View Full Version : Free Will
Leibniz claimed to believe in free will while maintaining that everything is predetermined. He said that although our actions are predetermined we take them of our own free will.
Sartre believed that our freedom was not impacted upon by our surroundings, past history, current goals, or anything else. This being so, our actions are not predetermined or predictable. Sartre's notion of free will is such that he believed a person standing on the edge of a cliff, even without any conscious or subconscious motivation to do so, might well decide to jump off.
Merleau-Ponty believed that although we have free will, our previous choices affect the probability of our future choices. If we have been doing one thing for a long period of time, it is improbable that we will suddenly decide to change. This view is a middle ground, holding that although we are always free to do anything and our actions are not predetermined, the probability of our taking certain actions may be predetermined.
Is the future predetermined by the nature of things?
If so, can the future be predicted if all relevant information is available?
If so, does this preclude free will?
It seems only logical that if people are biochemical machines, then they must be predictable, given full knowledge of their components. As distasteful as it is, it seems to me that without the existance of some sort of metaphysical aspect of conciousness such as a soul or essence free will cannot exist.
Leibniz's view on free will seems to cast it mainly as an illusion, we are free to make choices, but its already decided by our nature which choice we will decide to make.
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty's views requires the existance of a random ,"pure conciousness" which seems impossible without appealing to a metaphysical nature.
Fathoms
04-28-03, 01:37 AM
Leibniz takes an unusual approach to the question that I don't agree with. From one angle the philosophy asserts everything is predetermined (an "objective" veiw) in spite of also believing in free will (a "subjective" angle). Either consciousness is fixed or fluid. You may be able to have it both ways, but not in the fashion Leibniz speaks of.
When Satre relates the person on a cliff hypothesis he really gives no explanation for it. Weather or not a person consiously or subconsciously knows they are going to do something does not necessarily mean the action is not predetermined. Predetermined by time, fate, immesurable energy pockets of psyche debris. He also needs to take into account the psychology of human behavior, I feel.
As for the Merleua-Ponty idea of predetermined probability, I think the two terms contradict eachother. Probability is one thing (dealing in likelihoods and chance) while predetermination is unchangeable. In effect, our choices need to be 100% independant of phsyical reality, or they are 0%. For me there is little grey area. Although with enough reasoning I suppose I can be convince of anything.
Is the future predetermined by the nature of things?
Yes. Even if we convinced ourselves we are independant descicion makers and masters of our own destiny this so-called free will still takes place in the context of the human animal. The way we live, the way we experience emotion, the way we reason and all of these things boil down to psychology. The psychology of the human being. One might say we only ask these questions because it is part of our curious nature as mammals.
If so, can the future be predicted if all relevant information is available?
Theoretically yes.
If so, does this preclude free will?
Depends on ones own personal take on the problem, even so I think ultimately everyone on the planet who thinks up these questions is wrong. I'm wrong, you're wrong, everyone is wrong. We're just puppets played upon by chemical and emperical strings. We shouldn't have the slightest clue about what is really going on with reality and existence in general.
It seems only logical that if people are biochemical machines, then they must be predictable, given full knowledge of their components. As distasteful as it is, it seems to me that without the existance of some sort of metaphysical aspect of conciousness such as a soul or essence free will cannot exist.
I agree. But only on following the premise of untraditional concepts of metaphysics and soul-consciousness. The traditional ones still do not eliminate the problem of nature and creation. Same problem, different vehicle.
Leibniz's view on free will seems to cast it mainly as an illusion, we are free to make choices, but its already decided by our nature which choice we will decide to make.
Fortunately, reality is a cosmic and fluid dance of energy. Perhaps our personal concept of what constitutes free will is too narrow. It could be that free will is not something were supposed to understand.
In Everett theory of multiple universes (based on experiments in physics) if you come to a coffee bar and the waiter comes to you asking what you are going to drink (you think a bit: thea or coffee?) and order a coffee, at that moment the universe splits into two separate universes, in one you have a coffee and in the other a thea. So it happens with everything - everything possible happens. You live your existence in (hidden) multiplicity, you have a free will to make the choice but your "many shadows" make the rest (of not chosen alternatives) happen. Biology than does not influence your choices (all happen anyway). You are commanded through your life purely by you will (which can be influenced by others, education, etc). You are free. If Everett is right than Sartre would be right too.
proteus42
04-28-03, 04:23 AM
Originally posted by jps
Is the future predetermined by the nature of things?
Not yet known. According to the theory of relativity, yes. According to quantum mechanics, no. Still debated.
If so, can the future be predicted if all relevant information is available?
Not necessarily, even if we suppose the physical world is deterministic. "Prediction" as a process can still have inherent limits, logical, or other. For example, chaos theory is based on the insights that ideally exact measuring of a physical parameter is not possible (that is, some error is unavoidable), and that there are completely deterministic processes (no probabilities) that can be characterized through such parametric equations that are "infinitely sensitive" to the initial values of the parameters in question: if the same parameter was changed by an infinitesimal quantity, then the system would run on a completely different path in its state space.
When people think about freewill, the usual question that comes to their mind is determinism. But as chaos theory shows, for example, the concept of "prediction" bears just the same great weight in the question.
If so, does this preclude free will?
Phenomenologically we all have free will. That is, we all have the experience of choosing on our own decisions. If this is an illusion, then the question must be answered: how is it possible to have such an illusion?
Some say that at the moment of decision there is no freedom necessarily, we might act completely deterministically. But later, when we look back to the point of decision, we often see that we could have done otherwise. The illusion of free will therefore comes only retrospectively, say these philosophers. They've even found some physiological evidence as to the brain issuing motor commands a few hundred millisecs earlier than consciousness is notified of the decision.
It seems only logical that if people are biochemical machines, then they must be predictable, given full knowledge of their components.
On a conception of "machine", a machine is a completely predictable system. It's highly dubious that such machines can exist in reality (cf. quantum theory, chaos theory above). A weaker statment is that a machine is a deterministic system, that is, its actual state together with the actual inputs completely determine its next state. Strangely enough, general predictability is not possible even in the mathematical realm of abstract machines (see Church's theorem).
[I]t seems to me that without the existance of some sort of metaphysical aspect of conciousness such as a soul or essence free will cannot exist.
There is a more general insight behind yours, I think. And that's that consciousness is essentialy not a physical phenomenon. Not only free will, but consciousness as such implies something more than physical (material) reality.
Originally posted by Fathoms
As for the Merleau-Ponty idea of predetermined probability, I think the two terms contradict eachother. Probability is one thing (dealing in likelihoods and chance) while predetermination is unchangeable. In effect, our choices need to be 100% independant of phsyical reality, or they are 0%. For me there is little grey area. Although with enough reasoning I suppose I can be convince of anything.
I agree with you on Leibniz and Sartre, but I don't think Merleau-Ponty's view claims that anything is predetermined by saying that our past effects us. His view merely corrects Sartre's notion of radical freedom which has serious problems(people are often predictable which would not be the case if actions had no relation to the individuals specific situation) by saying that we do have free will, but if we make certain choices most of the time using that free will, then chances are we'll make those choices again. Going into the future this method of prediction becomes increasingly less accurate as more and more deviations from what is originally viewed as probable occur.
I think ultimately Merleau-Pontys position holds the most water of any argument as to the nature of free will if it exists.
edit:just saw i put "sartres view of rational freedom" when it should have been radical
Originally posted by ProCop
In Everett theory of multiple universes (based on experiments in physics) if you come to a coffee bar and the waiter comes to you asking what you are going to drink (you think a bit: thea or coffee?) and order a coffee, at that moment the universe splits into two separate universes, in one you have a coffee and in the other a thea. So it happens with everything - everything possible happens. You live your existence in (hidden) multiplicity, you have a free will to make the choice but your "many shadows" make the rest (of not chosen alternatives) happen. Biology than does not influence your choices (all happen anyway). You are commanded through your life purely by you will (which can be influenced by others, education, etc). You are free. If Everett is right than Sartre would be right too.
Thats really interesting, it seems that the philosophical question of free will ultimately relys on science for its resolution.
Originally posted by proteus42
Phenomenologically we all have free will. That is, we all have the experience of choosing on our own decisions. If this is an illusion, then the question must be answered: how is it possible to have such an illusion?
I think ultimately the fact that we all have the experience of free will is more important than whether or not it truly exists.
Originally posted by proteus42
Some say that at the moment of decision there is no freedom necessarily, we might act completely deterministically. But later, when we look back to the point of decision, we often see that we could have done otherwise. The illusion of free will therefore comes only retrospectively, say these philosophers. They've even found some physiological evidence as to the brain issuing motor commands a few hundred millisecs earlier than consciousness is notified of the decision. I haven't heard of the physiological evidence you describe. I'm really interested to learn more, do you know of anywhre online i could find it?
Originally posted by proteus42
On a conception of "machine", a machine is a completely predictable system. It's highly dubious that such machines can exist in reality (cf. quantum theory, chaos theory above). A weaker statment is that a machine is a deterministic system, that is, its actual state together with the actual inputs completely determine its next state. Strangely enough, general predictability is not possible even in the mathematical realm of abstract machines (see Church's theorem). I can't really comment on the quantum theory and chaos theory stuff (like the begining of your post) as my ignorance in that area is too great. Its very intersting though.
Originally posted by proteus42
There is a more general insight behind yours, I think. And that's that consciousness is essentialy not a physical phenomenon. Not only free will, but consciousness as such implies something more than physical (material) reality.
Of course the existance of conciousness itself, let alone free will, is debatable. There are those who argue that it is an illusion. If it really exists objectively it clearly cannot be something physical and this allows for the possiblity of free will.
Apologies for a long post - it's a favourite topic and some interesting points have been made here.
Originally posted by jps
Is the future predetermined by the nature of things?
If so, can the future be predicted if all relevant information is available? If so, does this preclude free will?
Nobody knows, yes and yes. (Uncertainty and chaos theory do not mean that the future cannot be predicted or is not strictly determined, just that we can't do it. Mind you one would have to know the current state of the entire cosmos in infinitessimal detail to do it). It seems the general view of science (if there can be said to be one) is that it is detirmined but not predictable. It is also the view of many Eastern philosophies, although they include consciousness as being both cause and caused.
[It seems only logical that if people are biochemical machines, then they must be predictable, given full knowledge of their components. As distasteful as it is, it seems to me that without the existance of some sort of metaphysical aspect of conciousness such as a soul or essence free will cannot exist. [/B]
That's a big IF. Consciousness does not have a non-metaphysical aspect, that's why its existence (or non-existence) cannot be proven by science. The ideas of soul or essence are superfluous here, since consciousness may be sufficient for free will without them, and since consciousness (as distinct from mind) may BE our soul and essence.
Fathoms - Can't see why free will must be all or nothing. IMO a mixture seems most plausible (if it exists at all).
Procop - The multiple universes idea (in the form you take it) suggests that there is no free will, since all outcomes must actually happen.
Proteus - The conclusions drawn from the results of experiments on reaction times you refer to (Libet et al) are inconclusive and still controversial. They don't in themselves indicate anything much about free will.
For what it's worth my guess is that free will exists but that we rarely exercise it, being so caught up in attending to and reacting to the phenomenal world rather than understanding ourselves properly. Pure conjecture of course.
proteus42
04-29-03, 08:58 AM
[QUOTE]Originally posted by jps
I haven't heard of the physiological evidence you describe. I'm really interested to learn more, do you know of anywhre online i could find it?
The most referred to article was written by Libet, Gleason and Wright sometime during the 80s. If you write their names in Google, you'll be likely to get some interesting stuff.
Procop - The multiple universes idea (in the form you take it) suggests that there is no free will, since all outcomes must actually happen.
True. But you live the part you have chosen. You, sitting anywhere where you now sit, have chosen that place. Other yous have chosen theirs. Everything possible happens, but you live only a splinter of it, a splinter you have chosen. It gives you some uniqueness, free will and responsibility.
Hmmm. This seems to mean that we all make every available choice. Doesn't seem much free will in this to me. In fact it's precisely equivalent to making no choice at all, since some 'splinter' of me will make all of them whatever 'I' think I choose to do.
Originally posted by Canute
That's a big IF. Consciousness does not have a non-metaphysical aspect, that's why its existence (or non-existence) cannot be proven by science. The ideas of soul or essence are superfluous here, since consciousness may be sufficient for free will without them, and since consciousness (as distinct from mind) may BE our soul and essence.
Yeah, thats the point I was trying to make. It seems to me fairly common for people to hold the view that there exists nothing outside of the physical world, and at the same time believe that people have free will. This position is contradictory.
Hmmm. This seems to mean that we all make every available choice. Doesn't seem much free will in this to me. In fact it's precisely equivalent to making no choice at all, since some 'splinter' of me will make all of them whatever 'I' think I choose to do.
Is a an alternate universe's you, really you? It seems to me that this splinter is distinct from you even if the only differences is one decision and its aftermath.
OK. Should you mentally be present at all those places your splinters reside in then it is deterministic: no choice. But you live only your part. You chose the thea, and the thea is it. The splinter has the coffee. You made your choice, he made his. You never meet again. You really live in the "choice world" with free will as an attribute of your existence. The "choiceless world" of all your splinters "together" is principally inadmissible to you. I thougth the topic was if humans have free will, if so my answer is YES. Is there a free will outside of the human being (as an attribute of the universe) my answer is NO.
Is a an alternate universe's you, really you? It seems to me that this splinter is distinct from you even if the only differences is one decision and its aftermath.
Sure, after leaving the cofeebar you are two different people. Though, you both have in your pockets identical passports (for a time being...)
So one of me gets coffee, one doesn't, one stays in bed, one goes to a different coffeee shop, one chokes on my doughnut, (the one that decides to have one), and we all end up wondering next day if we freely chose (except the dead one - or perhaps including the dead one). None of these 'me's has preferred status. This me here and now, writing this, didn't have coffee. This me HAD to exist, there had to be one of me that chose no coffee. It was a forced move, not freewill.
I'd rather think that the multiple universes idea refers to potentials, choices that I might have made but didn't. Otherwise ALL possible me's exist and none of them can do a damn thing about it. We're ALL just inevitable splinters by the other view.
PS - It just occured to me that there is a way all the splinters might equally exist. This is if when making choices we divide our consciousness between the alternatives. If, as some argue, we are all part of one cosmic consciousness then that consciousness may have freely chosen to become infinitely divided (since in this case 'I' is infinitely divisible) so as to experience all possible states of independent consciousness. Thus it would feel like we are separate individuals but it would be an illusion since we are all one, and it would seem like our individual choices were illusions, (since we must always choose all available options), but our original decision to choose them all would have been freely made. (Sorry about this - this me chose not to take my medication this morning).
You know the problem for me with parallel universes is the shocking thought that occured to me one night.
I was thinking about loads of parallel's like all possibilitys existing and played out somewhere(like you do,hehehe) and i thought
"what happens if i died right here,would i actually KNOW"
Now this is the interesting thing,see way i see it :
say i dropped dead right now from everyone in this universes perspective im dead right?
ok
but what about MY perspective?
my perspective might be that nothings happened and this is just the way things are and thats it.
So on this angle EVERYBODY may have died billions and billions of times in there life and not known it.
This idea comes to mind when thinking of closeness to equilivent universes,like your concousness could continue relative to you at the next nearest counterpart after death.
For obvious reasons youd not remember death or incidents leading to it,cos the nearest universe to that existance you lead is simply one where that event did not occur,if its not to occur
youd not have memory to it.
What about when you're 90,100 etc?
well you could say thats where the idea falls apart,although as youre dealing with conciousness,memory and parallel universes you can probably mix it back and forth and you still could technically exist.
Its not life after death,as you dont know about it.
Bit metaphysical but interesting all the same.
Life everlasting but not a life that depends on previous choices is what you say. Maybe, but I hope not.
Whats wrong with that?
as i say if thats correct you,yes you and everyone else has already died billions of times already,and your totally unaware,
cos your unaware you dont care.
I think its either this,or when you die you totally cease to exist,which is just as bad,but again youd not know about it.
It might explain deja vu,you done it all before but then youd get it all the time,so that cant be right,what it can be is closeness to an equilivent universe AND THAT IS RARE,deja vu would be very very infrequent,cos itd have to mean that a universe is the same but just one step ahead of you and only your motion different and outtimed to the other one,as you catch up you assume you did something before,you havent,youve not even thought about it,you might not know the place/event,but the memory is that you have,that could be cos its soooooo close on a quantum scale that the two universes are extremely the same but one is slightly behind the other in time sequence.
I don't like to think that we're not able to improve ourselves as we live these billions of lives, and the metaphysics doesn't stack up.
I have elaborated my vision on multiplicity of existence in a thread at General Science here: It is some time ago and the thread is not available any more. The name was "The Elimination of Time" (It was discussed broadly and the conclusion was it is beyond any posibility to prove or disprove. But it is on topic concerning your last entries.)
1) First I must dispose of time as co-existing element of space. Imagine a film box in which a role of film is rolled in. The movie which it contains is made from the beginning to the end and is now printed in plastic and will not change. You cannot see it all at once – but if you follow the tape with a small light (your brain?) all the way through you will experience the movie. You need time for that experience, but the movie itself doesn’t need time. It is ready and done.
2) Imagine a box of some size which is densly filled with miniscule points.They are structured similarly as the cells of my computer screen but they have the third dimension of depth. The box is now a structured quantity of points. These points are capable of taking on different qualities similarly to the computer screen cells which can take on different colors. Imagine the movie from the previous paragraph in 3D version.
3) Translate this image of 3D box to include the Universe.
4) Step yourself into this box en mingle with the points there. In such a way you wil became an actor in this movie. Your body has translated itself into points, and your mind watches (the movie) the Universe from the inside: your are the part of its structure which is made from the points.
5) Points can take on any form possible (in the way the mind experiences them).
6) In Everett Theory the universe splits into two if you get two choices (both happen simultaneously) – I have always had some problems in visualising this in Everetts Model, because it means that there is an infinity(?) of universes along one another. eg. From reading Everet you can conclude that there are on this very moment universes (paralel to ours) where eg. 11 september DIDN'T happen (Everett himself used Kenedy for this instance in his time)... I thought there must be a possibility of a different model which would provide the possibilities to happen without such consumption of space (or dimensions)...and what I am presenting here is an alternative which could also enable different possibilities to happen. When you come to a moment of choice (in the movie) your mind will follow one scenario in the space of points while the same mind will go on at the same place following the second scenario. (You experience only one scenario at the time even though you are playing in both of them. These scenarios are coded differently so that they never mingle: if in a moment of choice: theatre or concert in one scenario you go to the theatre and in other to the concert (and you wil never meet yourself again).
7) The structure of point contains all possibilities of what CAN happen. Points are the vehicle for these happenings and mind experience these happennings.
8) Imagine the movie is a DvD (not analog but digital). You actulaly don`t need the points for your world to happen. There is a sense giving sequence of numbers (a POSSIBLE world). Such sequence of numbers can exist without space and time. There is then a THEORETICAL universe to be experienced as real (in a digital to analoog proces).
9) Generally mind experiences the model as an actual happening and is not an outside observer. But there indeed is some duallity involved in the moments when the mind in the model observers itself. (quite a problem here). DvD player cannot play itself. Mind then would have to exist also in the form of a string too to be able to have a look at itself. Is not likely, and it is also difficult to let this "stream of mindstrings" flow together with the real thing. I that it is better to put some symetry element into the model, in the form of a inversion (mirror) capacity (in strings or in the DvD) which would enable the Mind to look at itself. This should then invert the DvD into strings and strings into DvD for moments of selfreflection Anyway it is unavoidable to confront the moment when observer/scientist observes simultaneosly himself observing himself (an instance of spontainious symetrificacion (in inversion) of the model).
10) Mind organizes the perception of existence. You may agree, that if the universe in which we reside didn't existed at all, a theoretical possibility of it would exist, regardless anything. This theoretical possibility includes all other possible universes and what ever else can be coded in strings and playd on the next generations of DvDs. These strings (possibilities) were not created. Strings have always existed (not in potencial but fully).
11) Problem with incorect strings: would the incorrenct string stop the DvD player with a "fatal error" screen? But if there are errant strings (freedom of Choice) then my model is going to collapse ....because the mind follows the possible structures of the theorethical universe - if it comes againts an errant string it would not know it is ERROR and would make it true and all would colapse (for the mind...) An oponent of this reading said non-readable strings (freedom) are of God, mind wouldn't collapse reading them it would onlly NOT UNDERSTAND them..
12) As to determination (which some readers see in this model) I must recognise it is getting pretty close to it. If I dispose of these "errant" strings, I am disposing of "accident" in my model, and thats bad. But the global picture (of my thesis) is not discredited by this.
Interesting. As I've just been reading something relevant I'll quote it.
"Special Relativity unifies Newtonian space and time into space-time. It does not recognise any special universal 'now' of time. Instead it states that objects consist, not of 3D entities enduring in time, but as 4D world lines existing and extending from the big bang to the big crunch. .... Thus the buildings of imperial Rome still stand - it is just that we cannot see them any more . The buildings of future cities exist - but we cannot see them yet...So if one wants to account for our psychological impression that there is a 'now' in time and moreover that time in some way flows, we must look elsewhere than contemporary physics, whether Newtonian or Relativity, to find it. " ( John Smythies - Journal of Consciousness Studies - this month)
Also the same article quotes Stannard as saying "In four dimensional space time nothing changes, there is no flow of time, everything simply is...It is only in consciousness that we come across the particular time known as 'now'. And Eddington
"Events do not happen, they are just there, and we come across them ..as...the observer on his voyage of exploration". Also many similar views.
It seems you are in good company on the time issue.
On the thing about the observer observing him/herself I think your problem mat be partly down to confusing the observer with the observed. The mind observes the world but it may not (ultimately) observe itself, since (right at the end of the regression of observers) it may be a seperate consciousness that observes mind. In other words a self-referential mind may not account for all self-observation, there may be something outside the system. The DVD player may not have to play itself.
On the thing about the observer observing him/herself I think your problem mat be partly down to confusing the observer with the observed. The mind observes the world but it may not (ultimately) observe itself, since (right at the end of the regression of observers) it may be a seperate consciousness that observes mind. In other words a self-referential mind may not account for all self-observation, there may be something outside the system. The DVD player may not have to play itself.
Stunning idea, really. I was somehow obsessed by urgency of having some total, closed system. I visualised the model like this:
<i>
The universe can be seen as a proces (eg. from the Big Bang to now) or a serie of states ( from the Big Bang to now). In mutiverse universe (a universe of which a copy/next state is slightly different and which exist side by side can lead to the illusion of generall existence of time. But this time, in which happens your movement from the eg. point A to the point B, exists only subjectively for you. You change your position from state to a different state but these states do not move or change - only you do.
(Imagine a big hall full of domino stones(cq "states"), push one and consequently (in a wave) they all fall. The top of the wave of the falling stones is you moving (metaphorically through the "states"). Now the same metaphor. The domino stones do not move/fall but you wave through the hall the same. You are the time. Only you move.) (There are many universes/states.) Time is a form of human percieving the (timeless) states/universe.
</i>
But I got a notion from a friend, that I am not really eliminating time, because I am a part of the universe (I am "time") (And another point was made: such "states model" actually presupposes time - without time what sense the states would have?)
Your point offers a new element. But at this point I cannot say if it will enhance or kill this idea.
Edited: Now I realise that I am getting too far from the original topic. My appology to ips.
I think you've eliminated objective time but kept the subjective variety. This is bang in line with Advaita Buddhism.
"The master keys to all doors of ignorance and confusion is the apperception (mind's perception of itself-OED) that nothing in relativity exists, not even knowledge. There is no creation, no dissolution. Spiritual seekers are lost children in a conceptual forest created by their own imagination."
and
"When 'I' remains in the subjective intemporality of the PRESENCE of each kshana (moment) there is no objective duration in which to experience either pain or pleasure: nirvanah of equinimity prevails. But when the kshanas are horizontally connected into duration the subjective whole-mind gets split into objective temporality, and experience happens to 'me' in this horizontal duration, the time-sequence which is the basis of all objectivization, the samsara." (cycle of lives/existences).
Both from 'The Ultimate Understanding' - Ramesh Balsekar
IMO for the most part western science seems to be busy proving the truth of Buddhist cosmology, in which your subjectivisation of time applies to all phenomena that exist within it. Thus complete mindfulness of being in the moment is intemporality, the escape from the illusion. Makes sense to me, but not so easy to do.
it seems that the philosophical question of free will ultimately relys on science for its resolution
I subscibe to this point of vieuw. Descartes said (paraphrase) 'if a devil was sitting on my nose and was showing the world to my eyes, I wouldn't know...(that I am cheated by my senses),... but I think and therefore I am...'(or something in that sense). I think we are cheated by our senses all right, but the science will show us how the cheat happens and why. (By this I am not closing the posibility that the "knowing" can happen in some other way, e.g. by meditation, fasting or what ever, in "a vision". But such "knowledge is hardly transferable to other people. I see the vision associated with an individual quest, while science is associated with mankind as a whole.)
IMO the idea that science will tell us anything interesting about consciousness comes from making a serious category error. Consciousness lies outside science by any normal definition of science. Hence the general scientific opinion that it is epiphenominal (ie not real).
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