, enduring essence), we should be able to find it. Considering everything I've said in previous posts, it seems obvious to me that we cannot (both the mind and physical body change over time, so there is nothing unitary, enduring, or essential about them). Therefore in order for us to make sense of our identity through time, we must adopt a different method than attributing it to the self.

Any ideas?


I'm not completely convinced by the argument as it is stated. After all, it's possible that the self is the thing that does the seeking, and the eye can't see itself directly, can it? The visual field normally doesn't contain the seer, but it would be obviously wrong to jump to the conclusion that, because of this, there is none.

Identity. You know the story of Theseus' ship? During the long years at sea each and every part of its had to be changed one by one because they lost functionality one after the other. Still the ship's identity remained intact. It was still Theseus' ship. In my opinion, partially overlapping stages could do the work in the case of the self, too. It is not necessary that you have anything common with your 3-year-old self; what is important is for your close time-slices to have enough overlapping (say, your self at the 3rd year and your self at the 3rd year + 1 week). In such a chain there is nothing in any stage you could attribute your identity to, because it's in the structure of the chain itself.

[pharmakon]

I'm not completely convinced by the argument as it is stated. After all, it's possible that the self is the thing that does the seeking, and the eye can't see itself directly, can it? The visual field normally doesn't contain the seer, but it would be obviously wrong to jump to the conclusion that, because of this, there is none.

All that does the seeking is some mental process we call thought. This occurs in a "conscious realm" that is made possible by some physical processes that are as yet not completely understood. While conscious is certainly enduring, it need not be unitary (schizophrenia, split-brain people, etc.) or essential (people who aren't conscious in the normal sense of the word - e.g. those in a vegetative state or coma - can certainly survive for long periods without it).

With respect to the physical body, we are capable of seeing just about any (exterior) aspect of it via mirrors, photos, etc. None of the parts, nor the whole person, is at once unitary, enduring (doesn't change through time), and essential (necessary for existence). For example, normally we would say that a person who loses a finger is still the same person. What if they lose two fingers? Their arms and legs? Taking this analysis to its fullest extent, we ask, what part is essential to the whole?

You know the story of Theseus' ship?

Yup. Nice story, but it doesn't quite solve the problem.

During the long years at sea each and every part of its had to be changed one by one because they lost functionality one after the other. Still the ship's identity remained intact.

As I see it, the issue here is does our language correspond to the real world? In other words, the fact that the name "Theseus' ship" doesn't change over time tells us nothing about what is actually going on with the physical object so designated.

In my opinion, partially overlapping stages could do the work in the case of the self, too. It is not necessary that you have anything common with your 3-year-old self; what is important is for your close time-slices to have enough overlapping. In such a chain there is nothing in any stage you could attribute your identity to, because it's in the structure of the chain itself.

This sounds a lot like Smart's conception I outlined in my first post. Didn't you reject that approach? For my part, I think both it and your idea are good ways to think about identity. I just disagree that it necessitates the existence of the self as defined earlier.

P.S. I have neglected to reply to some of those who have replied to my original post because I think it is clear that we would just be talking past each other. Again, if you don't accept my definition of self, we have no reason to argue. If you do, and think I've missed something in my analysis, point it out to me.

[proteus42]

Originally posted by pharmakon

In my opinion, partially overlapping stages could do the work in the case of the self, too. It is not necessary that you have anything common with your 3-year-old self; what is important is for your close time-slices to have enough overlapping. In such a chain there is nothing in any stage you could attribute your identity to, because it's in the structure of the chain itself.


This sounds a lot like Smart's conception I outlined in my first post. Didn't you reject that approach? For my part, I think both it and your idea are good ways to think about identity. I just disagree that it necessitates a self.



I've been thinking about it and now I think it won't work either.

What we wanted to do was to explain personal identity. Partially overlapping stages seemed to do the work, but then the next obvious question in any particular case is, what are they partially overlapping stages of? In other words, how can we individuate those stages to which we wanted to reduce the identity of a person? Obviously, there is no identifying them without saying first, whose stages they are. This is a general problem in trying to identify a whole mereologically on the basis of parts. Not just any parts will do, that's the problem. They must be precisely those parts that make up the whole in question. But how do you single out the parts of a whole without referring to the whole itself? (For example, some of my stages added to some of your stages won't give you a person.)
The notion of "part" is conceptually dependent on a whole which it is part of. Disregarding this fact would populate the universe with such ghostly entites as my left ear plus the Eiffel tower and a particular rock on the Moon. These do belong to one set, but don't define one entity.

Unfortunately I don't know what Smart has to say about this difficulty. Maybe he has some way out...

[One]

Lets look at it this way... Nothing, "alive" or non-living can physically exist in 3-space alone. It is impossible to observe the present, only the past. Therefore ones self and ones "reality" is DEFINED by interaction and change via time. You "are" what you've done, as remembered by the Collective. Trying to say which stages of change define our existance is like trying to say which waves define the ocean. They all do together.

[Clockwood]

Technically nobody is exactly the same person two days in a row. Events you witness change your outlook on life and personality one bit at a time. You may notice in a class reunion everybody you used to know will act and sound completely different. Sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. The change is much more notable after someone comes back from a war.

[sparkle]

@pharmakon

Just out of interest: Could you please give me an example on a practical application of your definition? Say: one of your friends, relatives lies in a coma, is artificially kept alive... What would be the consequences, if the course of further action depended on you?

greetings
sparkle

[lukerocongo]

how any of you can even consider writing about personal identity without referencing any of the literature on the subject is astonishing to me. It's all very well for you to posit vague quasi-theories about 'the self is a product of the physical body' and so on, but surely you are rather held back by what appears to be a dearth of knowledge on the subject?

Or perhaps I have understood nothing?

[pharmakon]

Been awhile since I've checked on this string...

proteus42 - glad to have you on board. Notions of memory, persistence, and survival may be adequate to explain personal identity without a self. A holistic - as opposed to reductionist - account would prima facie solve the difficulty (i.e. equate identity with the biological organism that changes over time). We can always take the pragmatists way out and assert that while personal identity may not make sense metaphysically, it is nonetheless a useful notion (and therefore should be used regardless of its ontological difficulties).

One - are you saying things only exist if they exist through time and that our reality is really just a composition of our memories? That would mean we're only what we think we are at a given moment, which is in fact the sum of our past experiences. So you equate our present existence with our entire past, concluding that those two together comprise our existence. But if they're equal, there's no way we could discern one from the other, meaning we couldn't make sense of our existence.

Clockwood - are you saying you agree with the no-self doctrine?

Sparkle - the practical consequences of no-self are, at first glance, devastating. There's no way we can make sense of people's change through time. So my friend in a coma would not be the same friend I knew before. Yet for many Buddhists rejection of a unitary, enduring, essential nature is a liberating starting point for freedom from our wordly bullshit.

lukerocongo - my sources are a synthesis of Buddhism's no self-doctrine with recent Western metaphysicians views of personal identity, e.g. Russell, Merleau-Ponty, and Smart. I make no claim to know what I'm talking about. I'm just trying to generate discussion on a matter that interests me.

[Siddhartha]

The self is not the body, for you can say: "My body", or "My arm". The self is the possesor of the body. Similarly it is not the mind, for you can say "My mind." The self is the possesor of the mind.
If it is not the body or the mind, it cannot be the product of body and mind. For you cannot make a flock of sheep out of things which are not sheep.

[sparkle]

Siddharta:
No, you cannot make a flock of sheep out of something which is not sheep. But you can shear the sheep, take the wool, extract fat out of it and sell it as a skin-cream. Lanolin is not sheep, but made of sheep. Sheep are not lanolin, but can become it. However, I don’t think you’d be content with this reply. In relation to self and self-deception one could play around with your example like this: you can make a flock of sheep out of something different if you just give it the name “sheep”. ;)

Pharmakon:
Your reply made me think of one Buddha incarnation – the Praveth… Do you know the story?

[soull]

hello! all..have been pursuing this thread with active interest and seems like some people have given the issue a great deal of thought. it only made me realise yet again that there could be as many meanings associated with the terms identity and self as the no. of people investigating the issue. As someone has already mentioned in the above posts that it becomes important to define the perspective that you are looking from. my interest in the issue has led me to look at the western notions of self from descartes, kant, locke, hume in the mainstream philosphy to james, piaget, erikson who talked about self and identity in later times. in the east similarly, there have been various perspectives which negate and affirm the exixtence of self and relevance of (concept of)personal identity. the budhist perspective is only one of the many (which negates the existence of any unitary 'Self') on the other hand vedantic philosophy is one which affirms not only the existence of but also outlines ways of reaching what they call the 'true Self'...before i go on yapping with my limited knowledge on the subject let me check if i am still talking english :p
...till next time
..luck!