Words in themselves have no meaning on their own.
They are just arbitrary symbols used to represent things and concepts.
We give meaning to words by our usage.
By our common usage we give words common meanings.

By our diverse usage we have problems understanding each other.

These words below have similar meanings, are related terms.

All of them have in common the idea of being a representation of what actually is. All of them try, but which ones are always accurate?

I have listed some of the concepts I try to determine, from the usage by other persons. Not what I mean by the use of the term, but what others mean.
I’m sure my list is not exhaustive, and was interested in seeing what I have missed.

I doubt that we can come to a mutual agreement on any particular meaning, but you never know.


Fact – Human contrivance (sometime true, sometimes false) or Actually exists (always true);

Belief - Always mistaken/uncertain; Sometimes mistaken/uncertain; Always held to be true by the believer?

Truth - Knowable by the mind; only exists in the mind; human contrivance (sometimes true, sometimes false); actually exists?

Reality – knowable by the mind; only exists in the mind; only exists outside the mind; both internal and external to the mind?

Existence – That which is; That which is, was, or will be; Only occurs in the mind; Only occurs outside the mind;

Knowledge – Human contrivance (sometimes true, sometimes false); Accurate awareness of reality;

Understanding – Human contrivance (sometime true, sometimes false); Accurate awareness of reality (always true); Deeper awareness than understanding;

I'd say...

reality: Everything that is. Which excludes past and future. Past and future matter because of their relation to "now", AKA reality, but aren't real at the moment. It includes imagination only as an image (a symbol of chemcial components instead of words) in someone's head, since it should exclude all ideas which "don't have foothold in reality".

Does reality include ideas and events? Do systems which take time to happen exist? I may conflict myself, but I'd say "yes". Even if reality needs to move on the timeline, if they exist, they still have to exist. Processes exist.


Belief: Something which a person accepts without question. It may or may not have evidence behind it, and it may or may not be true. The person who believes something may not even notice it, on some occasions. But the person who believes, accepts something as a basic truth, to get a stable solid something to build their world around.

Aviar Does reality include ideas and events?
I'd say, reality includes the occurrence of the idea, that is the chemical reaction which causes the idea, but the subject of the idea, is not real.

Events are merely material things in movement. All things are transient, therefore in movement.

The only way to truly know reality is to experience it. Others may share facts, or truths about reality, but if I do not experience it, I have knowledge only, and not understanding.
The past was real, the future will be real, both are potentials, one realized and one to be realized.
A series of existences, fulfills a process.

You guys should all read up on what Kant had to say about belief. You are in fact discussing notions of it and what "it" is. There's a copy online somewhere of "Critique of Reason"

I'd say, reality includes the occurrence of the idea, that is the chemical reaction which causes the idea, but the subject of the idea, is not real.

And I would go as far as to say that the chemical reaction is symbol, a foothold, an index for the idea. Just like a word or an image.


My name is Aivar, though. Not Aviar. I don't know why everone makes the same mistake.

what does it matter, your all figments of my imagination anyway. This thread only exists because i now view it:p

Aivar And I would go as far as to say that the chemical reaction is symbol, a foothold, an index for the idea. Just like a word or an image. (Sorry about the spelling.)
I’m having problems understanding this.
Are you saying the idea has an existence external to the mind, and the thought process is a symbol for the idea?

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Vkothii You guys should all read up on what Kant had to say about belief. You are in fact discussing notions of it and what "it" is. There's a copy online somewhere of "Critique of Reason"If you are referring to “Critique of Pure Reason”, been there, done that.

Kant says “If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time as being objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing.”

This is what our friend Jan Arden was trying to express (http://www.sciforums.com/showpost.php?p=1762763&postcount=71).
I believe this says we “know” our thoughts (beliefs) are merely subjective, and have no objective basis.
This is an unconventional position for the meaning of belief
To me what Kant describes as a belief is an opinion.

Kant says an opinion lacks evidence to be sufficient for even a subjective judgment (“Opining is such holding of a judgment as is consciously insufficient, not only objective, but also subjectively.”). If my judgments are based on evidence so weak, I cannot classify them as being as strong as a subjective position. . . . well, what is it that is weaker that a subjective viewpoint? To me, that is a disbelief.

So Vkothii, You are welcome to try to defend Kant’s position, but it is unusual, and easy to raise objections.

(Sorry about the spelling.)
Are you saying the idea has an existence external to the mind, and the thought process is a symbol for the idea?

Yes to that the thought process is a symbol for the idea.

An idea having an existence external to the mind... well... think of the Ancient Greek "realm of ideas". I don't claim we're born from a realm of ideas like they used to, but I would say that ideas and concepts and math all logic is in a sort of unlreal "realm of ideas". It doesn't exist in reality, but... uh... I'm not sure how I should even put this.

Processes and meaningful, systematic events and certain forms have a foothold in reality. I guess you could say I believe ideas are invading reality and giving it meaning. And the chemical processes in our heads, the images and words, are indexes for the ideas we already see in existence and what we may come up with through imagination.

aivar Yes to that the thought process is a symbol for the idea.

An idea having an existence external to the mind... well... think of the Ancient Greek "realm of ideas". I don't claim we're born from a realm of ideas like they used to, but I would say that ideas and concepts and math all logic is in a sort of unlreal "realm of ideas". It doesn't exist in reality, but... uh... I'm not sure how I should even put this.

Processes and meaningful, systematic events and certain forms have a foothold in reality. I’m with you until certain forms. I take it these certain forms exist in the unreal realm of ideas. Reminiscent of Plato’s theory of forms. There exists the ideal form of a perfect bucket, to which all actual buckets are compared to, and judged accordingly. We evaluate how much bucketness a particular (existing) container has. We do not do this in a conscious manner, but how are we to know how good our bucket is, unless there is an ideal to compare it to.
Have I got it correct?

I have found no perfect ideals for the qualities of bucketness, and find that for any use of a bucket, there is a special, unique need, that exhibits subjectivity in its ultimate form. I have found no perfect ideals, not in reality, and not in imagination.


I guess you could say I believe ideas are invading reality and giving it meaning. And the chemical processes in our heads, the images and words, are indexes for the ideas we already see in existence and what we may come up with through imagination.Your ”Ideas invading reality”, taken literally, means these ideas exist outside reality. You might mean it in a different way.
If they exist outside reality. . .well, supernatural?
Once you say something enters (invades) reality. . . do you have some description of this domain outside reality?
How are you aware of it's existence?
How does one know about the unreal?
Are we to trust fully some rational process that sees the possibility, or is there real evidence of the unreal realm?

I’m with you until certain forms. I take it these certain forms exist in the unreal realm of ideas. Reminiscent of Plato’s theory of forms. There exists the ideal form of a perfect bucket, to which all actual buckets are compared to, and judged accordingly. We evaluate how much bucketness a particular (existing) container has. We do not do this in a conscious manner, but how are we to know how good our bucket is, unless there is an ideal to compare it to.
Have I got it correct?

I have found no perfect ideals for the qualities of bucketness, and find that for any use of a bucket, there is a special, unique need, that exhibits subjectivity in its ultimate form. I have found no perfect ideals, not in reality, and not in imagination.

Yes. I still retain that ideal ideas and reality are separate. What we do have is always in reality, real etc. So it's can't be an idea in a pure form. An idea is... an idea.

Your ”Ideas invading reality”, taken literally, means these ideas exist outside reality. You might mean it in a different way.
If they exist outside reality. . .well, supernatural?
Once you say something enters (invades) reality. . . do you have some description of this domain outside reality?
How are you aware of it's existence?
How does one know about the unreal?
Are we to trust fully some rational process that sees the possibility, or is there real evidence of the unreal realm?
Hmm... well... there's the logic of "one plus one is two". I think the logic would still be "there", if there wasn't any reality. The idea takes no room. It could be rediscovered, reapplied, if there's any reality. Only it couldn't apply to anything if there isn't.

I guess I'd say ideas are supernatural, then.

How are we aware of ideas' existence at all? In a lot of ways... I'm not sure we are. Unless we can draw a symbol for them in our heads, and even then it'll be slightly off. But we do have symbols and projections (imperfect forms in the image of the idea) of ideas. Don't we?

A truth is based on facts, a belief is based on myths. Words always have two or more meanings it would seem to me.

Aivar I guess I'd say ideas are supernatural, then.

How are we aware of ideas' existence at all? In a lot of ways... I'm not sure we are. Unless we can draw a symbol for them in our heads, and even then it'll be slightly off. But we do have symbols and projections (imperfect forms in the image of the idea) of ideas. Don't we? I’m not much for the supernatural myself.

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cosmictraveler A truth is based on facts, a belief is based on myths. Words always have two or more meanings it would seem to me.But who gets to decide what is fact, and what is myth, there’s the rub.

Two or more meanings, and then some. The trick is to get the person giving us their attention, to know which way we mean the word in a particular usage.
For example, with some usage, myth can mean a false or mistaken story.
I do not know if you mean beliefs are always mistaken, or maybe sometimes false.

I'm not much for dogmas or accepting things without reason, myself.

But it seems sufficiently likely for me to believe there are pure ideas. The idea can still be in effect, when there's no specific mind which comprehends it (unless you count the "tree doesn't make a sound if noone hears it crash" theory. But I'm not convinced by that, yet). And yet, a pure idea does not exist in reality. It only affects it.

While I haven't thoroughly worked it through or tested it through fire and I don't know if there's a study or a view or a religion to represent/estimate this kind of view, it seems plausible enough for me, for now. Hm. But it may be getting off topic. I should start a new one about this sometime.

My take on Immanuel's discourse, is that he's talking about two kinds of belief, essentially.

One is the kind of epistemological belief we have, because of something (some event) we see. Sunrises, lunar cycles, weather, and so on are in this category. Things we "see" or experience, via our senses, are epistemic. This is "knowledge" we have about the world.

The other kind of belief, is the kind we have about things we are told, but haven't seen ourselves - that aren't part of direct experience. Most people believe that WW1 happened, even though they weren't born then. Those alive, but not living near the Western front, had knowledge of the war, too.

So those are the two different kinds, or ways we believe: direct experiental "knowledge", and conditional, i.e. "requiring affirmation".
I believe there's a structure called the Empire State Building in NY, though I've never seen it, except in pictures. I've never been to NY, but I believe it exists. I believe that whales go to the Southern Ocean during the summer, though I've never been to the Southern Ocean. And so on.

Just the facts ;>)

I think there should be a word that describes things that are “true”, “not false” or “accurate”, simply because society says they are.

Statistic are a very good example. Statistics are often an approximation, or an unknowable variable, but are considered accurate enough to be "true". Babe Ruth hit a certain number of home runs in his career, because we say so. Naturally there is a lot of evidence to support this, but maybe one got missed in the counting, or maybe one got counted twice, but nobody worries about these possibilities. It is considered a true statistic, an accurate reflection of reality.

Countries have certain cities as capitols, because we name them.

A certain county is the leading export of a certain produce, because that is what the books say. The people who keep track of such things, came up with a number, and now it is “true”.

Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade/sea level, because that is the number we came up with.

The Pope is the head of the Catholic Church, because we say he is.

In a particular kind of government or economical system, if the people are happy with these aspects of their life, it will be accepted as true that the government and economic system is “good”. “We have a good government.”, will be accepted as a true statement, in that particular society.

In another country, it may be considered a true statement to say “They have a bad type of government.”.

So the society (however large or small that might be) gets to say what is true about certain things. These may conform to reality, may be an approximation, or may be what is often called an opinion.

In some cases there will be competing societies, who will not recognize these same “truths”.

Certainly we could call these subjective truths, but most societies are offended at calling their subjective truths, subjective. They want to claim their view as the real “truth”, so although subjective truths is descriptive, it would not be well received, because t has an unpopular connotation.

I think a better term, that describes “truths” that are true because a society says so, is the word Facts.

I’m interested in discussing why this is not a good idea, why the word facts should mean something else, or why the meaning "true because society says it is true" is better applied to a different word or term.

Vkothii, and others.

I don't care much for Kant's usage.

I can’t help feeling that: the speaker has truths, whereas their opponent has beliefs.

Other than that, I believe the criteria is the same. And I believe there are many criterea that could be listed, that there is not, one obvious list of what it takes for a truth or belief. Regardless of the criterea, when there is a difference among groups, it is because the speaker has truths, and the opponent has beliefs.

Any agreement, or disagreement?

A truth is based on facts, a belief is based on myths. Words always have two or more meanings it would seem to me.

And that's not to mention synonyms !

Vkothii, and others.

I don't care much for Kant's usage.

I can’t help feeling that: the speaker has truths, whereas their opponent has beliefs.

Other than that, I believe the criteria is the same. And I believe there are many criterea that could be listed, that there is not, one obvious list of what it takes for a truth or belief. Regardless of the criterea, when there is a difference among groups, it is because the speaker has truths, and the opponent has beliefs.

Any agreement, or disagreement?


If you will allow me to simplify rather than get bogged down in epistemology.

A belief is what it says. It may be right or it may be wrong. I believe it will rain tomorrow. If it does , I cannot claim that I had knowledge , i.e., I had no evidence, only a belief/ opinion

Knowledge is justified belief, i.e., it is supported by evidence. I know it is raining now because I can experience the rain and get others to agree that I am having that experience.

I also know that Washington DC is the capital of the US. I can go there and check it out, i.e., seek evidence that will show that my belief is justified.

So, one can believe anything but belief is not knowledge, It may be right or it may be wrong. Knowledge cannot be wrong because it must be supported by evidence.

mylesIf you will allow me to simplify rather than get bogged down in epistemology.

A belief is what it says. It may be right or it may be wrong. I believe it will rain tomorrow. If it does , I cannot claim that I had knowledge , i.e., I had no evidence, only a belief/ opinion.You say you would believe something as true, with no evidence.
And you think you are typical?

I don’t get it. Why would anyone believe something with no evidence.
For that matter, why would someone have an opinion with no evidence?
I have had occasions to think about decision making. That is what we are talking about, isn’t it? We are talking about making a decision such as: “I have a belief this is true.”, and you would make such a decision with no evidence.
I would say I have very little respect for your decision making.


Knowledge is justified belief, i.e., it is supported by evidence. I know it is raining now because I can experience the rain and get others to agree that I am having that experience.Well, you have not shown that beliefs can be formulated without evidence. If it is possible, I do not think it is common place.

Even if you could, evidence supports falseness as handily as it supports truthfulness. Knowledge may be true, it may be false. Evidence has sent men to their death in a legal court of law, and some of those death causing decisions were based on false conclusions. Yes you can get others to agree with you, whether you are correct or not.

I also know that Washington DC is the capital of the US. I can go there and check it out, i.e., seek evidence that will show that my belief is justified.This is a thing that is true because we say it is true. Every rational person knows it is true, and only an irrational person would disagree with your claim.
When there is no disagreement, no justification is necessary. There is no need to justify your claim to any sane person. If justification is necessary for knowledge, this is not knowledge.

So, one can believe anything but belief is not knowledge, It may be right or it may be wrong. Knowledge cannot be wrong because it must be supported by evidence.What you say is a truism. Knowledge must be supported by the evidence.
The problems is, who gets to decide what is acceptable evidence?
Among Christians, there is much evidence Jesus was the only son of God, and the savior of the world.
Do you claim among Christians there is not an abundance of evidence for these things?

Is there knowledge about global warming?
There is conflicting information about the causes and effects of global warming, especially in regard to mankind’s role, and all of the beliefs are supported by evidence, so is all of the information knowledge, that cannot be wrong?

In many cases there are two sides, each with evidence, and you would have us believe . . . .what?
Are we to think any time there is disagreement between two groups, neither one has knowledge (true information), or do they both have knowledge?

It's like this:
we see stuff, and we call it "knowing" that stuff happens (has happened). This means we believe it happened. We may also believe that it will happen (in some future). Maybe we see it happen more than once, which tends to strengthen our "belief" (not "knowing") that it will happen again.

Then there's the 2nd-hand stuff, that we don't experience directly, but through "others".

That's the guts of Kant's ideas from "Critique". Or the chapter he put together about "belief".

Or not.

belief is formed through fuzzy logic on the basis of fuzzy evidence.
knowledge is formed through deductive logic on the basis of (nonfuzzy) facts.

the difference between them is that one accepts fuzzy logic values (values between true and false) and the other doesnt.

You say you would believe something as true, with no evidence.
And you think you are typical?

I don’t get it. Why would anyone believe something with no evidence.
For that matter, why would someone have an opinion with no evidence?
I have had occasions to think about decision making. That is what we are talking about, isn’t it? We are talking about making a decision such as: “I have a belief this is true.”, and you would make such a decision with no evidence.
I would say I have very little respect for your decision making.


Well, you have not shown that beliefs can be formulated without evidence. If it is possible, I do not think it is common place.

Even if you could, evidence supports falseness as handily as it supports truthfulness. Knowledge may be true, it may be false. Evidence has sent men to their death in a legal court of law, and some of those death causing decisions were based on false conclusions. Yes you can get others to agree with you, whether you are correct or not.

This is a thing that is true because we say it is true. Every rational person knows it is true, and only an irrational person would disagree with your claim.
When there is no disagreement, no justification is necessary. There is no need to justify your claim to any sane person. If justification is necessary for knowledge, this is not knowledge.

What you say is a truism. Knowledge must be supported by the evidence.
The problems is, who gets to decide what is acceptable evidence?
Among Christians, there is much evidence Jesus was the only son of God, and the savior of the world.
Do you claim among Christians there is not an abundance of evidence for these things?

Is there knowledge about global warming?
There is conflicting information about the causes and effects of global warming, especially in regard to mankind’s role, and all of the beliefs are supported by evidence, so is all of the information knowledge, that cannot be wrong?

In many cases there are two sides, each with evidence, and you would have us believe . . . .what?
Are we to think any time there is disagreement between two groups, neither one has knowledge (true information), or do they both have knowledge?

You seem to have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. I can believe in unicorns, alien invaders, cabbages on mars without objective evidence. There is no limit to what beliefs I can have .

Knowledge is belief supported be evidence. I assumed you would infer that I meant objective evidence, i.e., evidence that would be acceptable to others- see what I said about rain and my meaning should be clear

I can believe in unicorns, alien invaders, cabbages on mars without objective evidence..

i cant.

i cant.

If I sent you a pic would that help ?

If I sent you a pic would that help ?

nope. i cant arbitrarily make myself believe in something.

one must distinguish between believing (thinking), feeling, and knowing. what you are describing sounds more like a FEELING than a belief. feelings are the result of inductive thinking. like the monster behind the shower curtain. i can make myself feel that there is a monster behind the shower curtain. but i dont believe it.

in inductive thinking you temporarily suspend your disbelief in something in order to get a FEEL for whether it is probably true or not.

suspension of disbelief is not the same as belief.
FEELING is not the same as believing.

nope. i cant arbitrarily make myself believe in something.

one must distinguish between believing (thinking), feeling, and knowing. what you are describing sounds more like a FEELING than a belief. feelings are the result of inductive thinking. like the monster behind the shower curtain. i can make myself feel that there is a monster behind the shower curtain. but i dont believe it.

in inductive thinking you temporarily suspend your disbelief in something in order to get a FEEL for whether it is probably true or not.

suspension of disbelief is not the same as belief.
FEELING is not the same as believing.

Not necessarily. People who believe in alien abduction will describe in great detail how they were taken to the spaceship, what was done to them and so. Some are probably hoaxers but I suggest there are a few who believe it because they have the (subjective) evidence.

Consifder also how people behave under hypnosis, not to mention all those who believe in miracles which cannot be supported by evidence

Not necessarily. People who believe in alien abduction will describe in great detail how they were taken to the spaceship, what was done to them and so. Some are probably hoaxers but I suggest there are a few who believe it because they have the (subjective) evidence.

Consifder also how people behave under hypnosis, not to mention all those who believe in miracles which cannot be supported by evidence

so, in other words, naive, nonobjective people believe in things based on the evidence of subjective feelings. you may be onto something there. but i dont think thats true of mature objective adults.

How can any human be objective ?

How can any human be objective ?

a subjective person sees whatever they look for. look for a monster behind the shower curtain and you will see it. an objective person honestly looks for the objective truth. look for the objective truth and you will find it.

its just a matter of being willing to accept the truth whether it is what you want it to be or not. that is objectivity.

a subjective person sees whatever they look for. look for a monster behind the shower curtain and you will see it. an objective person looks for the objective truth. look for the objective truth and you will find it.

its just a matter of being willing to accept the truth whether it is what you want it to be or not. that is objectivity.

I don't think objective truth can be experienced though.. what exactly do you mean by it ?

I don't think objective truth can be experienced though.. what exactly do you mean by it ?

i mean exactly what people usually mean. as far as not being able to experience (know) objective truth, there isnt much i can say. i have told you exactly what you must do. you will just have to try it and see for yourself.

our senses are fuzzy but fuzziness can be eliminated with error correction techniques. thats precisely what 'feelings' are for. also not everything needs to be known precisely. if there was an atom bomb 10 feet over my head i may not know whether it is 10 feet or 10.001 feet but either way i know that if it went off i would die.

its just a matter of being willing to accept the truth whether it is what you want it to be or not. that is objectivity.

Is it so easy to know what one wants to believe?
I assume, also, that you believe in free will? Was your process at arriving in the belief objective?
If you don't believe in free will, I find your sense of what an objective person does rather odd. They would be compelled to have their beliefs just like everyone else.

Is it so easy to know what one wants to believe?
I assume, also, that you believe in free will? Was your process at arriving in the belief objective?

why you would believe that beyond me.

If you don't believe in free will...They would be compelled to have their beliefs just like everyone else.

so? as long as they, by being objective, are compelled to believe in the objective truth what does it matter?

[QUOTE]why you would believe that beyond me.

I will answer that question, but can you state it clearly whether you believe in free will or not.



so? as long as they are compelled to believe in the objective truth what does it matter?

I may not have made my point clearly. It seemed to me you were making a distinction between two ways of arriving at a belief. In a deterministic universe this distinction is meaningless. And certainly there is no room for pride in the process of ascertaining truth, everyone being simply propelled toward it unavoidably, whatever that belief is. Beliefs would simply happen in that universe.

But it seemed like you believe in free will. So perhaps that issue is moot. Let me know.

so, in other words, naive, nonobjective people believe in things based on the evidence of subjective feelings. you may be onto something there. but i dont think thats true of mature objective adults.



its just a matter of being willing to accept the truth whether it is what you want it to be or not. that is objectivity.
Is it so easy to know what one wants to believe?
one doesnt need to know what one wants to believe. one simply has to be willing to accept the truth regardless of what one wants.

If you don't believe in free will...They would be compelled to have their beliefs just like everyone else.



I may not have made my point clearly. It seemed to me you were making a distinction between two ways of arriving at a belief. In a deterministic universe this distinction is meaningless. And certainly there is no room for pride in the process of ascertaining truth, everyone being simply propelled toward it unavoidably, whatever that belief is. Beliefs would simply happen in that universe.


i have no idea why you are bringing up the issue of freewill. i see no connection at all. what two ways of arriving at a belief are you talking about. why is the distinction meaningless in a deterministic universe?

i am saying that objective people dont form beliefs based on the evidence of subjective feelings.

beliefs are based on fuzzy logic. knowledge isnt. thats what i meant when i said that fuzziness can be eliminated (through objective error correction).

so, in other words, naive, nonobjective people believe in things based on the evidence of subjective feelings. you may be onto something there. but i dont think thats true of mature objective adults.

How about all the people who believe in god ?

The usual crop of ideas about the subjects of free will, objectivity, etc.

"Free will" is a strange beast. "Free" means unbound or unconstrained, and "will" means control or constraint, so it's non sequitur.
"Choice" is an easier version to deal with, in my lexicon.

We have choice, or we can choose. It's an advantage.

one doesnt need to know what one wants to believe. one simply has to be willing to accept the truth regardless of what one wants.
What I was heading toward was that recent psychology and neuroscience seems to question how much the conscious mind really knows about why it makes the choices it makes, including those choices that seem objective and logical.



i have no idea why you are bringing up the issue of freewill. i see no connection at all. what two ways of arriving at a belief are you talking about. why is the distinction meaningless in a deterministic universe?

I thought you made a distinction between those who search for knowledge that fits with what they want and those who search for the truth regardless of whether it fits with their wants. The distinction becomes meaningless in a deterministic universe because each would simply end up in a belief. The belief being the last domino in some chain.

i am saying that objective people dont form beliefs based on the evidence of subjective feelings. That word 'form' could be misleading. It makes it sound like they create or choose their beliefs. In a deterministic universe they would not choose their beliefs. Just like the people you are calling subjective, the beliefs would simply happen.

The usual crop of ideas about the subjects of free will, objectivity, etc.

"Free will" is a strange beast. "Free" means unbound or unconstrained, and "will" means control or constraint, so it's non sequitur.
"Choice" is an easier version to deal with, in my lexicon.

We have choice, or we can choose. It's an advantage.

Free will , as used by philosophers, means the ability to make unconstrained choices

Why do you believe that will means control or constraint ?

if you would just say 'no, being objective wont change anything. its all beliefs' i could understand. you would be wrong but i would understand. bringing up freewill makes it sound like i am suggesting something mystical or supernatural.

objectivity is simply being perfectly willing to accept the outcome of ones reasoning whether it is what you want it to be or not. it has the effect of eliminating subjective bias. there is nothing mystical about it.

eliminating the fuzziness from our fuzzy logic thinking is simply a matter of error correction. again nothing mystical here.

if you would just say 'no, being objective wont change anything. its all beliefs' i could understand. you would be wrong but i would understand. bringing up freewill makes it sound like i am suggesting something mystical or supernatural.

objectivity is simply being perfectly willing to accept the outcome of ones reasoning whether it is what you want it to be or not. it has the effect of eliminating subjective bias. there is nothing mystical about it.

eliminating the fuzziness from our fuzzy logic thinking is simply a matter of error correction. again nothing mystical here.

I see what you mean but I suggest that you are wrong. The outcome of reasoning is the result of what one has taken into consideration, what one has rejected and accepted. If we ask a dozen people to consider a question, the answers given will not all be the same. They will depend on intelligence, how well one is informed, one's life experience and a host of other subjective factors. Thus, I cannot claim that my reasoning is objective.

You are overlooking the fact that in reasoning you are not necessarily starting from the same place as others. Hence, your reasoning can only be subjective.

objectivity is simply being perfectly willing to accept the outcome of ones reasoning...and that such reasoning is based on observation (of objects) and deduction, not introspection.
Of course, as soon as you build a model of something, you've abstracted it, so you can abstract the abstraction, or think about what the model you have really is, and on until you end up going up the spout of your own abstraction. Sort of an abstraction vortex.

Since this thread has gotten completely offtrack......



Words in themselves have no meaning on their own.
They are just arbitrary symbols used to represent things and concepts.
We give meaning to words by our usage.
...
I doubt that we can come to a mutual agreement on any particular meaning, but you never know.
...



Correct.

"Meaning" is nothing beyond the signification of relevance granted to a notion by its perceptor.

The problem here is that the OP is implicitly contrasting an artificial meaning with an innate meaning. This is further problematized with the ontological assumption of an innate meaning.

Remove the non-subjective ontological status of meaning, and the problem dissolves: a meaning is specifically, and only given.

if you would just say 'no, being objective wont change anything. its all beliefs' i could understand. you would be wrong but i would understand. bringing up freewill makes it sound like i am suggesting something mystical or supernatural.

objectivity is simply being perfectly willing to accept the outcome of ones reasoning whether it is what you want it to be or not. it has the effect of eliminating subjective bias. there is nothing mystical about it.

eliminating the fuzziness from our fuzzy logic thinking is simply a matter of error correction. again nothing mystical here.

I agree with you, though I am not sure fuzzy logic is the right term. There are others here who think free will is illusory. But I will leave their objections to them.

"Meaning" is nothing beyond the signification of relevance Whoah neddy; "nothing beyond" the signification (i.e. meaning) of relevance (i.e. meaning)?? Meaning means nothing if it's "beyond" the meaning of meaning...
granted to a notion by its perceptor.It gets granted to a notion, i.e. an idea? You mean we assign meaning to it?
... the OP is implicitly contrasting an artificial meaning with an innate meaning. This is further problematized with the ontological assumption of an innate meaning.
An innate meaning being "one we get born with", presumably?
Remove the non-subjective ontological status of meaning, and the problem dissolves: a meaning is specifically, and only given.You mean, we only assign it subjectively, this meaning thing? Well, sure. But we don't do it by ourselves, we compare notes.

Whoah neddy; "nothing beyond" the signification (i.e. meaning) of relevance (i.e. meaning)?? Meaning means nothing if it's "beyond" the meaning of meaning...

lol

You misunderstand.

The signification (which is not meaning) relates the object in question to another.


It gets granted to a notion, i.e. an idea? You mean we assign meaning to it?

Exactly.


An innate meaning being "one we get born with", presumably?

No.
An innate one being the one construed as somehow being a 'part of', or 'property' of the notion in question.


You mean, we only assign it subjectively, this meaning thing? Well, sure. But we don't do it by ourselves, we compare notes.

Exactly.

The signification (which is not meaning) relates the object in question to another.How does it relate an object to another object? Surely the sign is a symbol or representation of the thing in question, so it has meaning..?
An innate one being the one construed as somehow being a 'part of', or 'property' of the notion in question.How is it "a part of" or "a property of" the notion? Either it's there in our heads or it isn't. We recognise a pattern or we don't.

How does it relate an object to another object? Surely the sign is a symbol or representation of the thing in question, so it has meaning..?

Not entirely.
The symbol signifies more than itself; indeed, it signifies an other thing as well. This is the action of relation.


How is it "a part of" or "a property of" the notion? Either it's there in our heads or it isn't. We recognise a pattern or we don't.


According to you an I, yes.
According to the OP (and those people who can be described as essentialists), no.

Isn't truth really always a value someone superimposes on something ?
Truth is related to meaning, and while it has a basis in reality it is not the same thing.
Truth cannot be objective, it is always subjective.
I think the words you are looking for are 'objective reality'.

So how many symbols are needed to convey actual meaning...?

So how many symbols are needed to convey actual meaning...?

What do you mean by 'actual meaning' ?

Well, a symbol relates something, and doesn't have "meaning" entirely, according to glaucon (but I'm not sure what that means).

So when does "meaning" arrive on the scene? If one symbol doesn't do it?

Well, a symbol relates something, and doesn't have "meaning" entirely, according to glaucon (but I'm not sure what that means).

So when does "meaning" arrive on the scene? If one symbol doesn't do it?

The question is to who, a symbol can have meaning to someone. And it can have an entirely different meaning to someone else.
A symbol means what we want it to mean. It doesn't mean anything in itself.

Same with words.

" When I use a word it means what I want it to mean......"

Humpty Dumpty

Alice

I think Enmos means that symbols can have various meanings, which means complementary meanings. I don't think conflicting meanings works so well.

Words are meant to convey particular meanings. So words are like containers with messages in them, or something.

I think Enmos means that symbols can have various meanings, which means complementary meanings. I don't think conflicting meanings works so well.

Words are meant to convey particular meanings. So words are like containers with messages in them, or something.

Look up any word in the dictionary, I can pretty much guarantee that it will have more than one meaning.
About symbols, the perfect example is the Swastika..

Also, what does the word 'pop' mean to you (just a random example) ?

Pop means...........drinks like Coke, pepsi, 7 up, all of them.......

Hey do you want a pop?
Sure what kind?
Coke Zero thanks

Pop means...........drinks like Coke, pepsi, 7 up, all of them.......

Hey do you want a pop?
Sure what kind?
Coke Zero thanks

Yes, and pop means something else to me:

Translations

pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (mooi meisje)
doll [the ~]
manequin [the ~]
beautiful girl [the ~]
pretty girl [the ~]
pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (speelpop)
puppet [the ~]
doll [the ~]
pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (speelgoedpop)
dress-stand [the ~]
dummy [the ~]
doll [the ~]
http://www.interglot.com/interglotresult.php

I think Enmos means that symbols can have various meanings, which means complementary meanings. I don't think conflicting meanings works so well.

Words are meant to convey particular meanings. So words are like containers with messages in them, or something.

The idea of words or language as a container is a fairly imbedded one in our language. It is a kind of metaphor for language. Metaphors can have strengths and weaknesses, since they tend to highlight certain aspects and hide others. They can in fact be very misleading.

A far more subtle case of how a metaphorical concept can hide an aspect of our experience can be seen in what Michael Reddy has called the "conduit metaphor."' Reddy observes that our language about language is structured roughly by the following complex metaphor:

IDEAS (Of MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS.

COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.

The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a bearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers. Reddy documents this with more than a hundred types of expressions in English, which he estimates account for at least 70 percent of the expressions we use for talking about language. Here are some examples:

THE CONDUIT METAPHOR

It's hard to get that idea across to him.

I gave you that idea.

Your reasons came through to us.

It's difficult to put my ideas into words.

When you have a good idea, try to capture it immediately in words.

Try to pack more thought into fewer words.

You can't simply stuff ideas into a sentence any old way.

The meaning is right there in the words.

Don't force your meanings into the wrong words.

His words carry little meaning.

The introduction has a great deal of thought content.

Your words seem hollow.

The sentence is without meaning.

The idea is buried in terribly dense paragraphs.

In examples like these it is far more difficult to see that there is anything hidden by the metaphor or even to see that there is a metaphor here at all. This is so much the conventional way of thinking about language that it is sometimes hard to imagine that it might not fit reality. But if we look at what the conduit metaphor entails, we can see some of the ways in which it masks aspects of the communicative process.

First, the Linguistic EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANINGS aspect of the conduit metaphor entails that words and sentences have meanings in themselves, independent of any context or speaker. The MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS part of the metaphor, for example, entails that meanings have an existence independent of people and contexts. The part of the metaphor that says LINGUISTICS EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANING entails that words (and sentences) have meanings, again independent of contexts and speakers. These metaphors are appropriate in many situations--those where context differences don't matter and where all the participants in the conversation understand the sentences in the same way. These two entailments are exemplified by sentences like

The meaning is right there in the words,

which, according to the CONDUIT metaphor, can correctly be said of any sentence. But there are many cases where context does matter. Here is a celebrated one recorded in actual conversation by Pamela Downing:

Please sit in the apple-juice seat.

In isolation this sentence has no meaning at all, since the expression "apple-juice seat" is not a conventional way of referring to any kind of object. But the sentence makes perfect sense in the context in which it was uttered. An overnight guest came down to breakfast. There were four place settings, three with orange juice and one with apple juice. It was clear what the apple-juice seat was. And even the next morning, when there was no apple juice, it was still clear which seat was the apple-juice seat.

In addition to sentences that have no meaning without context, there are cases where a single sentence will mean different things to different people. Consider:

We need new alternative sources of energy.

This means something very different to the president of Mobil Oil from what it means to the president of Friends of the Earth. The meaning is not right there in the sentence--it matters a lot who is saying or listening to the sentence and what his social and political attitudes are. The CONDUIT metaphor does not fit cases where context is required to determine whether the sentence has any meaning at all and, if so, what meaning it has.

These examples show that the metaphorical concepts we have looked at provide us with a partial understanding of what communication, argument, and time are and that, in doing this, they hide other aspects of these concepts. It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of it. For example, time isn't really money. If you spend your time trying to do something and it doesn't work, you can't get your time back. There are no time banks. I can give you a lot of time, but you can't give me back the same time, though you can give me back the same amount of time. And so on. Thus, part of a metaphorical concept does not and cannot fit.

On the other hand, metaphorical concepts can be extended beyond the range of ordinary literal ways of thinking and talking into the range of what is called figurative, poetic, colorful, or fanciful thought and language. Thus, if ideas are objects, we can dress them?n up in fancy clothes, juggle them, line them up nice and neat, etc. So when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphors we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others.



I do not think the argument put forth here is the best one, but it gives a taste. Reddy went on to consciously construct an alternative tool-users metaphor and laid out how it might improve our communication skills, partially by humbling us. The meaning is not 'in' the words in that metaphor, so we cannot simply expect the other person to open up the container and take it out.

Yes, and pop means something else to me:

Translations

pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (mooi meisje)
doll [the ~]
manequin [the ~]
beautiful girl [the ~]
pretty girl [the ~]
pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (speelpop)
puppet [the ~]
doll [the ~]
pop [de ~ (v),de ~] (speelgoedpop)
dress-stand [the ~]
dummy [the ~]
doll [the ~]
http://www.interglot.com/interglotresult.php

Some further meanings of pop

Dad
Shot as in popgun, a kid's toy
Lemonade
The sound one hears when a balloon bursts
The sound made when one puts one's finger in one's mouth and pulls it out against the cheek
Popeye
Popshop a pawnbroker's shop

As a verb

Pop in/ out/ over/up
pop one's clogs (klompen, ha, ha) to die
pop... to pawn an article
Pop a girl....self-explanatory

Lemonade



You call Lemonade Pop?

I think Enmos means that symbols can have various meanings, which means complementary meanings. I don't think conflicting meanings works so well.

Words are meant to convey particular meanings. So words are like containers with messages in them, or something.

Can we agree on particular meanings depending on the context in which they are used ?

You call Lemonade Pop?

Better than the reverse.

You call Lemonade Pop?

Yep. We may be talking about a different type of lemonade, which would beautifully illustrate the point Enmos is making.

Pop, on this side of the pond means lemonade or similar that comes in a bottle,a fizzy drink.

You may be thinking of lemonade made with fresh lemons

Do Canadian girls get popped ?

Enmos,
You may not have heard this but Oscar Wilde made the point you are making. He spoke of America and England as

"Two countries divided by a common language"

Enmos,
You may not have heard this but Oscar Wilde made the point you are making. He spoke of America and England as

"Two countries divided by a common language"

Well, the same symbols or symbol constructions can mean different things to different people. And the same meaning can be represented by different symbols or symbol constructions..
It's pretty straight forward I'd say.. what is the confusion about ?

Yep. We may be talking about a different type of lemonade, which would beautifully illustrate the point Enmos is making.

Pop, on this side of the pond means lemonade or similar that comes in a bottle,a fizzy drink.

You may be thinking of lemonade made with fresh lemons

Do Canadian girls get popped ?

Yes I thought of a jug of lemonade. In Canada only those "fuzzy drinks"
carbonated drinks like Coke, Pepsi, Crush, 7 Up, etc are called POP.
Drinks like the lemonade you are describing wouldn't be called a POP.

I have also heard the Term......Hear about that guy who got Popped at the club last night, meaning shot.

Do Canadian girls get popped hmmmmmm I don't know if I should even take a guess at this one lol :eek:
Yes they do.....Some more than others lol

Yes I thought of a jug of lemonade. In Canada only those "fuzzy drinks"
carbonated drinks like Coke, Pepsi, Crush, 7 Up, etc are called POP.
Drinks like the lemonade you are describing wouldn't be called a POP.

I have also heard the Term......Hear about that guy who got Popped at the club last night, meaning shot.

Do Canadian girls get popped hmmmmmm I don't know if I should even take a guess at this one lol :eek:
Yes they do.....Some more than others lol

That's why you are here to talk about it.

By, the way, I'm not sure that lemonade in a bottle has ever been near a lemon, cherryade near a cherry and so on. They are conctions of water, CO2 and flavouring.

I drink what you call lemonade.

Hey I was just doing my workout. The instructor actually said this.
Okay faster come on POP! POP!.......lol

Well, a symbol relates something, and doesn't have "meaning" entirely, according to glaucon (but I'm not sure what that means).

So when does "meaning" arrive on the scene? If one symbol doesn't do it?

The question is to who, a symbol can have meaning to someone. And it can have an entirely different meaning to someone else.
A symbol means what we want it to mean. It doesn't mean anything in itself.

Same with words.

Enmos has it correct here.

Symbols, like words, can have a distinct meaning or, more likely, often share meanings with other symbols. Thus, both the Cruciform and Swastika are crosses, and may convey meaning associated with certain religious structures. And yet, while they both share in this, the Swastika may certainly convey meaning that could never be done so by the Cruciform.

Just like words, symbols in and of themselves, are mute; meaning is entirely a function of context and application.

Hey I was just doing my workout. The instructor actually said this.
Okay faster come on POP! POP!.......lol

I like it. It's a good thing I alerted you and saved your honour. That's one you owe me, ha, ha

Just like words, symbols in and of themselves, are mute; meaning is entirely a function of context and application.

Agreed.

However, something that can make this issue difficult to understand is the fact that there are so many words, so many symbols. Where did they come from? How? If they have developed - how, why, in what time?

Anthroplogists and linguists will have us look back at primitive man, list a dozen of possible words or symbols that he might have used. But how did human language get from there to where it is today?!

It's easy to say "It slowly developed over time". But frankly, I find the notion of millenia and millenia of development mind-boggling. Given the complexity and length of an evolutionary outlook, and the difficulty to prove it, it's no wonder many people find some form of essentialism to be closer to reality.

Agreed.

However, something that can make this issue difficult to understand is the fact that there are so many words, so many symbols. Where did they come from? How? If they have developed - how, why, in what time?

Anthroplogists and linguists will have us look back at primitive man, list a dozen of possible words or symbols that he might have used. But how did human language get from there to where it is today?!

It's easy to say "It slowly developed over time". But frankly, I find the notion of millenia and millenia of development mind-boggling. Given the complexity and length of an evolutionary outlook, and the difficulty to prove it, it's no wonder many people find some form of essentialism to be closer to reality.


I would suggest that ,as our lifestyle became more sophisticated ,our vocabulary had to grow ( be expanded by us ) so we could communicate more complex ideas.

...
It's easy to say "It slowly developed over time". But frankly, I find the notion of millenia and millenia of development mind-boggling. Given the complexity and length of an evolutionary outlook, and the difficulty to prove it, it's no wonder many people find some form of essentialism to be closer to reality.

True enough. But I would have to argue that an essentialist perspective is simply easier, naive even. Understandable? Yes, but it too often falls short of being exhaustive. What's more, it's anthropomorphocentric to believe in such a 'Ding An Sich' or 'Platonic Form' type of ontology.



...
However, something that can make this issue difficult to understand is the fact that there are so many words, so many symbols.
...

Indeed. Just as there are so many things, and so many people to name them.
Consider the possible tonal gradations of a red paint.
How many different names could one observer create for each tone he identifies? Now consider that another observer comes along. How many different tones will she identify? More, less, or the same number? Assuming the two could agree even on one, and then agree on a name for it, what is to say that they are indeed experiencing the same tone? Next, add another observer into the mix.

Thus the need for symbols and language. All is convention.

It's easy to say "It slowly developed over time". But frankly, I find the notion of millenia and millenia of development mind-boggling. Given the complexity and length of an evolutionary outlook, and the difficulty to prove it, it's no wonder many people find some form of essentialism to be closer to reality.
I think there is an element of streamlining and inflexibility in essentialism. To be poised and flexible in communication is challenging creatively and perhaps emotionally. I can remember when I first became fluent in a second language how I felt no culture shock until we got to the names of plants. Suddenly I felt unhinged. The plant names often fit the plants: they were not merely arbritrary signs, but often were descriptive - this is true of many words but the roots are not so conscious. I actually felt grief, like my relationship with plants had become more anonymous. The phase passed.

To really be prepared to meet others with a shifting set of approaches, a creative dynamic language is a challenge I think most people want to avoid. We have hardened in places into ways of mentioning things and expressing feelings in language such that it feels like our identity is being challenged by someone who demands - even simply by not understanding - a non habitual rephrasing. And to be a flexible communicator you need to be able to not simply substitute synonyms and paraphrases, but utilize grammar and tone of voice in nuanced ways, and this again is challenging rigidity in character.

Tonal languages really mess with my head here, where it seemed like I had to convey the wrong emotion just naming certain objects at the right pitch.

But one need not get into exotic contexts to be challenged as any close relationship with opposite sex will show you.

I suppose that is an exotic context, however commonplace we want to believe it is.

Then there's the whole issue of when language can change the boundaries of a noun.

No, that is where that noun ends.

Sorry, but you are wrong.

symbols in and of themselves, are mute; meaning is entirely a function of context and application.A function of context and application, sounds like some kind of agency.

So, how many symbols are needed to convey "meaning"? What are the requirements of "context", or "application"?
One symbol can convey meaning, but how is unambiguous meaning (like we tried with the Voyager plaque) conveyed...? Or is it impossible?

If you're wandering in a big desert, all you can see is a vast sea of sand. There is no "meaning", no features appear to convey it, just this same surface, a continuous 2-d plane.
Then you see a rock sitting, all by itself? How come there's this hard, lumpy thing where there should be sand? What's it doing here? Did someone else put it here?
What does it mean, this odd, hard lumpy rock thing? What if there's another one nearby (in some direction), is that more meaningful?

True enough. But I would have to argue that an essentialist perspective is simply easier, naive even. Understandable? Yes, but it too often falls short of being exhaustive. What's more, it's anthropomorphocentric to believe in such a 'Ding An Sich' or 'Platonic Form' type of ontology.

I'm going to play the devil's advocate for this one:
What exactly is wrong with the anthropomorphocentric belief in such a 'Ding An Sich' or 'Platonic Form' type of ontology?


All is convention.

I wonder how come many people have such distrust -and disdain- when it comes to the notion of something being a "convention".
Say "Language use is a convention" or "The way we are supposed to behave at the table is a convention", and they'll maul you, calling you a "pernicious relativist". (To say nothing of suggesting "Religion is a convention".)

What does anthropomorphocentric mean? Without the whole "meaning is meaningful to meanings... " stuff.:D

And exactly what's essentialism?

Anthropo - that's us.

morpho - of shape or "form".

centric - aimed at the self.

We anthropoids (or anthropological beings) are anthropomorphic - we assign human nature or "personality" to non-humans and inorganic things (like vehicles, boats, lakes, rivers, we even call a day "she").

Oh. Hmm. I myself prefer platonic idealism, to a level. But I'm not sure how that's anthropomorphocentric. Those ideas actively projected in reality can vary and become more complicated, so it shouldn't conflict with "evolutionary outlook". Maybe platonic idealism includes more elements than I know.

glaucon"Meaning" is nothing beyond the signification of relevance granted to a notion by its perceptor.

The problem here is that the OP is implicitly contrasting an artificial meaning with an innate meaning. This is further problematized with the ontological assumption of an innate meaning. Remove the non-subjective ontological status of meaning, and the problem dissolves: a meaning is specifically, and only given. I stated quite clearly there is no innate meaning to a word. Words only gain meaning through usage. Words, like things themselves, are transient. They are symbols constructed to communicate what is recognized in the truth of existence.

The truth of existence is not dependent on words or the minds that create them.

When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language. It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.

The first party has complete, actual interaction and experience with truth. If they hold this understanding separate from other experiences, they can experience, and know truth in a particular manner.
This is not scientific truth, for there are other truths, that are not scientific.

Words have a lot of "meanings."

For example. When I am writing I can find a great meaning in every word that I am using. Although it not be necessary for many people to find meaning in their words that they use some people for example I find an enormous ammount of actual meaning in words alone; so by that aviar was correct on page one.

And pardon for not reading the thread;
So yes. Words have a lot of meaning. Sometimes. And sometimes, they don't.

sisyphus__

The usage of words can have meaning. Or not.

This is because the meaning of the word is not in the word itself, it is in the mind of the reader or listener. When the word enters the mind, it gains meaning. No mind, no meaning (other than the obvious physical existence of the compositition making the letters).
Some words that enter the mind are meaningless (a foreign language, for example).

When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language.
"Subjective language", would be a language with no objects in it?
It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.Would that be because words are objects? A subject uses objects (words) to give a subjective view (to another subject)?

How can objects like words be a subjective language? Could objects other than words convey a subjective experience?

Holy deluge....

Well then.. in chronological order....



A function of context and application, sounds like some kind of agency.
...


Not at all. In fact, there's no such implication therein. If there is a relevant agent, it would be the user.


So, how many symbols are needed to convey "meaning"? What are the requirements of "context", or "application"?
One symbol can convey meaning, but how is unambiguous meaning (like we tried with the Voyager plaque) conveyed...? Or is it impossible?


The relationship is not one of necessity, merely one of sufficiency. One could easily hold that a singular symbol can convey every possible meaning (e.g., the Tao). Similarly, there are no requirements of context and application; it is the user who defines the symbol's usage. It is also the user(s) who is responsible for any errors in interpretation.



If you're wandering in a big desert, all you can see is a vast sea of sand. There is no "meaning", no features appear to convey it, just this same surface, a continuous 2-d plane.
Then you see a rock sitting, all by itself? How come there's this hard, lumpy thing where there should be sand? What's it doing here? Did someone else put it here?
What does it mean, this odd, hard lumpy rock thing? What if there's another one nearby (in some direction), is that more meaningful?



Not necessarily. Again, it is entirely contingent upon the user. A vast sea of sand can have momentous meaning: imagine that your observer in question is a displaced Inuit. Conversely, I could find that rock to be utterly insignificant, perhaps even passing notice.

Meaning is applied.


I'm going to play the devil's advocate for this one:
What exactly is wrong with the anthropomorphocentric belief in such a 'Ding An Sich' or 'Platonic Form' type of ontology?


Well, for one, I would say that it would be the height of arrogance. To believe that there are such entities simply because we can conceive of them??

I'll take Ockham's.....




I wonder how come many people have such distrust -and disdain- when it comes to the notion of something being a "convention".
Say "Language use is a convention" or "The way we are supposed to behave at the table is a convention", and they'll maul you, calling you a "pernicious relativist". (To say nothing of suggesting "Religion is a convention".)

You'll find most of them in the Religion Forum.

I pity rather than wonder of them.

To elect to disagree with any system that is de facto contingent upon the artifice of the human mind is to elect to beleive in some form of Rationalist (a la Descartes) or Idealist (a la Spinoza) ontology.


Oh. Hmm. I myself prefer platonic idealism, to a level. But I'm not sure how that's anthropomorphocentric. Those ideas actively projected in reality can vary and become more complicated, so it shouldn't conflict with "evolutionary outlook". Maybe platonic idealism includes more elements than I know.


See above, regarding arrogance.


I stated quite clearly there is no innate meaning to a word. Words only gain meaning through usage. Words, like things themselves, are transient.
...


I concur.


...
They are symbols constructed to communicate what is recognized in the truth of existence.

Or, what is recognized in existence.
(I don't believe in 'Truth'.)



The truth of existence is not dependent on words or the minds that create them.

That's your belief. I don't buy into Rationalist epistemology.



When the truth of existence is observed or experienced, there can be an attempt to share this objective knowledge (a true experience) with another mind, and this is done by the use of subjective language. It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view.


ibid


The first party has complete, actual interaction and experience with truth. If they hold this understanding separate from other experiences, they can experience, and know truth in a particular manner.
...


ibid

Vlothii Subjective language", would be a language with no objects in it?All language is subjective.

Originally Posted by BeHereNow
It is the words themselves which separate the second party from reality. They give a secondary view, a subjective view. ”
V Would that be because words are objects?Words are not objects, they are symbols.

A subject uses objects (words) to give a subjective view (to another subject)?
Words are not objects.

How can objects like words be a subjective language?Because words have no absolute meaning.
The have no objective meaning.

Could objects other than words convey a subjective experience?Words are not objects. Symbols other than words can convey an objective experience in a subjective manner

Words are not objects, they are symbols.A symbol isn't an object?
Symbols other than words can convey an objective experience...Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?

glaucionI don't buy into Rationalist epistemology.What do you buy into?


~ ~ ~ ~~ ~

Vkothii A symbol isn't an object?No. An object may be a symbol, but a symbol need not be an object. We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an object, but in their function as symbols, they are not objects.
Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?Agreed.

We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an objectWhat sort of "form"? You mean some symbols are objects, and some aren't?
...but in their function as symbols, they are not objects.How can a symbol not be some thing? Are you saying a symbol can be non-physical? If it's not actually there, how is it a symbol?
This is the bit I'm struggling with.

A symbol isn't an object?
Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?


BHN is quite correct here.
The simplest example would be a number.


What do you buy into?


Depends on what we're discussing.

With respect to existence in general, and words in particular, I would say that I take a Materialist position as far as existence goes ( although, from an epistemological POV, I'd say epiphenomenalism) and a nominalist position as far as words (and indeed symbols of all sort) go.

A symbol isn't an object?
Symbols can be something that isn't a "word"?

I think Vkothii is confusing "object" with "material thing".

I think Vkothii is confusing "object" with "material thing".As you do.
OK, so you're saying an object can be a mental (i.e. not material) thing?

As you do.



Not at all.


OK, so you're saying an object can be a mental (i.e. not material) thing?

Yes.

OK, so you're saying an object can be a mental (i.e. not material) thing?

Yes.
Can a mental object, then be a symbol?

Can a mental object, then be a symbol?

Yes.

An object may be a symbol, but a symbol need not be an object."A symbol can be non-material."
We might say some symbols take form, and threrefore are representative of an object"A mental object can be a symbol."
...but in their function as symbols, they are not objects."But a symbol is not an object."..huh?

A symbol can be non-material.


Correct.


A mental object can be a symbol. But a symbol is not an object...huh?

Read again.

BHN said they may not function as an object.


Perhaps we're simply having semantical problems here.

Can you think of something that cannot be an object?

Can you think of something that cannot be an object?If I "think of something", it's already an object, because I'm thinking (conceiving) of it.

Apparently a word isn't an object, according to BHN
A symbol is something that only sometimes "takes form" whatever that means.
Again, this is BHN's philosophy. He also says that "(in their function) as symbols" they (objects as symbols) are not objects. That's impenetrable.,,?

I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.

If I "think of something", it's already an object, because I'm thinking (conceiving) of it.

Apparently a word isn't an object, according to BHN
A symbol is something that only sometimes "takes form" whatever that means.
Again, this is BHN's philosophy. He also says that "as symbols" they (objects as symbols) are not objects. That's impenetrable.,,?

I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.

Ah.
We are in agreement then; it was a semantical issue.

Perhaps when BHN says "object" he is meaning to say something more precise....

I can't, by definition think of something that "cannot be an object". This is non sequitur. If I objectivise something, by thinking about it, it's an object - a "mental" object.
I'm not sure about this. Unless it is redundant - in the use of the word something, and even then...

If you are thinking of something, or thinking about it, this is not the mental object. The mental object is about that thing not the thing itself.

Also if I think especially of hypnogic states, etc., I wonder if 'mental object is appropriate. Their can be processes and relationships that are imagined - as a collective feltpictured something in motion. I don't know if that is an object.

What?
I really do not follow the statement: "Objects as symbols are not objects"
And I'm having semantic difficulty with: "A word is not an object".

Can you clarify (or can he) what "Some symbols can take form" actually means? A symbol can be formless? How can something formless be a symbol?

If you are thinking of something, or thinking about it, this is not the mental object. It's not? What is "thinking of something" then, if it's not mental?
The mental object is about that thing not the thing itself.What's "the thing itself"?

...
If you are thinking of something, or thinking about it, this is not the mental object.

In fact, it is indeed the mental object you are operating on.


... The mental object is about that thing not the thing itself.


This makes no sense.

Vkothii


I am thinking of the spoken word being a symbol.

A word written in the sand, is a particular configuration of grains of sand, but it is not a thing in itself.
We brush away the sand spread across a surface, and the negative space can create letters and words.
We can carve out wood from a board, and the empty space forms words.
We can use moving flags or blinking lights as semaphore, to make letters and words.
In all cases, it is not the method of forming letters or words which carries the meaning, it is the symbolic representation, whether it has substance, is a thing, or has no substance.

If you want to argue that the spoken word has substance, let’s jump to the chase and say, for the sake of the argument, that it does.
Certainly in most cases words have a substance.
Does it matter?

In all cases, it is not the method of forming letters or words which carries the meaning, it is the symbolic representation, whether it has substance, is a thing, or has no substance.
I disagree completely with "symbolic representation, whether it has substance, is a thing, or has no substance".
A symbol simply cannot exist if it isn't a thing, whether that thing be a real physical shape, or an imagined one (imagination is substantial).
A symbol has substance or it's nothing at all.

Does it matter? Well, only if it means you can call anything (including nothing whatsoever), a sign or symbol of some kind. I guess, on the face of it, anything substantial, including thoughts, can be symbolic.

A symbol needn't be a static shape, it can be an event, say, an omen. A pigeon's or a rabbit's intestines are a signal (they were important omens back in Roman times, like before a battle), if you're a pagan.
Anything can be a symbol, sign, omen, important, unimportant, etc.

A symbol is anything that conveys that old chestnut: "meaning".

Vkothii I disagree completely with "symbolic representation, whether it has substance, is a thing, or has no substance".
A symbol simply cannot exist if it isn't a thing, whether that thing be a real physical shape, or an imagined one (imagination is substantial).
A symbol has substance or it's nothing at all.

Does it matter? Well, only if it means you can call anything (including nothing whatsoever), a sign or symbol of some kind. I guess, on the face of it, anything substantial, including thoughts, can be symbolic.

A symbol needn't be a static shape, it can be an event, say, an omen. A pigeon's or a rabbit's intestines are a signal (they were important omens back in Roman times, like before a battle), if you're a pagan.
Anything can be a symbol, sign, omen, important, unimportant, etc.

A symbol is anything that conveys that old chestnut: "meaning".

If you want to say a thought has substance, and the spoken word has substance, then on those conditions, certainly all symbols have substance.

This substance is of course not the substance represented by the symbol.
A symbol has one substance, and represents another. It may even be that some symbols have the same substance they represent. If the word cheese is spelled with pieces of cheese, the substance of the symbol is the same as the representation.

I do not believe we can get everyone to agree that the spoken word has substance, but certainly we are free to put that chiaracteristic to the word.
If we are to explain this to someone who disagrees with us, how are we to explain the substance of the spoken word?

Right. Symbols represent something (have meaning).

Anything that can be conceived (Fairies, unicorns, glowing blue lines, a black "space") is symbolic because it has a "mental" substance.
Generally, we look for symbols or signs externally, and then internalise, rather then the other way around.

Symbology and meaning are a thing called Semiotics. Not sure about "semiology", that would translate as "the word - logos- of meaning" - a bit circular perhaps.
Semiotic means "of meaning".

The word "represent" implies a re-iteration of "present", or "give". So it means "to give again".

sisyphus__

The usage of words can have meaning. Or not.

This is because the meaning of the word is not in the word itself, it is in the mind of the reader or listener. When the word enters the mind, it gains meaning. No mind, no meaning (other than the obvious physical existence of the compositition making the letters).
Some words that enter the mind are meaningless (a foreign language, for example).

Yeah.
P-e-o-p-l-e understand my "meanings", in very odd ways.
If you had noticed in my writing it is very almost similar to reikus in a semantical pragmatic perspective like but infact it is not quite so.
The point I am making is that in the post I had made (where's it at?), I had clarified a whole lot if not most of the debate as to where a further debate would remain.

Other th an the actual truth of how the words themselfs having some deep meaning which you are refering to here, I wouldn't know, hardley would care at the moment,

Anyway. Just attempting to find out what this wasteland of a debate is all about


:p

It's not? What is "thinking of something" then, if it's not mental? It seemed like you were saying that the mental object was 'about' something. It is not about itself. It refers.

I looked back at the post. You said 'thinking of something'. It is that 'of' that crawed in my stuck. If you had said 'thinking something' I might not have quibbled.

Yes, watch out for the abstraction vortex (it looks a bit like the cookie monster).

In fact, it is indeed the mental object you are operating on.I felt like he was adding confusing with the preposition 'of'. If you are thinking of something you distinguish the thing and the thought of it. If you are thinking something, no prep., that is something else. Mental objects are taken as referring, not always, but in the context he set up.



This makes no sense.In a sense I am making a distinction between sensing/perceiving and thinking of.

... If you are thinking of something you distinguish the thing and the thought of it.

Not while thinking of it, that would be impossible.


In a sense I am making a distinction between sensing/perceiving and thinking of.


How is it that there is a difference between the two states?

Not while thinking of it, that would be impossible. Why don't we then say 'I am experiencing Mary, right now.' When someone asks why we are looking off, our eyes misty.

How is it that there is a difference between the two states?

To be crass, the difference between fantasizing about sex with ___________ and having it.

I find thinking of has a quality of ephemeralness and quasi existence. This is only more so if the thinking is verbal.

Yes, watch out for the abstraction vortex (it looks a bit like the cookie monster).

How do we avoid infinite regress?

If we are not experiencing things in themselves, but our thoughts. From what vantage to we experiences our thoughts. Is it really the thoughts in themselves we are aware of or their shadows on the cave wall?

I feel like I just feel backwards down my spine.

Why don't we then say 'I am experiencing Mary, right now.' When someone asks why we are looking off, our eyes misty.


I don't see your point.

When considering something, there can be no distinguishing between the thought object and its attendant material object (if there is one..). The act of thinking cannot be disparate.



To be crass, the difference between fantasizing about sex with ___________ and having it.


I don't believe that the analogy holds. You seem to be taking the position that thinking can be 'extracted' from perceiving....

The difference between fantasizing and acting is just that; the two are different acts. But the one common element to both is the activity of thinking. There's also the distinction to be made between thinking in general, and imaginative thinking. The latter being an extremely specialized form of the former.

Cookie monster huh.

I'll... cookie monster you ! yeah! That's it ;-)

To add to what Glaucon said above:

To be crass, the difference between fantasizing about sex with ___________ and having it.

I find thinking of has a quality of ephemeralness and quasi existence. This is only more so if the thinking is verbal.

There is obviously the difference between expectation/fantasyand experience.

If a person doesn't train their imagination very much, then their expectations will, in comparison to their experiences, be incomplete - in that in the expectation/fantasy, much of the sensory input will be absent but which is usually present in the experience.

Greenberg,
do you agree with Glaucon said here:

When considering something, there can be no distinguishing between the thought object and its attendant material object (if there is one..).

I don't see your point.

When considering something, there can be no distinguishing between the thought object and its attendant material object (if there is one..). The act of thinking cannot be disparate.
I have the feeling we are writing at cross purposes somehow. But I will try to find that. I don't confuse my thought of my car with my car.





I don't believe that the analogy holds. You seem to be taking the position that thinking can be 'extracted' from perceiving....
Actually I think I am. I can then percieve my thought object, but I do not confuse this experience with perceiving the object.

Probably my fault missing something obvious in what you said earlier.

The difference between fantasizing and acting is just that; the two are different acts. But the one common element to both is the activity of thinking.
There's brain activity. But I would say I can act without thinking. To me thinking has a meta quality to it which perceiving does not. I am conscious that I am referring.

There is obviously the difference between expectation/fantasyand experience.
This sounds to me like you are agreeing with me.

If a person doesn't train their imagination very much, then their expectations will, in comparison to their experiences, be incomplete - in that in the expectation/fantasy, much of the sensory input will be absent but which is usually present in the experience.
I don't think even with training it can ever reach parity.

Greenberg,
do you agree with Glaucon said here:

When considering something, there can be no distinguishing between the thought object and its attendant material object (if there is one..).

Yes, I agree. Only an "essentialist" would make a distinction between the thought object and the material object.



There is obviously the difference between expectation/fantasy and experience.

This sounds to me like you are agreeing with me.

On what grounds?

For me, the difference between expectation/fantasy and experience is that they the first seems incomplete in comparison to the other; but for me, this incompleteness is due to poor training (and poor use of imagination/fantasy) and not some other, inherent distinction as you seem to suggest.


If a person doesn't train their imagination very much, then their expectations will, in comparison to their experiences, be incomplete - in that in the expectation/fantasy, much of the sensory input will be absent but which is usually present in the experience.

I don't think even with training it can ever reach parity.

Do you ever get lost in dreams, thinking they are "real"?
Have you ever studied productivity advice and study skills, how one should "visualize" being successful? Ie. painting in one's imagination the situation of when one wins, all the sights, sounds, smells, feelings in the body, ... everything.

Yes, I agree. Only an "essentialist" would make a distinction between the thought object and the material object.

So do you have a hard time knowing whether you are with someone you care about or when you are thinking about them?

Only an "essentialist" would make a distinction between the thought object and the material object.

Can you explain how you see essentialism connected to this ?

es·sen·tial·ism
–noun Education.
a doctrine that certain traditional concepts, ideals, and skills are essential to society and should be taught methodically to all students, regardless of individual ability, need, etc.

Enmos,
you needed to scroll down a bit.

es·sen·tial·ism (ĭ-sěn'shə-lĭz'əm) Pronunciation Key
n. The metaphysical theory that the essential properties of an object can be distinguished from those that are accidental to it.

Not that that is a great definition, but you can see how it moves the word into this ballpark.

On what grounds?

For me, the difference between expectation/fantasy and experience is that they the first seems incomplete in comparison to the other; but for me, this incompleteness is due to poor training (and poor use of imagination/fantasy) and not some other, inherent distinction as you seem to suggest.[QUOTE]

Do you have sufficient training? How do you know this is true? It does not fit my experience? I would guess my imaginitive abilities are pretty strong and I have worked quite a bit with hypnosis. I experience them differently.

I would assume that a person who finds them the same would see little need for 'reality', going out, and socializing.


[QUOTE]

Do you ever get lost in dreams, thinking they are "real"?
Have you ever studied productivity advice and study skills, how one should "visualize" being successful? Ie. painting in one's imagination the situation of when one wins, all the sights, sounds, smells, feelings in the body, ... everything.

Yes, I have gotten lost in dreams, but I that is yet another state. I have also trained myself to have lucid dreams where one notices the differences between dreaming and waking states and via checking can become aware it is a dream. The phenomenology is different.

And yes, I have had quite a bit of training in visualization. To me it has a quasi realness to it. It would be a digression, but I do believe one can experience things or realms that are real but are not the same as what we consider reality. But again, the phenomenology is different.

Not that that is a great definition, but you can see how it moves the word into this ballpark.


Hehe.
I think it's a fine description.
A detailed discription wouldn't do you too well would it?

Enmos,
you needed to scroll down a bit.

es·sen·tial·ism (ĭ-sěn'shə-lĭz'əm) Pronunciation Key
n. The metaphysical theory that the essential properties of an object can be distinguished from those that are accidental to it.

Not that that is a great definition, but you can see how it moves the word into this ballpark.

Oh right.. :o
Thanks :)

Yes, I agree. Only an "essentialist" would make a distinction between the thought object and the material object.

So do you have a hard time knowing whether you are with someone you care about or when you are thinking about them?

That's not how I mean it.

I'll whittle things down to the difference I'm trying to point out:

When with someone, there are the thoughts:
"Mary is here in the same room with me."
"Mary is a nice person."

When not with Mary but thinking about Mary:
"Mary is not here in the same room with me."
"Mary is a nice person."

When I am with someone ("Mary is here in the same room with me"), I have thoughts about this person ("Mary is a nice person"); and these thoughts are for the most part the same ("Mary is a nice person") when I am not with someone, except for the thought ("Mary is not here in the same room with me").

The thoughts "Mary is here in the same room with me" and "Mary is not here in the same room with me" are descriptions of circumstance, not of Mary.




For me, the difference between expectation/fantasy and experience is that they the first seems incomplete in comparison to the other; but for me, this incompleteness is due to poor training (and poor use of imagination/fantasy) and not some other, inherent distinction as you seem to suggest.
Do you have sufficient training? How do you know this is true? It does not fit my experience? I would guess my imaginitive abilities are pretty strong and I have worked quite a bit with hypnosis. I experience them differently.

I would assume that a person who finds them the same would see little need for 'reality', going out, and socializing.

I think this depends on a person's priorities.

However, I am sensing that you are trying to pragmatize this whole issue, while Glaucon and myself are arguing along the lines of general principles of thinking.

But, this here might shed more light -

Yes, I have gotten lost in dreams, but I that is yet another state. I have also trained myself to have lucid dreams where one notices the differences between dreaming and waking states and via checking can become aware it is a dream. The phenomenology is different.

And yes, I have had quite a bit of training in visualization. To me it has a quasi realness to it. It would be a digression, but I do believe one can experience things or realms that are real but are not the same as what we consider reality. But again, the phenomenology is different.

We seem to have a different understanding of what is "real", and this difference seems to be key.

I would venture to say that only an "essentialist" would make a distinction between the "real" and the "unreal".

Yeah, hehe.

Whatever an "essentialist" is hehe :D

:p

Funny. We won't hear that ! hah!

"an essentialist is precisely this.
an essentialist does things precisely with that in mind.
an essentialist is someone who"

And a nice little description written out nicely. Heh.
It's funny how I am dismissed all the damn time here.

Words have meanings.
Maybe they're hard to figure out.
But definately.

sisyphus__ Words have meanings.
Maybe they're hard to figure out.
But definately.Are you saying words exist, and it is up to humans to find them, and figure out their meaning?
Would you say that for every word, there is an objective meaning, that has existence, separate from the individuals who are required to find that meaning?

Fuck off be shit now.
You're advoided.

sisyphus__ Fuck off be shit now.
You're advoided. News flash!
I started this thread.
Why would a sane mind post where they didn't want to be?

'
For me, the difference between expectation/fantasy and experience is that they the first seems incomplete in comparison to the other; but for me, this incompleteness is due to poor training (and poor use of imagination/fantasy) and not some other, inherent distinction as you seem to suggest.


Uh, sorry, I know this will probably make decent communication harder, but I'll have to say it anyway...

This sounds a LOT like you're trying to justify delusions. Not saying imagination is all bad, but y'know... it sounded lke it.


You can give Mary characteristics. That's what you imagine her as. But like you said, there's a difference in whether she's with you or not. And if she hasn't been with you and you can't access it from memory, you can't even "correctly" imagine yourself with her.

Anser:

One is not a sane mind.

I have the feeling we are writing at cross purposes somehow. But I will try to find that. I don't confuse my thought of my car with my car.


Confuse, no. But you cannot not have a thought of your car, when observing your car.



Actually I think I am. I can then percieve my thought object, but I do not confuse this experience with perceiving the object.

Again, while you can think of an object in absence of it's attendant material object, the converse cannot be said.



There's brain activity. But I would say I can act without thinking. To me thinking has a meta quality to it which perceiving does not. I am conscious that I am referring.

I would say that it's impossible to act without thinking. If that were the case, it would have to be possible to have no brain activity whatsoever while performing the act. Note that, simply because you're not deliberately thinking on the act, thinking nonetheless must go on. The exception to this possibility could be if it's the case that you beleive bare perception to be a non-thought process (which I suspect is indeed your position..). If that is the case, then we're opening up an entirely new can o worms..

Confuse, no. But you cannot not have a thought of your car, when observing your car.
I don't think this is correct. I just tested this out. I stared at a green apple and thought about a red apple and, while the images were sort of superimporsed, muttered, mentally to myself about apples.




Again, while you can think of an object in absence of it's attendant material object, the converse cannot be said. Pardon my dullness, but I need you to lay out the converse.




I would say that it's impossible to act without thinking. If that were the case, it would have to be possible to have no brain activity whatsoever while performing the act.
I think we need a definition of thinking. Are animals thinking when they move? Are they thinking when they roll over in their sleep? if I am thinking about my wife while I am driving does that count? Again, I am sure there is brain activity. There always is. If that is always 'thinking' then I agree.


Note th