Prince_James
07-18-06, 11:43 PM
"There are no absolute truths."
The above statement is commonly bandied about by the professional and amateur philosopher alike, coming as it is from a position that seems to epitomize the the modern world's prevailing nihilism and the skepticism of ages past. But at first glance by a trained mind, one can see that it is faulty. For consider what it is claiming: That it is objectively so that there exists nothing in this world which can be claimed that is true absolutely. But...would not that mean that the very sentence thus claimed is not itself an absolutely true statement? For if there are no absolute truths, it must be itself absolutely true that such do not exist, or the statement is wrong, but the statement -is- wrong if it is -right-...so what are we left with? Well, quite simply, we are left with absurdity. Whereas on the other hand, suppose we take this statement and analyze it:
"There are absolute truths"
Now, what would happen if this declaration was true? Does it fall victim to the same pitfalls? No, it is directly the opposite! It is impossible to refute! For consider if it is right, there are absolute truths, and the above statement itself is an example, but were it wrong, it would be right, for it would demonstrate that which is absoulute, namely, that there are no absolutes.
For Water specifically: See above for an example of a context-independent truth. I've noticed your skepticism in a few posts recently! I've been lurking!
But back to the topic...
Now I do declare that the above is the strongest reason to assert that there exists some truths are absolute, but a reasonable question can be asked which goes as followed:
James, might there not be some truths which are not absolute?
To which I answer:
No, my good man, there is not. For let us consider, as always, the question in depth.
Now, it would seem to be at first glance, that I am wrong. That there exists such things as are known as subjective truths, which hold true, but only hold true to that person. For instance, I rather like the song I am listening to now, and I could declare that it is a subjective truth in that it is not objectively so that this song is good, but only that I have declared it such as it fits with my personal tastes (for those interested, I am currently listening to "How High" by Madonna, although that bodes ill for my heterosexuality). Yet though it is peculiar to me that I like this song, and by no means must another also enjoy it, nor is it true that because I like it everyone else does, it is nevertheless always a truth that so long as I like this song, that I like this song. In essence: That it is an absolutely so that that I like this song at this present time, and to say that it is otherwise is not to point at some relativity, but to simply be wrong. Now, what would happen if I changed my tastes in the future? It would cease to be true, so in what way is it absolutely true that I like this song? Does not absolute status preclude the capacity for something to change? In some cases, yes, but only in what can be determined as necessary truths, such as as in our first example of truth's absolute nature. When speaking of subjective truths, however, one is speaking of truths which must not necessarily so, but so long as they are so, they are absolutely true, because that is what objectively is to be found. Moreover, it shall be true forevermore that I held a like for this song, and though few will remember down through the ages that I was a fan of such, it will nevertheless be true even if this was declared a million years hence. To put it another way, even the subjective may become objective, and though the subjective may change, the past objectivity of the subjective truth is perpetually so. Furthermore, when my tastes do change, that new truth is similarly absolutely so.
Lastly: What about perspective? (Water: This is for you, also!) It is sometimes held that perspective invalidates truth, on the foundation that someone might look at an object from the right and declare it looks like a cube, whereas another looks at the left and declares it looks like a pyramid, and in reality, neither would be right, as the shape is so designed as to be an optical illusion, and really it is some sort of combination of the twain. Now, it would seem that this undermines the entire notion of truth, for if two rational agents can look at the same thing and come to utterly contradictory conclusions, where is truth to be found? But this, in fact, is a faulty belief. Why? Now, it is indeed true that this confuses truth, but like most things, it is because the matter was not fully investigated. There is a famous picture that illustrates this point quite well, where if viewed from one angle it looks like a rabbit's ears, whereas from another it looks like the bill of a duck. Which one is it? Well, in reality, it is -both- and something -more-. That the shape, when viewed differently, and oriented in one way or another, is so as to resemble either. The truth then is to be found in its multiple perspectives and as an object that is neither rabbit nor duck, nor both at the same time in the same respect, but capable of being seen as such from different angles. So that what may be deemed "the lesser truths" are perspective-based - that it is true that the drawing can be conceived as a pair of rabbit ears or a duck's bill - yet the non-contextual truth is that it is neither, but an image so constructed so as to be an optical illusion. That far being from invalidating truth, perspective only shows us that even in empirical matters that truths beyond perspective can be found, for it is in the realization that both perspectives are equally valid only from that perspective and that the object is something else entirely, that we find that truth remains vindicated on all levels, and absolute as again, for in either case every truth is so and shall remain so.
It is with the above in mind that a triune declaration can be made: Absolute truth is reasonable, absolute truth exists, and absolute truth prevails at all times. Accordingly, we can resign nihilism on the nature of truth to the duskbucket and, moreover, be certain that knowledge is possible for us. Now, it seems rather silly - as does many things in philosophy - that we must justify whether or not we can know something, as knowledge seems so present, but nonetheless, I would affirm that the rescues of knowledge from the dungeon of ignorance is of paramount importance not only to the individual, but to mankind.
Oh: And I am back.
The above statement is commonly bandied about by the professional and amateur philosopher alike, coming as it is from a position that seems to epitomize the the modern world's prevailing nihilism and the skepticism of ages past. But at first glance by a trained mind, one can see that it is faulty. For consider what it is claiming: That it is objectively so that there exists nothing in this world which can be claimed that is true absolutely. But...would not that mean that the very sentence thus claimed is not itself an absolutely true statement? For if there are no absolute truths, it must be itself absolutely true that such do not exist, or the statement is wrong, but the statement -is- wrong if it is -right-...so what are we left with? Well, quite simply, we are left with absurdity. Whereas on the other hand, suppose we take this statement and analyze it:
"There are absolute truths"
Now, what would happen if this declaration was true? Does it fall victim to the same pitfalls? No, it is directly the opposite! It is impossible to refute! For consider if it is right, there are absolute truths, and the above statement itself is an example, but were it wrong, it would be right, for it would demonstrate that which is absoulute, namely, that there are no absolutes.
For Water specifically: See above for an example of a context-independent truth. I've noticed your skepticism in a few posts recently! I've been lurking!
But back to the topic...
Now I do declare that the above is the strongest reason to assert that there exists some truths are absolute, but a reasonable question can be asked which goes as followed:
James, might there not be some truths which are not absolute?
To which I answer:
No, my good man, there is not. For let us consider, as always, the question in depth.
Now, it would seem to be at first glance, that I am wrong. That there exists such things as are known as subjective truths, which hold true, but only hold true to that person. For instance, I rather like the song I am listening to now, and I could declare that it is a subjective truth in that it is not objectively so that this song is good, but only that I have declared it such as it fits with my personal tastes (for those interested, I am currently listening to "How High" by Madonna, although that bodes ill for my heterosexuality). Yet though it is peculiar to me that I like this song, and by no means must another also enjoy it, nor is it true that because I like it everyone else does, it is nevertheless always a truth that so long as I like this song, that I like this song. In essence: That it is an absolutely so that that I like this song at this present time, and to say that it is otherwise is not to point at some relativity, but to simply be wrong. Now, what would happen if I changed my tastes in the future? It would cease to be true, so in what way is it absolutely true that I like this song? Does not absolute status preclude the capacity for something to change? In some cases, yes, but only in what can be determined as necessary truths, such as as in our first example of truth's absolute nature. When speaking of subjective truths, however, one is speaking of truths which must not necessarily so, but so long as they are so, they are absolutely true, because that is what objectively is to be found. Moreover, it shall be true forevermore that I held a like for this song, and though few will remember down through the ages that I was a fan of such, it will nevertheless be true even if this was declared a million years hence. To put it another way, even the subjective may become objective, and though the subjective may change, the past objectivity of the subjective truth is perpetually so. Furthermore, when my tastes do change, that new truth is similarly absolutely so.
Lastly: What about perspective? (Water: This is for you, also!) It is sometimes held that perspective invalidates truth, on the foundation that someone might look at an object from the right and declare it looks like a cube, whereas another looks at the left and declares it looks like a pyramid, and in reality, neither would be right, as the shape is so designed as to be an optical illusion, and really it is some sort of combination of the twain. Now, it would seem that this undermines the entire notion of truth, for if two rational agents can look at the same thing and come to utterly contradictory conclusions, where is truth to be found? But this, in fact, is a faulty belief. Why? Now, it is indeed true that this confuses truth, but like most things, it is because the matter was not fully investigated. There is a famous picture that illustrates this point quite well, where if viewed from one angle it looks like a rabbit's ears, whereas from another it looks like the bill of a duck. Which one is it? Well, in reality, it is -both- and something -more-. That the shape, when viewed differently, and oriented in one way or another, is so as to resemble either. The truth then is to be found in its multiple perspectives and as an object that is neither rabbit nor duck, nor both at the same time in the same respect, but capable of being seen as such from different angles. So that what may be deemed "the lesser truths" are perspective-based - that it is true that the drawing can be conceived as a pair of rabbit ears or a duck's bill - yet the non-contextual truth is that it is neither, but an image so constructed so as to be an optical illusion. That far being from invalidating truth, perspective only shows us that even in empirical matters that truths beyond perspective can be found, for it is in the realization that both perspectives are equally valid only from that perspective and that the object is something else entirely, that we find that truth remains vindicated on all levels, and absolute as again, for in either case every truth is so and shall remain so.
It is with the above in mind that a triune declaration can be made: Absolute truth is reasonable, absolute truth exists, and absolute truth prevails at all times. Accordingly, we can resign nihilism on the nature of truth to the duskbucket and, moreover, be certain that knowledge is possible for us. Now, it seems rather silly - as does many things in philosophy - that we must justify whether or not we can know something, as knowledge seems so present, but nonetheless, I would affirm that the rescues of knowledge from the dungeon of ignorance is of paramount importance not only to the individual, but to mankind.
Oh: And I am back.