http://www.iscid.org/papers/Langan_CTMU_092902.pdf

(may take a while to load)


From the November 2001 issue of Popular Science: "He's scored as high as 195 on IQ tests, a result so rare that experts estimate that fewer than 1 in a billion people can achieve it. A score of 100 is considered average and most university graduates come in at about 120."

Robert Seitz, a physicist and former NASA executive, is familiar with Langan's work but admits that he "doesn't fully understand Langan's theory." Seitz does say, however, that Langan is "perhaps the smartest individual" he's ever met.


"It’s a mathematical, philosophical manuscript with a radical view of the universe, a theory of everything. He proposes that all things, including the existence of God, the soul and the afterlife, can be proven using mathematics."

(from interview)

Chris Langan:
You have to prove that the universe is a self-referential system. Then you have to examine the attributes of this system, analyze the system to determine how it behaves. It turns out that in certain ways it behaves mentally like a mind. The natural question to ask then is: whose mind are we talking about? The answer to that question is the mind of God.

Chris Langan:
I believe in the theory of evolution, but I believe as well in the allegorical truth of creation theory. In other words, I believe that evolution, including the principle of natural selection, is one of the tools used by God to create mankind. Mankind is then a participant in the creation of the universe itself, so that we have a closed loop. I believe that there is a level on which science and religious metaphor are mutually compatible.

J.P.

who is arguably the smartest individual in the worldOr is just good at IQ tests. But there doesn’t seem to be anything about his life that demonstrates he is smarter than anyone else. He hasn’t done anything.

And his bizarre papers on the theory of everything appear to show that he shares the same baseless fantasies as other theists. I don’t see the scientific community rushing to embrace his theories that weren’t even his originally. And isn’t he still working as a bouncer in a nightclub and he is in his 50s. Einstein formed his earth shattering theories when he was 24. Langan is still desperately trying to find something equally powerful that makes sense and he hasn’t made it yet. He should perhaps stick to what he does best - solving omni puzzles

Needless to say he most certainly has not proved that a god exists.

Cris,

The only thing I can suggest for any of the critics is to first read it, understand it second (or at least attempt to), and then engage in discussion. Nothing is more inconvenient than someone squabbling about it or anything in particular without actually having done the footwork and background checking.

Einstein formed his earth shattering theories when he was 24.

And M theory has proved that Einstein may be wrong.

Langan sounds like a nut.

J.P.,

I did and din't find anything convincing.

From inspection, although he does a very good job explaining the terms, I think I would have to know some quantum physics and alot of computer science linguistic type stuft to have a good understanding.

I don't think this fellows choice of jobs (bouncer) is necessarily
a disqualifier for writing theories that rely on math, logic, and
theory.


Anyyyyhow, I looked at the article. There were alot of cool ideas
discussed. I did pick up on his emotional standpoint
towards 'believing' in 'God' at a couple of points.


The article seems to argue the following:

1) Science has failed to definitively show how the univers works.
2) We are made up of material in the universe.

3) We are self contained.
4) We evolve.
5) The specific materials we are mode from form a program which consequently allows us to achieve conciousness.
6) This program has syntax, language, operators, and functions.

7) The universe is self contained (much like a person).
8) The universe 'evolves'.
9) The universe itself is a quantum program that has syntax, language, operators, and functions (much like a person).
10) THEREFORE, the universe must be concious.
11) THEREFORE, the universe is God.

Which makes 'sense' because man was made in 'God'-s image
and therefore man is a reflection (mirror 'image'?) of reality/the universe ('God').


Anyhow, the article makes alot of fun points but does not prove
that 'God' exists. Just a random thought. If our 'bubble' of reality
were to pop, then 'God' would cease to exist; therefore, perhaps
a more valid question is where the heck did that 'bubble' come
from?

1) Science has failed to definitively show how the univers works.

False. Science has SO FAR failed to make more tha nan approximation of how the universe works. There is nothing to indicate that it is definite.

2) We are made up of material in the universe.

Well, unless you believe we have an immaterial soul, yes.

3) We are self contained.

What does that mean?

4) We evolve.

Presumably ,yes.

5) The specific materials we are mode from form a program which consequently allows us to achieve conciousness.

That is one theory of how consciousness functions, yes.

6) This program has syntax, language, operators, and functions.

Unfounded assumptions. In fact, this description fits a program for a binary computer. Your brain is not a binary computer, and we have no indication that it functions like one.

7) The universe is self contained (much like a person).

Since, per definition, "the universe" is all that exists, it is obviously self-contained. Very much UNLIKE a person, as a person interacts with its surroundings and depends on them.

8) The universe 'evolves'.

But not in the way a living thing does.

9) The universe itself is a quantum program that has syntax, language, operators, and functions (much like a person).

False, or at least, a far-fetched interpretation.

10) THEREFORE, the universe must be concious.

False. Even accepting #9, this conclusion requires the premise that all programs with syntax, language, operators, and functions are conscious. This premise is obviously false, thus invalidating the conclusion.

11) THEREFORE, the universe is God.

And, with the fall of #10, this falls too.


:rolleyes: I am less than impressed.

Hans

Smartest man proves God to be real

The smartest man in the world hasn't proved God to be real at all. What he has done is provided another theory.

What I am impressed with however is that the smartest man in the world believes the existence of God is real. All those people who do not believe in the possibility that a God exists must realise that they aren't very smart after all.

Hans, yes the fallacies are undeniably there but thanks for
going through each one in detail :). Definately not a proof for
'God'; however, I do recommend reading the article as there
is just alot of cool stuff in it (a moderate amount of logically valid
and very cool ideas).

Vienna Snuasages. Interesting point. Why the heck would
the smartest person on earth believe in 'God' after all? I am
guessing that even this great intellect can't escape the fact that
he has human needs and emotions.

Originally posted by Vienna
What I am impressed with however is that the smartest man in the world believes the existence of God is real. All those people who do not believe in the possibility that a God exists must realise that they aren't very smart after all.

"belief" either way is completely unwarrented and indicative of an emotional requisite by that POV's mental structure to assume one way or the other in order to validate whatever they need to validate to satiate that emotional requisite.

for instance our new friend J.P. seems to have an emotional requisite to intellectually snuggle with a bar dude who claims to be the smartest joe alive. oh how many reasons there could be for that.

further though we can tell that J.P. needs to believe in the idea of god for some reason. OH how many reasons there could be for THAT.

shall we theorize that he's gotten caught up in the causality thing? I mean something had to precede something and on and on and simply came to the conclusion that something had to have started it all, so he placed a mental stake in the sand, called that stake god and built the rest of his perspective on reality based on this assumption without realizing that it was an assumption?

maybe it was a relative or friend or just the way he was raised? maybe all of the people in his life that he truly loved and respected have ALWAYS told him about god and god's plan.. so while he tries to question it, he still cannot help but draw a conclusion relating to god because his love cannot be wrong. this love imprinted the notion of the existence god upon the foundations of his psyche, leading him to find a myriad of creative means by which to justify this structure as having a basis in physical reality. after all, in HIS reality, it HAS a basis (though that's of course not necessarily correlated with physical reality at all, merely one's impression of it).

i'm sure he means well and thinks that he's onto something...

of course we'll never know.

i might ask:

"why is the question of god pertinent?"

we can see the big bangy kind of thing as first..

why isn't that cause enough?

eh I'll drop it for now.

What I am impressed with however is that the smartest man in the world believes the existence of God is real. All those people who do not believe in the possibility that a God exists must realise that they aren't very smart after all.I think you are confusing a high IQ with the ability of being smart. He has done nothing to indicate that he can apply his IQ to anything that could be called smart.

Of course there are plenty of statistics that show a marked negative correlation between intelligence and religion.

http://www.objectivethought.com/atheism/iqstats.html

Originally posted by J.P.
Here is a paper written by Chris Langan, who is arguably the smartest individual in the world, in which he claims to have proof for the existence of God and souls:

http://www.iscid.org/papers/Langan_CTMU_092902.pdf

(may take a while to load)

From the November 2001 issue of Popular Science: "He's scored as high as 195 on IQ tests, a result so rare that experts estimate that fewer than 1 in a billion people can achieve it. A score off 100 is considered average and most university graduates come in at about 120."

Originally posted by Cris
I think you are confusing a high IQ with the ability of being smart. He has done nothing to indicate that he can apply his IQ to anything that could be called smart.


Yeah OK Cris - anyone with an IQ of 195 MUST be a dumbass....LOL :D

Vienna,

Yeah OK Cris - anyone with an IQ of 195 MUST be a dumbassI didn’t say that, just that it doesn’t follow that someone with a high IQ will be smart, in the same way that someone with a lower IQ will necessarily be dumb. For example I think it takes someone pretty smart to rise to be the president of the USA and arguably the most powerful man in the world, yet GW Bush has only slightly above average IQ.

I’m considering ‘smart’ here to mean a demonstrable use of whatever intelligence they might have. Here we see that GW has probably stretched himself to the limit whereas it is very unclear that Langan has used his high IQ, i.e. he has not demonstrated ‘smartness’.

So as Wes points out Langan might simply be basing his assertion for God on emotional desires rather than any latent and undemonstrated higher intelligence.

The danger is that becuase someone has a high IQ that anything they say will reflect high intelligence. This doesn't necessarily follow.

Of course, being intelligent has absolutely nothing to do with being correct about any particular thing.

Langan's theory meets a fatal flaw in Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. If the Universe/God is a formally complex system then it is, by Godel's proof, incomplete.

Additionally, if Langan has indeed come up with a 'Theory of Everything' I would be interested to know how he has reconciled QED with Gravity.

~Raithere

Originally posted by Raithere


Additionally, if Langan has indeed come up with a 'Theory of Everything' I would be interested to know how he has reconciled QED with Gravity.

~Raithere

Duh!! God did it.

All those people who do not believe in the possibility that a God exists must realise that they aren't very smart after all.

You know I agree somewhat. Many people who argue against god forget that the chances of an all omnipotent being existing are just as solid as the opposite of that. We nearly do not know enough to come to valid conclusion to support any side of the argument.

Those who say that god is nothing but unfounded faith forget that not believing in god, totally denying his/her existence is also unfounded faith.

Originally posted by sargentlard
Duh!! God did it.No sgt. I'm referring to this:

http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything

'God did it.' Does not suffice.

Those who say that god is nothing but unfounded faith forget that not believing in god, totally denying his/her existence is also unfounded faith.Of course, not believing in god and believing god does not exist are not the same thing. Disbelief requires no faith.

~Raithere

Originally posted by Raithere
No sgt. I'm referring to this:

http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything

'God did it.' Does not suffice.


Ok so that was an attempt at humor on my part. It failed..yes..but i tried.

Originally posted by Crunchy Cat
Hans, yes the fallacies are undeniably there but thanks for
going through each one in detail :). Definately not a proof for
'God'; however, I do recommend reading the article as there
is just alot of cool stuff in it (a moderate amount of logically valid
and very cool ideas).

Vienna Snuasages. Interesting point. Why the heck would
the smartest person on earth believe in 'God' after all? I am
guessing that even this great intellect can't escape the fact that
he has human needs and emotions. So, how great is that intellect? He has presented a chain of arguments, and I can pick them apart. Presuming that chain of arguments is his best effort in that direction, the obvious conclusion is that in this field I'm at least as smart as he is (and so are the others here who also saw the fallacies).

SO why should we find his opinion more interesting than that of the next guy?

Hans

we should take him seriously because he has a really high IQ!

except who made up the IQ test, his little brother?

He has presented a chain of arguments, and I can pick them apart.


Then do so.

I did in a previous post.

Hans

Originally posted by guthrie
we should take him seriously because he has a really high IQ!

except who made up the IQ test, his little brother? You know, even proponents of IQ tests acknowledge that an IQ test measures - the person's ability to score in an IQ test. To be sure, there is SOME correlation between intelligence and that ability, but not any direct ratio. You can meet people who score poorly, yet function very well and appear quite bright, and others (and this is more often) who score high, but do not seem sensible.

Even an arguably high intelligence is no guarantee that what you say makes sense. Simply put, being intelligent does not neccessarily equal being smart.

Hans

Okay, I know that this isn't a physics forum, but I'm reading the paper and I'm going to take issue with a couple of things. First problem: the conception of time.

Why does every model of the universe assume that time exists outside of the present? The fact that we remember that something happened does not mean that the past still exists in any way.

The concept of the past as some kind of physical trail that we leave behind us in the "space/time continuum" is possibly only a metaphor, and the concept of some kind of deterministic future as a road that we have yet to travel is kind of the same...

If the universe is simply a system of interacting particles, then the past is only something that we remember in order to try to understand the interactions, and the future is something that we try to predict for the same reason. The fact that we do this at all seems to be proof enough to believe in free will...

Second problem: metaphorical construction.

My main problem with this "Theory of Everything" so far is that it only attempts to provide a metaphor for the universe, and metaphorical reference will not lead to the "absolute truth" any faster or more accurately than scientific study... if you understand how a car works in terms of little gnomes running around inside and turning little cranks, it's great that you're trying to understand and all but you're still wrong.

So, looking for a compelling picture of how "everything" works (in this case, so far, a self-modifying computer program, or so it seems) kind of presumes that reality is simple enough to jam into some small subset of itself and thereby be accurately modeled. This is giving human intelligence too much credit for extrapolation. I'm sorry, but if you look at a cube you don't see a cube, you see 1, 2, or 3 sides of the cube and extrapolate its shape from a two-dimensional image. We're good at it with visual perception, but you still don't have a complete understanding of the cube from that one image.

Exactly Hans.

Bigbluehead has also put his finger straight on one of my unspoken niggles.

we should take him seriously because he has a really high IQ!

except who made up the IQ test, his little brother?

LOL!
That sarcastic remark really does sum up what I think about this matter.


Simply put, being intelligent does not neccessarily equal being smart.

Exactly!
Success in academics does not come from being naturally bright. It comes from being inquisitive, strong-willed, and determined. You must also be willing to learn.

You must also know how to apply that knowledge.

Originally posted by mountainhare
LOL!
That sarcastic remark really does sum up what I think about this matter.

Exactly!
Success in academics does not come from being naturally bright. It comes from being inquisitive, strong-willed, and determined. You must also be willing to learn.

You must also know how to apply that knowledge.
----------
M*W: Well said!

I have been somewhat watching this guy and loosely following his "TOE" for a few years now.
Why?
The same reason that so many people believe he is right.
Because I WANT him to be right.

He is the underdog that everyone wants to root for.
Beyond that, he personifies so many peoples' desire to be that Joe Blow that comes up from nowhere and has no formal training to thumb his nose at all the "smart" scientists and say, "No. You have it all wrong. Here's the answer you have been looking for."
They want him to be that guy who changes the world and wins the Nobel Prize and changes the way everyone thinks by no means other than his won intellect.

People (including me) want that romanticized version of the underdog to win.
However, wanting him to be right, and him actually being right are not the same thing.
That desire tends to cloud objective judgement.

Originally posted by J.P.
Here is a paper written by Chris Langan, who is arguably the smartest individual in the world, in which he claims to have proof for the existence of God and souls:
...........................................From the November 2001 issue of Popular Science: "He's scored as high as 195 on IQ tests, a result so rare that experts estimate that fewer than 1 in a billion people can achieve it. A score off 100 is considered average and most university graduates come in at about 120."
..............................................
;)
He maybe smart, but certainly he is not inspired.
He can't prove the impossible.
Moreover, your hero'IQ is beaten great deal by the astronomical IQ of this woman:
http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache:KH3KsLwvMg4J:www.marilynvossavant.c om/+Marilyn+vos+Savant+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

:cool:

Where does it say what her IQ is?

*edit, I found a page that says her highest IQ score was 228, but it was determined in the 1960's. Her 'adult' IQ has scored at 180 using modern techniques.
quoted from the same page as the previous imformation http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marilyn_vos_Savant
Currently, a Japanese-Korean-American boy of 12 years of age is the current record holder of highest IQ title, so high that it is unmeasurable, but beyond IQ of 228.

Currently, he graduated from Loyola university magna cum laud at the age of 12, and attends the University of Chicago Medical school on a full scholarship.
The next Doogie Howser?

Originally posted by Idle Mind
Where does it say what her IQ is?

*edit, I found a page that says her highest IQ score was 228, but it was determined in the 1960's. Her 'adult' IQ has scored at 180 using modern techniques.

The next Doogie Howser?
:)
There is some sort of controversy about her actual IQ.
However most critics agree that it is at least 197.
Check out this link. Notice at the end of it the IQs of the historical geniuses. Einstein's IQ is 160!
[http://www.wiskit.com/marilyn/iq.html]
:D

He maybe smart, but certainly he is not inspired.
He can't prove the impossible.
Moreover, your hero'IQ is beaten great deal by the astronomical IQ of this woman:
http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache...&hl=en&ie=UTF-8


Actually no. Quote: COMMENT: With regard to super-high childhood IQ scores [derived from: (MA/CA) x 100]: It is clear from Hollingworth's work and the work of others that there is a marked "regression to the mean" with maturity. It has been suggested that childhood "ratio" scores have a natural standard deviation of 24 (cf. the Cattell Scale), so it is necessary to multiply the excess above the mean by 2/3rds to convert a childhood score to an adult score with the conventional SD16. That would imply the following adult scores: IQ 200+ for Sidis, and IQ 185 for Savant. Still, extremely high, but more probable.

http://home8.swipnet.se/~w-80790/



A seemingly idiot can be a genius, a genius can be an idiot within other areas. I don't believe Savant is an exception to this rule.

Look for an example at the Marilyn was wrong website:

http://www.wiskit.com/marilyn/


http://home8.swipnet.se/~w-80790/Q&A/Q&A.htm#06/13/98


However, serious research have showed that a person scoring around 210 St-Bin as a child, normally scores around 170 St-Bin as an adult (Like a really brilliant mathematician).


http://home8.swipnet.se/~w-80790/Q&A/Q&A.htm#05/08/99

9) The universe itself is a quantum program that has syntax, language, operators, and functions (much like a person).

False, or at least, a far-fetched interpretation.

Don't you have to explain "why" [9.] is wrong and if you understand what the words "syntax, operators, functors ...etc" mean, and if, or not, those concepts correspond to what exists, before you can pronounce [9.] false?



10) THEREFORE, the universe must be concious.

False. Even accepting #9, this conclusion requires the premise that all programs with syntax, language, operators, and functions are conscious. This premise is obviously false, thus invalidating the conclusion.

Some programs are more complex than others. In order to say that [10.] is false, you must prove that the universe is far too simplistic to be "conscious". You have not.

Therefore MRC_Hans' refutation is refuted.

Conclusion?

Chris Langan has done[and is doing] his homework.


About all you did was throw out several opinions without any logical meat behind them. I would advise you to lose the smug air and read through the list before going any further.

God is a perfect entity:
It is assumed that propositions are true when they correspond to what exists. To accept that the total existence "exists" cannot be an assumption. It is a perfect correspondence to truth, which should not be at all problematic, because: "necessarily it is a truth, or necessarily it is not a truth", which is an absolutely true statement. An absolutely true statement is a perfection. Both this ontological initialization of the necessarily recognizable instantiated universal sufficiency itself, and the existential truths that follow from it, are non-assumptional, and therefore exactly "true" because of an exact generic correspondence to existence, or they are correspondingly exactly generally false iff existence does not exist.

The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of potentiality of existence, and conversely, the potentiality of existence is obviously, negation of the potentiality of non-existence. If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition; ergo, either nothing exists, or else an entity that is absolutely-compositionally-existential, necessarily composes existence. By definition, the compositional entity is perfect, if it is absolute. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in some composition of total existence, which, necessarily exists. Therefore, total existence is an entity being an absolute, that is to say, a perfection. Ergo, for all intents and purposes, the perfect entity is God.


Here is a very interesting Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe paper:

http://www.polymath-systems.com/intel/hiqsocs/megasoc/noes44/newcomb.html

"Chris Langan has done[and is doing] his homework."

J.P.

Your arguments have been shown to be weak by about every person other than you posting in this thread.

This makes you seem more like a cultist with a IQerotic fixation on Cris Langden, than a person actually questioning the idea of "god".

Argument from authority is a commonly recognised logical fallacy. It doesn't matter how high somebody's IQ is. You still need to examine their claims to determine if they are correct about any particular thing. It simply isn't good enough to say "They're so smart, they MUST be right!" Even geniuses can be wrong. Einstein was wrong about many things.

Originally posted by J.P.
[B]God is a perfect entity:

I disagree.
if god created man in his image,as your book says,then man
(does it include woman?)
would also be perfect.
we all know it aint so,dont we?

http://www.geocities.com/inquisitive79/

Anyone consider that J.P. is Chris Langan? The J.P. posts and the articles both have the same gibberish quality, the same seriously flawed logic, and similar style.

Just a thought.

J.P.,
I hate to be mean, but this comes across as just so much gibberish. I'm going to translate and you let me know if I'm missing something here.

J.P. > It is assumed that propositions are true when they correspond to what exists.

Somewhat problematic without addressing modality but we'll go with it for now.

J.P. > To accept that the total existence "exists" cannot be an assumption.

Translation: Everything that exists; exists.

J.P. > It is a perfect correspondence to truth, which should not be at all problematic, because: "necessarily it is a truth, or necessarily it is not a truth", which is an absolutely true statement.

Translation: The previous statement is true which is not problematic because a statement is necessarily either true or false, this is absolutely true. (We'll ignore modal problems with this statement for the moment.)

J.P. > An absolutely true statement is a perfection.

It depends upon what you mean by 'a perfection'. As it stands the statement is nonsensical or perhaps may be taken as a definition.

J.P. > Both this ontological initialization of the necessarily recognizable instantiated universal sufficiency itself, and the existential truths that follow from it, are non-assumptional,

Translation: (I have no f-ing clue what you are trying to say here. What is a 'necessarily recognizable instantiated universal sufficiency'?)

J.P. > and therefore exactly "true" because of an exact generic correspondence to existence, or they are correspondingly exactly generally false iff existence does not exist.

Translation: This proposition is true because it corresponds to what exists.

J.P. > The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of potentiality of existence, and conversely, the potentiality of existence is obviously, negation of the potentiality of non-existence.

I disagree completely. The potentialities are perfectly compatible; it is the actualities that are negations of each other. Something may potentially exist or not exist, but it cannot exist and not exist in the same frame of reference.

J.P. > If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition;

Translation: The whole is greater than the part.

J.P. > ergo, either nothing exists, or else an entity that is absolutely-compositionally-existential, necessarily composes existence.

Translation: Therefore either nothing exists or the whole of existence, comprised of existent parts, exists.

J.P. > By definition, the compositional entity is perfect, if it is absolute.

Same thing as before, what exactly do you mean by 'perfect' and 'absolute'?

J.P. > Now we exist either in ourselves, or in some composition of total existence, which, necessarily exists.

I don't see where you've established that anything necessarily exists.

J.P. > Therefore, total existence is an entity being an absolute, that is to say, a perfection. Ergo, for all intents and purposes, the perfect entity is God.

Basically, this is just another unfounded assertion. Translation: God is the totality of existence.


It just doesn't work J.P.

~Raithere

Rait, nice try.

You might also like to take a stab at the latest Rumsfeld "Foot in Mouth" award -

"We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know."

John Lister, spokesman for the campaign which strives to have public information delivered in clear, straightforward English, said: "We think we know what he means. But we don't know if we really know."

http://www.rense.com/general45/rumsfeldlondon.htm

:D :D

Originally posted by Cris

You might also like to take a stab at the latest Rumsfeld "Foot in Mouth" award -

"We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know."


I find the 'Foot in the Mouth' award wrongly given to Rumsfeld who speaks some sense after all.

Known knowns - Oil

Known Unknowns - Iraqi WMD

Unknown Unkowns - Implies a potential un-known future cause that would help an US adventure not-known at present. :p

Originally posted by Cris
You might also like to take a stab at the latest Rumsfeld "Foot in Mouth" award -I take no responsibility for that mess. ;) I never said I could get it to make sense. I was trying to reduce J.P.'s argument into something comprehensible but as I parsed out each statement the whole thing fell apart.

But I'll take the award anyway. :D

~Raithere

J.P.
The word "prove" raises a lot of arguments. What can be called "proved"?
I did not finish the reading because he did not reach my standard of seriousness by defining every concepts he used to build a structure of undersanding. Without a concret begining, everything following sounds shaky.

you call this logics?

Rait,

LOL, it seems I am guilty of not being clear either. :o

I think you need an award for attempting to unravel and decode gibberish and for your immense patience.

If anyone can unravel 'Foot in the Mouth' confusion then you are my favorite choice.

Originally posted by Cris
LOL, it seems I am guilty of not being clear either. :o

I think you need an award for attempting to unravel and decode gibberish and for your immense patience.

If anyone can unravel 'Foot in the Mouth' confusion then you are my favorite choice.Ah... in that case I humbly thank you.

I was considering your suggestion that J.P. is Langan but after reading a bunch of Langan's work I don't think so. J.P. just seems to have been contaminated by his writing style. Langan actually has some ideas I find interesting but his prose is unnecessarily (or perhaps deliberately) confusing and his theories far from being proven or complete.

I think if he backed off of the idea that he's solved the riddle of existence and worked on developing and explaining his idea's more clearly and concisely some of his ideas might be taken more seriously. But he needlessly confuses things, using 20 words when 10 would have sufficed, using ambiguous terms, and inventing new terms when they are not really needed. J.P. comes across similarly. As in this wonderful example here:

"If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition;"

Which essentially breaks down into meaning 'the whole is greater than the part'. Similarly reduced the whole argument crumbles into a set of unproven assertions and while some are individually true or provable, the conclusion is unwarranted.

The clever part (truly brilliant) is the insinuation of the term 'entity' which is a wonderful use of ambiguity. In context one would interpret it to mean 'something that exists' but it also brings in the notion of 'a being' which is yet unfounded in the argument. Yet agreement with the assertion sneaks in a tacit agreement that opens the door for the idea of god.

I think both J.P. and Langan tend to use this over-worked loquacity to confuse and intimidate or impress their opponents. There's an interesting 5 page discussion on Langan's site where he attempts to explain his theory to someone which displays his style very nicely. Despite the man's pleading for Langan to take it slowly and not to introduce too much of his CTMU theory too quickly he keeps flooding the discussion with it. Perhaps this is caused by his high IQ and he just has difficulty speaking at a more common level but I tend to think that it isn't.

~Raithere

Rait,

Yes I am sure you are correct.

But I think that -

"If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition;"

deserves some type of award.

Take care
Cris

"If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but PLANT CELLS, then such PLANT CELLS are greater in existence than an existing PLANT, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing PLANT must contain all* existing PLANT CELLS, by definition;"

Want to give awards.?! :D

all* - is it necessary.?

Your arguments have been shown to be weak by about every person other than you posting in this thread.

This makes you seem more like a cultist with a IQerotic fixation on Cris Langden, than a person actually questioning the idea of "god".


Well, ...OK, whatever you say Wes ;)

Your insights have been most helpful.

Anyyyyhow, I looked at the article. There were alot of cool ideas discussed. I did pick up on his emotional standpoint
towards 'believing' in 'God' at a couple of points.

The article seems to argue the following:

"Seems" is quite an appropriate remark.


1) Science has failed to definitively show how the univers works.

It says that? I must have missed it.


False. Science has SO FAR failed to make more tha nan approximation of how the universe works. There is nothing to indicate that it is definite.

If the assumption is wrong (i.e. the first numbered statement), what does that make your conclusion?


2) We are made up of material in the universe.

Again, the CTMU says that? And again, I must have missed it.


3) We are self contained.

What does that mean?


It doesn't say that "We" are self-contained, it says that *Reality* is self-contained. What this means: if anything were outside of reality and could somehow influence reality, then it would be inside reality. No observations can be made outside of reality for this reason.


4) We evolve.

Presumably ,yes.

Indeed.


5) The specific materials we are mode from form a program which consequently allows us to achieve conciousness.


It says nothing of this sort. Are we talking about the same CTMU here? I think the CTMU says that consciousness transcends reality, and not that is is some sort of "program".


That is one theory of how consciousness functions, yes.

Perhaps, but that theory is not the CTMU.


6) This program has syntax, language, operators, and functions.

Unfounded assumptions. In fact, this description fits a program for a binary computer. Your brain is not a binary computer, and we have no indication that it functions like one.

Unfounded assumptions would be something like this: "This program ..." - first of all, there is no program. The CTMU speaks of UBT (Unbound Telesis), and it also talks about SCSPL (Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language). I'm beginning to wonder if you have any experience (at all) with formal logic?


7) The universe is self contained (much like a person).

Where are you getting the impression that the self-containment principle has anything to do with people?


Since, per definition, "the universe" is all that exists, it is obviously self-contained. Very much UNLIKE a person, as a person interacts with its surroundings and depends on them.

Again, the CTMU doesn't make any reference to humans being "self-contained" - now that is something unfounded.


8) The universe 'evolves'.

But not in the way a living thing does.

What kind of expert are you? You state, "but not in the way a living thing does", yet you offer absolutely no explanation in how the universe differs from a "living thing". Strangely, if you look close enough you might come to notice no distinction between a "living thing" and the "universe".


9) The universe itself is a quantum program that has syntax, language, operators, and functions (much like a person).

Strange, you seem to be stuck on the "program" idea, and also the relationship between universe and "person". I can't force myself to believe you gathered this from the CTMU.


False, or at least, a far-fetched interpretation.

The only interpretation that is far-fetched is ... I will save the insults, but you need serious revision.


10) THEREFORE, the universe must be concious.

What!? Where did you pull this one from? Seriously, if you are here to joke around this isn't the place.


False. Even accepting #9, this conclusion requires the premise that all programs with syntax, language, operators, and functions are conscious. This premise is obviously false, thus invalidating the conclusion.

From #1 - #10 you made up your own little statements and own little conclusions about them, all while none of which have anything to do with actual CTMU material.


11) THEREFORE, the universe is God.

Universe = God.

Its called Pantheism, aside from the CTMU, Pantheism has numerous insightful and logically based references. It would only be to your benefit to research this material.


And, with the fall of #10, this falls too.

Yes, that's right - the same #10 that mysteriously came from the CTMU when we weren't looking.


Anyhow, the article makes alot of fun points but does not prove that 'God' exists. Just a random thought. If our 'bubble' of reality were to pop, then 'God' would cease to exist; therefore, perhaps a more valid question is where the heck did that 'bubble' come from?

Interesting use of logic.


I am less than impressed.

Remarkable! After reading this I am left with the same reflection - how ironic indeed.

Originally posted by Raithere
J.P.,
I hate to be mean, but this comes across as just so much gibberish.



Using 2-valued logic, the statement becomes:

[Existence is a paradox] or [existence is not a paradox]

If existence is "NOT" a paradox, then existence is completely logical.

If existence is both a paradox and not a paradox, then it is

P and ~P

which is a P, paradox.

Absolute truth?

If we observe a logically consistent universe, the conclusion is that the universe is a self resolving paradox.


Is it metaphysically objectionable with regards to formulating existential paradox in terms of sentenial relations encapsulating true and false predications, in a noncompliance with certain restrictions against the sentences in any formalizable language, with self ability to express predicated truth value? However necessary, paradox in all of its many splendored forms, does not involve self-denial or self affirmation of categorical truth, with which we concern ourselves, to prohibit a solution to the liar paradox in formal languages? Alas, the assumption and conclusion are metalogical expressions in a heretofore informal metalanguage. It most certainly must refer to the truth and falsehood of the antecedent and consequent of a certain true conditional, expressed in the object language of standard propositional logic.

It need not be that the modality of the liar paradox be oh so disquieting. The modality of a proposition's being, such, that it can be either true or false, whether or not it can be reduced away, or driven underground in Bertrand Russellian fashon, by making reference instead to a proposition's being true or false indifferently, is ineliminably, and unalienably, part of the metalogic of the definition of a material conditional, just as it is ineffably and ineliminably part of the higher-order metalogical semantic characterization of the concept of deductive validity. It must be metalogically conclusive to say most truly of a true conditional, that if its antecedent is true, then, its consequent must be true or necessarily is true, and that if its antecedent is false then its consequent can be or is possibly either true or false, and of a false conditional that it must be or is necessarily such that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. For such as it may be, it is by means of these modalities of truth conditions in the metalogic of standard propositional logic and predicate calculus that we define the conditional, by all means necessary and sufficient. It is categorically in terms of the inevitable truth table requirements, that the metalogical paradox about which the conditional contraposition is most necessarily proposed, to, which the deductively valid transformation rule of conditional contraposition is then applied most judiciously with metalogical paradoxical implications notwithstanding.
Trivial but absolute: Existence "Exists"...

Using 2-valued logic, the statement becomes:Why do you assume that 2-valued logic is applicable here? When we consider such things as QED, superposition, or the wave-function of a photon it seems to me that the nature of existence defies such a limited duality. Nor do I see that you've actually resolved or offered anything new here. To be or not to be, is rather old observation.

If we observe a logically consistent universe, the conclusion is that the universe is a self resolving paradox.What paradox?

Is it metaphysically objectionableWhat the fuck does 'metaphysically objectionable' mean? Is that like epistemologically contrite?

Trivial but absolute: Existence "Exists"...Wow. What a mind-breaker.

Look J.P. I'm not going to apologize for being rude anymore because I find your posts ridiculous. They essentially amount to a snow-job. While I am awed by your ability to transform rather simple observations into jargon filled, grandiose sounding, conundrums your arguments reduce into purely trivial observations linked by faulty logic to unwarranted conclusions.

If reality is formally syntactic there are indeed certain things we can infer about it. But that's a big 'if' and you haven't proven it. Nor does it seem to be very well explored in your treatment of it. You're glossing over any number of assumptions. Finally it would be, by definition, incomplete (re: Gödel's Theorem) and therefore CTMU must be incomplete. You cannot simply 'wish' it away by stating that it's a self-resolving paradox. Not unless you bring the mathematical proof with you.

~Raithere

Originally posted by J.P.
Not only that, if you're around for long enough then you'll have the chance to witness the identical onslaught of pseudo-intellectualists like yourself whose nit-picking and so-called logical conclusions seem endless in quantity, regrettably not quality.[There seems to be a cycle of fresh recruits to constantly put together the same argument(s) and ask the same question(s)]. New people repetitively asking old questions (and old people repetitively asking old questions) can be exceptionally demanding
and strenuous for Chris (as I can only imagine). The only thing I can suggest for any of the critics is to first read the CTMU, Understand it second, and then engage in discussion.

so you come to this forum, insult everyone in it, try to shove your crock of shit down everyone's throat and then fucking whine about it when people trash your argument.

you sir, are an annoying prick.

it might be fun to actually debate your pile of shit if you weren't such a wannabe intellectual cunt.

(yes both a prick and a cunt, you seem to at least entertain yourself)

show you're a human. show you give a fuck about people. show you are a fucking TEACHER if you think you have something to teach. the debate tactic "I'm smarter than you, you cretin, you dolt" won't do much to enlighten anyone if you can't properly defend it when very bright people (like cris and raithere) "nitpick".

ass.

Here's a for instance:

Agnosticism dictates that the question of god is fundamentally unknowable (basically since you can never know if there is a system functioning outside the system you're currently in, unless you find out and then you don't know if there's one outside of that.. blah blah blah).

You advocate a "theory" (the 'pile of shit' referred to above) that seemingly ignores that conclusion.

Can you explain briefly how it is possible to know that which can't be known?

Is it because Chris Langden's IQ is so high?

:rolleyes:

Or is just good at IQ tests. But there doesn’t seem to be anything about his life that demonstrates he is smarter than anyone else. He hasn’t done anything. You seem so quick to criticise this guy's intelligence (Chris Langan's) Chris, and I agree with you, he hasn't really done anything, but that doesn't mean he's not intelligent, or even highly intelligent. Yes someone else proposed the theory of evolution, which has take time to be produced (in terms of history), and no doubt he uses other peoples theories, but that doesn't mean they are all incorrect. Anyway, isn't 'I.Q' (and it's tests) about noticing a proper correlation between seemingly random aspects??

langan was not able to succeed in college nor has he ever established himself as reputable in any field. the guy is completely full of himself. he is a laughing stock by anyone who even knows the slightest bit about anything.

[ ... snip ... ]

so you come to this forum, insult everyone in it, try to shove your crock of shit down everyone's throat and then fucking whine about it when people trash your argument.

I feel obligated to apologize for giving you - or anyone - the impression that I was directly insulting someone. To some extent, I was [if you characterize a group of people as I had done], but I certainly did not name names and I didn't mean anyone in particular and it was definitely a generalization. I didn't mention much about those few people who made their way here and actually contributed a thing or two - my focus wasn't on any of them. I would estimate for every 20 people who attempt to analyze the CTMU, only 1 or 2 get at least half of it straight - including me, I was one of those 18 - 19 others who didn't quite get it at first.

I've been following the CTMU for quite some time now, and I've had plenty of questions of my own. In due time, nearly everything I have asked has been addressed, and I soon found out that I didn't know as much as I thought I did about the subject. I think the same can be said for a number of people visiting this forum.


you sir, are an annoying *****.

I get the impression that you are insecure of yourself at this forum. Perhaps you felt as if I was including you in that generalization and I'm sorry for that. But I wasn't including you - in fact I wasn't even talking to you.

it might be fun to actually debate your pile of **** if you weren't such a wannabe intellectual ****.

Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, no matter how useless it is.

(yes both a ***** and a ****, you seem to at least entertain yourself)

LOL! That I do!

show you're a human. show you give a **** about people. show you are a ******* TEACHER if you think you have something to teach. the debate tactic "I'm smarter than you, you
cretin, you dolt" won't do much to enlighten anyone blah blah blah

Calling me a "cunt" and thinking of yourself as "bright" in the same post wouldn't really give much credit to either. Again, I must apologize for invoking such a response, I truly am sorry. I feel like we could have gotten much further if not for this.

If the universe is closed, the "information" or entangled quantum states cannot leak out of the closed system. So the density of entangled quantum states, continually increases, as the entropy must always increase.

Response from Raithere:
Sorry but I still have a problem with this, where is the 'additional' energy/information coming from? If two waves constructively interfere all we have is the sum of the two waves. Additionally, in a closed universe entropy is only a local phenomena, it remains constant for the whole.

Each quantum-wave intersection corresponds (I think) to processed information. The energy is re-quantized, so the total energy of a system is a constant. Information is compressed and matter shrinks.



Langan's theory meets a fatal flaw in Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. If the Universe/God is a formally complex system then it is, by Godel's proof, incomplete.

You're glossing over any number of assumptions. Finally it would be, by definition, incomplete (re: Gödel's Theorem) and therefore CTMU must be incomplete. You cannot simply 'wish' it away by stating that it's a self-resolving paradox. Not unless you
bring the mathematical proof with you.

http://www.polymath-systems.com/intel/hiqsocs/megasoc/noes44/newcomb.html


quote:

The solution of problems, and the resolution of paradoxes, are inherently computational activities. What, then, could be a better setting for this resolution than a computative one? And what could possibly be a more fitting preface than a brief introduction to the abstract theory of computation?

Consider an acceptor F = (Q, S,d,qo,A). Q is a finite nonempty set of internal states, S is an alphabet whose symbols are concat_enated as strings, qo c Q is the initial state, and A c Q is the set of accepting states triggered only by input recognizable to F. The transition mapping d, which governs the way in which F changes states, is deterministic if d:Q x S —> Q, but nondeterministic if d:Q x S —> 2Q (where 2Q is the set of all subsets of Q). In the nondeterministic case, d will be written dn, for clarity. In terms of human psychology, we might regard the 5-tuple of F as its "categorical imperative", or accepting syntax, and say that F projects this syntax onto its universe. Nothing in the universe of F is recognizable to it but the particular input strings (sense data, facts) which cause it to pass through some q e A; they are its phenomenal "reality", a subset of the noumenal metareality of the wider universe in which strings are representationally gener_ated and entered by programmers. The restriction to finite Q is pragmatic and amenable to conditional relaxation.

If F is deterministic, it accepts (recognizes) a string s e S* if and only if d(qo, s) e A. Since we have defined d only for the individual symbols s e S, we must define an extended transition function d': where l is the null string, d'(q,l) = q; and for all q e Q, s e S, and s e S* (where S* is the set of varirepetitional permutations of the d e S) , d'(q,ss) = d' (d' (q, s) ,s). Thus, the accepting behavior of F is defined inductively for s-quantized string extensions; the way in which we recognize and assimilate new bits of information within our reality is specified in d'. Were we to widen the discussion to imagination, conceptualization, theorization, or other intrinsic computations, we would need to consider "ideas"; we would have to generalize from recognition to abstraction by means of a nonlocal or self-iterating, input-free extension of d. If the reference to "strings" seems to imply a dimensional limitation on input, this too can be generalized.

Where F is nondeterministic, it accepts a string s e S* if and only if dn'(qo,s) n A = ~Ø. The nondeterministic extension dn' of dn is defined by induction: dn'(qo, l) = {q} , and dn'(q,ss) = Uq'cdn'(q,s) dn(q',s). I.e., q' is one of the possible successors of q under dn' given s; the unextended mapping dn on singletons of S* then determines the image under dn' of s plus an adjoint symbol s, given q'. This is a classical recursive definition. It describes a stepwise probabilistic ramification of computative potential whose complexity depends on dn.

Nondeterminism is not always restricted to Q x S; under certain conditions, either Q or S can be extended, or A shifted within Q. This. of course, entails a modification of F, unless F is defined to allow for parametric extension and adjustment. To this effect, let F' be such an open extension. To be meaningful in mechanistic contexts such as those in which acceptors are usually considered, F' must exist within an appropriate mechanistic extension of the computative environment of F. Organisms, being mechanical in the deterministic sense, need not be distinguished in this extension. Nondeterminism can be used to subtly manipulate recognition, thus cryptically modifying an acceptor's reality. Nondeterministic recognition can help to explain the ability of an acceptor to rapidly sieze certain kinds of higher-order phenomena, or even interact with higher-order agencies ordinarily insensible to it.

Having thus formalized the logical abstraction of recognition - i.e., the passive phase of organo-mechanical cognition - we now proceed to the output behavior of computative automata, or to the active phase of cognition. Consider a transducer M = (S,Q,T,d,m), where S is a finite nonempty input alphabet, Q a finite nonempty state set, T a finite nonempty output alphabet, d:Q x S —> Q the state-transition function, and m: Q x S —> T the output function. A computation of M has internal and external phases; through m, the output that M delivers back to its outward universe depends on strings of d-iterated transitional internal states. Thus, m is a functional of the function d of input. Together, m and d totally determine the behavior of M. They can be extended from S and T to S* and T* as for the acceptor F: d'(q,l) = q, m'(q,l) = l; and d'(q, ss) = d( d'(q,s),s), m'(q,ss) = m'(q,s) m(d'(q,s), s). Where appropriate, we can add to M an initial state ("reset control") qo: M = (S,Q,T,d',m',qo), to be regarded as a separator of locally independent computations, and put it at the disposal of a function r c M which determines computational relevancy.

Considered as a robotic brain, M T-behaves according to m, but Q-reasons towards its decisions along paths generated by d. Where d is deterministic, m may be related to it as a "timing function" according to which any computation can be arrested (input aborted, regression terminated) and converted to output on passing certain tests. Where the duration of the computation is determined with d, input becomes the only variable. Where input as well is fixed in content and scheduling, the entire system is tightly determined. As Laplace might have observed, predicting the behavior of deter_minate mechanisms requires only data, the means to acquire it, and a valid scientific methodology to organize and interpret it. While the situation is actually more complex, the fact remains that were one to play a deterministic game with a deterministic transducer like M, one would need only a detailed knowledge of its input and programming to predict the outcome, given analytic tools adequate for that purpose and consistent with one's own constraints (e.g., the amount of time available for analysis and strategy). If one's object in the game were merely the validation of one's prediction, so much the easier to win.

Suppose instead that M has nondetenninistic output capping mn, where state-transition may or may not be deterministic. Then the prediction of output entails control of mn by the predictor. To win a game of prediction, one must now control mn as well dn Sn to the extent chat it is output-critical; one must take over where the probabilistic mn leaves off. Since whichever control the transducer has over itself resides in mn and dn, one must in effect deprive it of self-control. The relevance to "free will" is obvious.

Computation is purposive. The purpose of an acceptor is pure recognition; no action is explicitly predicated on its internal transitions. The purpose of a transducer is conversion of input to output; yet, such a conversion is aimless unless algorithmic. Like yin and yang, acceptors and transducers are complementary; only together can they begin to resemble functional systems of organic complexity. In order to model organic systems, transducers must be endowed with goals and algorithms comparable to the ends and means of living beings. Algorithms are themselves purposive procedures which model both acceptance and transduction. The problems which comprise their input are scanned by preliminary steps for certain kinds of information, which must in turn be accepted as parameters by subsequent steps, and so on to the output stage (at which point the algorithm delivers its answer). The mechanistic representation of an algorithm must allow for the innate structure of a device, considered apart from the algorithm itself; this structure may have variant and invariant aspects. The algorithm simply conforms variables to purpose given the invariants. As the definitions of F and M might lead one to expect, this generally involves importing to M the set A c Q defined for F.

Human beings, it is said, are self-programming. Their thought is polyalgorithmic; useful algorithms are either meta-algorithmically constructed, or selected from a learned store, to deal with input. If learning, construction, and selection are deterministic, then they characterize a deterministic meta-algorithm not fundamentally different from any other deterministic algorithm we might study. If they are nondeterministic, then they are characteristic of a nondeterministic meta-algorithm, and likewise. It follows that the formal transductive model of human nature withstands any objection from the relative complexity of human mentality or behavior.

Newcomb's object-transducer MN naturally includes an acceptor: MN (S,Q,qo,d,A,m,T). Recognition is phasic; a string must often be "pre-accepted" for M to tell whether to accept or reject it. Ordinarily, this tentative phase of recognition is easily computed by the physical entities whose behavior is predicted by ND. To be "real", an input-quantum s must simply possess a certain first-order predicate, "reality", which - this being a self-validating tautology - induces a type-theoretic predicate stratification like that involving the old Cretan, Epimenides. To this sine qua non of recognition corresponds a primary element q1 of A; no input-quantum failing the q1-test is reified, whereas all those passing are relayed to Q - q1. Higher-order recognition of "passed" quanta then proceeds at a rate determined by the respective computational demands of the stratified-algorithmic phases of dM. Corresponding to the structure of A are various ordered states analogous to q1 within their respective levels of acceptance.

Let us narrow the definition of MN in a way consistent with Newcomb's problem. Suppose that associated with mM is a threshhold value b > 0 below which output is nil, but above which a decision will be finalized and implemented. With each qi c Q we associate a pair of strength coefficients ai, and ai2, to be incremented and decremented according to a strategic dM, appropriate to the Newcomb decision-theoretic context; these represent the current tendency, given the present amount of input, for MN to output either possible behavior (taking one or both boxes, respectively). The ai divide Q into three classes XQ, YQ, and ZQ, with membership conditions a, > a2, a, < a2, and a, = a2 respectively. To each qi is attached a total weight ai = |ai, - ai2|. As soon as the output condition [a = b] is met, a decision and behavior result which correspond to the Q-class of the current state (note that dM, being strategic, precludes q c ZQ, or "indecision", at the output deadline). Thus, the states of Q c MN are preferential and impetal, the graded fore-images of the outputs they favor. This is just a convenient way to view the internal configurations to which they correspond, and does not violate the general definition of transducers. Nor, for that matter, does it violate the way human beings perceive their own decision-making processes.

The question posed by Newcomb's problem involves the computative analysis, by a predictive agency with computative characteristics, of the computative analysis undertaken by a transducer on a given input. That input is the problem itself, presented in the manner prescribed by the formulation. This situation, which defines a computative regression, is recursive and inductively extensible. The regression in turn defines the only soluble context for the higher-level "paradox" generated by the problem. This context translates as mechanism. The mechanism is a stratified automaton G containing both the predictor and its object-transducer as sub-automata. Whether "free will" is defined determlnistically as mere outside non-interference in m and d, or nondeterministically as the ability of MN to override any exogenous restriction of mn or dn, its mechanism is contained in that of G.

Logical diagonalization of the formal computational language generated by the accepting syntax of MN directly implies that certain structural aspects of G may be unrecognizable to MN. In particular, those aspects involving MN-relativized nondeterminacy, as well as those involving certain higher-order predicates of the nondistributive, nonlocal organizations involving mM and dM, are formally undecidable to it and need not be recognized directly by it with any degree of specificity. To understand why, consider the extent to which a common computer "recognizes" the extended system including its cpu, its other components, its programmers, and the environment it inhabits. In fact, it can recognize nothing that does not conform to its input-to-output transformational grammar. Even if it were self-analytic, such analysis could be limited to a schematic electronic syntax which overlooks the material elements of which it is constructed. In any case, it can make sense of nothing but strings of input translated and rearranged according to the internal stratification of its hard and soft programming.

You, your purposes, and your dependencies are undecidable to it, and so are the mechanisms by which you can predict and control its behavior. It matters not who formulates this undecidability; if the machine's internal logic is inadequate to do so, yours surely is not (currently, most mechanical acceptors are nongeneralistic, treating complementation as negation and negation as rejection; this bars the tools of diagonalization from their computations). Should it ignore your higher prerogatives, you could "diagonalize" it - if nothing extrinsic to the machine were to stop you - with a sledgehammer whose effects on it do not depend on its acceptance. By analogy, Newcomb's object-transducer MN cannot preclude G on grounds of "insensibility". Nor, for chat matter, can we.

There are many self-styled experts on undecidability who have expressed the opinion that all attempts to reify Godel's theorem along paranormal lines reflect a misunderstanding of its "real nature". Such experts are quite correct in that a misunderstanding exists, but the misunderstanding is all theirs. What the theorem forces by juxtaposing truth and derivability (or consistency and completeness) is a hierarchical stratification of classes of truth functions and the inferential syntaxes which parametrize them. This stratification follows that of G, fractionating computative reality along with the "truth" to which it corresponds.

The stratification of G induces stratum-relativizations of computative time and space. Thus, the timetype in which MN computes recognition and output is a mere subtype of that in which it is programmed. Dynamical "arrows of determinacy" which are inviolable to MN, being programmed into its accepting syntax, have no force whatsoever to the programmatic agencies themselves. This applies just as well to "metrical" restrictions embodied in the MN-syntax; these may allow MN to recognize nothing but an artificial submetric of the metric in which these agencies define their own existence. MN and its reality might consist of quanta with higher-dimensional interpretations as the termini of channels for the transmission of information between strata. Metatemporal predicates may exist with respect to which those of MN, are definite only in a mutual sense; predicates which MN accepts as "before" and "after" could be the programmatic projections of "in front of" and "in back of", or any other G-consistent higher-prepositional relationships.

There can thus exist a mechanism x c G through which a predictor like ND could measure and/or control the mappings d, m c MN in ways directly insensible to MN. Where in G relative to MN would such a predictor have to be located? Precisely where access is available. Sirnplistically, we might characterize the predictor-M relationship as one of proper inclusion, where it is understood that prediction is direct rather than second-hand, and programmatic in the passive and active senses. That is, a programmer mentally internalizes the structure of that which he programs, and this internalization amounts to computative inclusion. The fine structure of G, while to a degree analytic, is a natter of some complexity. For now, it will suffice to have demonstrated the possibility of x and its utility to well-situated G-subautomata. Because G is structured to allow for relativized deteririnacy and nondeterminacy, the solution is invariant with respect to argumentation involving mind-brain dichotomy. That is, such dichotomies reduce to distinctions of determinacy and nondeterminacy, and may be treated in kind.

Restricted dominance, which relies on probabilistic independence derived from the lower-order, local istic dynamical timetype of MN's artificially restricted "reality", is revealed under G-extension to be 'itself dominated by utility. That is, the subjective utility of MN forces the assimilation by dM of this entire demonstration, which disables restricted dominance and thus frees the strategic component to recognize higher patterns among observed data. The principle of restricted dominance, though valid as long as the reality of MN remains unbreached, loses all force in the presence of exodynamic influence.

Let's sum it up. You can be modeled as a deterministic or nondeterministic transducer with an accepting syntax that can be diagonalized, or complemented by logical self-negation. ND can be modeled as a metalogical, metamechanistic programmatic agency, some insensible part of whom surrounds you in a computational space Including physical reality, but not limited thereto. This space is the mechanistic equivalent of the computative regression around which Newcomb's problem is essentially formulated. The existence of this space cannot be precluded by you on the grounds that you cannot directly observe it, nor can it be said by you to deny ND a mechanism of control and prediction of your thought and behavior. Additionally, you have an open-ended run of data which lowers to 1/ 8 the probability that NO is "just lucky". This implies that mechanism does indeed exist, and warrants the adjunction to the axioms of physics an independent, empirical physical axiom affirming that mechanism. This then implies that ND can predict or control human thought and behavior (a somewhat weaker implication, you will notice, than "omniscience"). ND possesses means, motive, opportunity...and you. You are "possessed" by Newcomb's Demon, and whatever self-interest remains to you will make you take the black box only. (Q.E.D.)


I was considering your suggestion that J.P. is Langan but after reading a bunch of Langan's work I don't think so. J.P. just seems to have been contaminated by his writing style.I think both J.P. and Langan tend to use this over-worked loquacity to confuse and intimidate or impress their opponents. There's an interesting 5 page discussion on Langan's site where he attempts to explain his theory to someone which displays his style very nicely. Despite the man's pleading for Langan to take it slowly and not to introduce too much of his CTMU theory too quickly he keeps flooding the discussion with it. Perhaps this is caused by his high IQ and he just has difficulty speaking at a more common level but I tend to think that it isn't.

Trust me, Langan knows what he is talking about, more than I do.

/Wow Wes, are you reaching a breaking point or something? ;)

Are you stupid or something? LOL.

Figures a sorry assed lemming like yourself wouldn't address a single point! YOU ARE A FRAUD, and you make me sick. :D

/Wes, you are assuming that you know what you are talking about but unless you demonstrate it, by giving us a few "new" mathematical insights then you are only huffing an puffing around.

Not much for word problems there bright boy?

/Soon your brain will reach a type of informational
equilibrium, as maximum entropy sets in.

LOL. What a jerk! Is this all you have? And you expect to be taken seriously? You are a joke! Address points or you'll be taken for an idiot. Sadly, I think you are doomed for the latter.

/I have witnessed first hand the mathematical genius of people like Chris Langan ;)

LOL. What a powerful point! LOSER! LOL. OH man you're killing me the quality comedy. You sir, are pathetic.

/So, the equations please...

I gave you simple logic which you wholly failed to address. It's beneath you eh? Oh, you need someone else to think for you? Okay, I'm a genius. My IQ is WAY HIGH. Does that make you want to suckle? Here's a teat bitch, have fun!

LOL.

I think your failure to address a simple point is indicative of your inability to do so.

Oh man THIS is your response? Appeal to authority? Sweet. Did the world's smartest man tell you to try that approach? "hey jp, go tell everyone I'm smarter than them!" LOL. He must not like you or isn't as smart as you give him credit for.

Did you know that mathematical aptitude isn't the total measure of intelligence, and the IQ tests are a pretty half-assed measurement of one's insight or (real world) problem solving capability? YOu were probably overpowerd by the smell of langen's ass and lost focus? Gawd. LOL. Shall we delve a little further into your phsyche? Would you prefer to be civil and avoid your ridiculous appeal to authority and realize you are talking with some pretty sharp guys who need to be addresses seriously? Are you simply incapable? Pathetic man, pathetic.

/Calling me a "cunt" and thinking of yourself as "bright" in the same post wouldn't really give much credit to either. Again, I must apologize for invoking such a response, I truly am sorry. I feel like we could have gotten much further if not for this.

At least you appear semi-human in that post, thank you.

So you think the use of the word cunt and one's relative intellect are directly correlated? Please produce the math. LOL. Get over yourself man! Hey did you know that some people are better with verbal reasoning than with math? It's weird! Not everyone thinks the same! I swear.

The CTMU is entirely irrelavant if it claims there is an answer to the god problem, as it assumes that this is knowable. If you can justify that assumption (or any others required by its content) then you may be able to present a reasonable argument. Otherwise, uhm.. well, your point(s) are wholly moot.

when langan is published in a respectable journal, i then may read what he has to say. since he is total crap though. imnot going to read anything he has to say.

Originally posted by J.P.
If the universe is closed, the "information" or entangled quantum states cannot leak out of the closed system. So the density of entangled quantum states, continually increases, as the entropy must always increase.

Each quantum-wave intersection corresponds (I think) to processed information. The energy is re-quantized, so the total energy of a system is a constant. Information is compressed and matter shrinks.I still find several problems with this. Firstly, I do not how quantum entanglement equates with compression. It seems to me to indicate that time and/or space is simply another emergent property of force interaction just as matter is.

Even given his proposition that this 'quantum compression' results in our perception of an expanding Universe such a relative expansion would be universal, thus we would observe an expansion between all objects, from the quantum to the celestial. Yet this is not what we observe.

Re the link, I am not going to pretend to be able to handle set theory to a point where I am able to mathematically counter his argument. However, I do see several theoretical issues here as well:

Nondeterministic recognition can help to explain the ability of an acceptor to rapidly sieze certain kinds of higher-order phenomena, or even interact with higher-order agencies ordinarily insensible to it. Such would require a deterministic relationship, not a nondeterministic one. Nondeterministic phenomena would simply be noise in the system and while it might randomly affect perception it would not correlate to any other phenomena.

Suppose instead that M has nondetenninistic output capping mn, where state-transition may or may not be deterministic. Then the prediction of output entails control of mn by the predictor. To win a game of prediction, one must now control mn as well dn Sn to the extent chat it is output-critical; one must take over where the probabilistic mn leaves off. Since whichever control the transducer has over itself resides in mn and dn, one must in effect deprive it of self-control. The relevance to "free will" is obvious. Indeterminacy does not equate to "free will" only randomness. If we accept that indeterminacy does play a significant role in the output it is, once again, only the generation of noise in the system, which would confound prediction but does not equate to an independent operator. That which we desire to understand as 'free will' is more likely to be a function of deterministic self-recursion. Complexity (and some random input perhaps) only give the illusion of "free will" but provide no basis for truly independent self-determinism.

What the theorem forces by juxtaposing truth and derivability (or consistency and completeness) is a hierarchical stratification of classes of truth functions and the inferential syntaxes which parametrize them. This stratification follows that of G, fractionating computative reality along with the "truth" to which it corresponds. ... Sorry but I don't see where he's escaped Godel's theorem. All he seems to be saying here is that we are confined to a closed system described by an open system. I see two problems. One, how is it that we can express Godel's theorem if our system is not open. And two, we still wind up unable to explain the larger system. ML simply winds up describing this unknowable meta-system as God. He's come no further than the mystics 5000 years ago. It's interesting and fun but it really doesn't explain anything useful.

Trust me, Langan knows what he is talking about, more than I do.Some of what he says is interesting (once deciphered) but I find nothing new or particularly valuable in it. Certainly nothing that even comes close to the TOE.

~Raithere

J.P. - when quantum states interact the total amount of information that they represent doesn't increase; when you drop two objects into the water and they make waves, they don't change the volume of the water, only its shape. An iterated system like the one you've described here doesn't compress or increase, it just changes.

The actuality of any set of opposing pair of probabilities can be defined as a boolean. For the sake of simplicity I will use the computer science practice of using binary digits to represent the boolean values. TRUE will be defined as 1 and FALSE will be defined as 0. In any matter of the probability of existance there is one pair of opposing probabilities. The probability that something exists and the probability that it doesn't. Both probabilities are equally valid but concerning any one entity only one or the other can be true. If we represent the probability of existance as exist and the probability of non-existance as nonexist then we can display this in the following equation.

(exist && nonexist) = 0

One or the other of these probabalities must be true. Something either exists or doesn't.

(exist || nonexist) = 1

Common sense will back up the notion that when asserting the existance of something one must either assert it's existance or it's non-existance for the assertion to be 1. Therefore if I assert my existance is 1 then the probability of my non-existance becomes 0. By common sense everyperson will attempt to assert their own existance. Therefore every person will accept the following statement. When made from my perspective towards them.

(youexist = 1)

Now if trying to assert I exist I am in fact trying to assert the follwing.

(iexist = 1)

And therefore, given the previous assertion you accepted, I am also trying to assert the following.

(youexist || iexist) = 1
(youexist && iexist) = 1

Therefore we can see that:

(youexist || iexist) == (youexist && iexist)

In english this would be read "If either you exist or I exist then both you and I exist." By typing out these formulae I have proven to you that I exist. When god does the same for me then I will see that the existance of god has been proven.

Let's examine the statement "IF you exist OR I exist THEN you exist AND I exist" (which is, I believe, what you said).

Let's replace "I exist" with "I am being gang probed by aliens". Now you have a tautological proof that you are being gang probed by aliens.

Um...

Actually you don't. The problem is that

"If (You exist OR I exist) then (You exist AND I exist)" is false in the case where "I exist" is false, because that makes the antecedent (You exist OR I exist) true, and the consequent (You exist AND I exist) false.

You used the thing that you were trying to prove (I exist) as a premise. When you use your conclusion as a premise, proving it as a conclusion doesn't take much effort...

Anyway, asserting "I exist" = true is not a good way to start out to prove that I exist. Religious types will give you bonus marks for circular reasoning though.

I figured someone would catch that. But like you said, circular reasoning is a favorite of christians, so I was trying to fight stupidity with stupidity. As the saying goes though, "Never argue with an idiot, they will drag you down to their level and beat you with experience."

Sorry, please continue.

I don't think the existance or non existance of something can be proven mathmatically unless you first accept that what your senses reveal to you is real.

Originally posted by Angelus
I don't think the existance or non existance of something can be proven mathmatically unless you first accept that what your senses reveal to you is real.

IMO, that's quite a stretch.

You'd also have to assume that math is necessarily applicable.

Though ultimately many concede that nothing can really be proven, Langen begs to differ eh? His CTMU could be self-consistent. Does that indicate a proof?

I think the only way to prove god is real is faith. Personally, I've got all of my faith wrapped up in reason right now - which implies directly (as I fathom it):

FAITH IN GOD IS UNREASONABLE.

Originally posted by J.P.
There is much theoretical controversy regarding the nature of intelligence, largely because prevailing scientific models – having been designed to preclude subjective contamination in the gathering and evaluation of objective data - support the existence of neither intelligence nor any other subjective attribute. Thus, it has often been asked whether intelligence (as in "Intelligent Design") is really a measurable, empirically verifiable quantity.

I have a real problem with trying to correlate intellect with raw horsepower. I don't see a problem with measuring horsepower mind you, but there is a real problem to me with labelling it "intelligence". IMO, intelligence is context dependent. It comes in a myriad of flavors, each with talent in some areas, not as much in others. It's so complicated by not only the individual's gifts and the context they create/encounter during their lives that develop/inhibit their gift(s) that it's almost impossible to look at someone and say "you're dumb". Consider savants as an extreme (and rare) example.

Mr. Langen might be a mathematical genius, but apparently he's not so sharp when it comes to epistemology. IMO, if he were, he'd address the whole "you can't really prove anything" thing before asking me to pretend his theory is proof of anything.

I'd say regarding the issue of god - the only thing that is provable is that you can't prove anything abou tit. And really, that is no proof unless one has faith in reason.

My Cat's brain is the size of a walnut, but he's got a very high I.Q. for a cat.

My cat tells me that people who appeal to Human IQ's as proof of supernatural phenomena- are full of shit.

Just fuckin wit ya.