The universe is either random, determined, or both. All entities in the universe are governed by the laws of the universe, ie. they are determined by the causal chain, or are randomly acted upon, but they have NO choice in what happens to them.

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.

Do we really have free will in the sense that we are free from the laws of the universe? We are apart of the universe just as any other entity. The special ability of living things is that they can avoid harm and seek the good. How can we explain being free from the causal chain? If the universe isn't determined, rather it is completely random then that doesn't give us any more freedom. It just makes our actions random.

in my view, we have no free will. we cannot do something for no reason. every action that we make is determined by various factors: our upbringing, our genetics, our environment, the circumstances that exist during the action.

an example that was made 'in favour' of free will was this: 'I like steak more than liver. but I can choose the liver.' you can. but you choose it for a reason. let's imagine that liver is healthy and steak is not. maybe you're choosing the liver for health reasons. the more common reason would be choosing the liver for the sake of proving determinism wrong. you are not doing so. only by choosing the liver for no reason whatever, would you be demonstrating that our behaviour is not determined. choosing the liver for no reason is, as far as i know, impossible.

my friend, who is an advocate of free will, thinks that he is proving a point by twitching randomly or dancing and saying 'so this was determined?' theologically it seems a bit silly, and that's primarily what he's reacting against. but his actions are motivated by the desire to demonstrate that there is free will. (there is an irony here: a belief in free will is determining his actions.) what random action he chooses likely depends on a number of factors.

choice, in my view, is ultimately an illusion.

May I offer the suggestion that before posting on this thread all non-philosophers should at least read this brief discussion of free will:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Of course, I have little expectation that any more than 8% of persons shall do so, not because they are exercising free will, but because they are being compelled to react against my suggestion in an effort to demonstrate that they have free will. Thus their attempt to provide proof they are right will merely provide evidence they are wrong.

alteredperception:

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.

We must ask whether or not this is valid. Many would claim that free-will is illusionary. In fact, philosophical libertarianism (the belief in free-will) is the least valid of the three views on the matter, as regards evidence to support it. But if we take this as a given, we can talk...

Do we really have free will in the sense that we are free from the laws of the universe? We are apart of the universe just as any other entity. The special ability of living things is that they can avoid harm and seek the good. How can we explain being free from the causal chain? If the universe isn't determined, rather it is completely random then that doesn't give us any more freedom. It just makes our actions random.

Are we free from the laws of the universe? No. The laws of the universe govern us entirely, just as you asserted. You've also attacked the notion of philosophical libertarianism very well with your question of freedom from a causal chain. How -can- we be free if we come from deterministic processes?

alteredperception:



We must ask whether or not this is valid. Many would claim that free-will is illusionary. In fact, philosophical libertarianism (the belief in free-will) is the least valid of the three views on the matter, as regards evidence to support it. But if we take this as a given, we can talk...



Are we free from the laws of the universe? No. The laws of the universe govern us entirely, just as you asserted. You've also attacked the notion of philosophical libertarianism very well with your question of freedom from a causal chain. How -can- we be free if we come from deterministic processes?

I've debated this one many times. :D

I certainly agree that we are in now way free from the laws of the universe BUT that in no way implies that we do not have free will within the realm that does not violate those physical laws.

For example, was it predetermined that you would wear precisely those clothes - as opposed to others you own - today? Many free will believers would respond with "of course not, that's just trivial." Then my next question to them is at exactly what level does it kick in? They usually just go away muttering to themselves. ;)

There are 2 levels of freedom. Freedom within a determined universe. And freedom from a determined universe. I think it is impossible to have free will in the latter. But it is clear that we have degrees of freedom in a determined universe. If someone throws a rock at us, we have the ability (freedom) to choose to avoid by moving out of the way. But if an asteroid destroys earth we do not have the freedom to avoid it. Therefore we were determined to die. If we had the technology to destroy the asteroid, than we would have been able to avoid it.

In principle, couldn't we become so advanced that we could control our lives 100%. For instance, genetic engineering so we live forever, technology to travel throughout the universe, etc.??? Then we would have 100% freedom within a determined universe. But we still wouldn't be free from the univerise, we would still be governed by its laws.

do we really have the freedom to choose to avoid it? or do we simply avoid it because there is a rock coming at us? can we choose to avoid a rock which does not exist, and we do not believe exists? no. we can only react. we are reacting based on our environments. is it really a choice to avoid the rock? or do we just think it's a choice?

dr. cello -

I agree with you. Free will is an illusion. But we still must be able to differentiate between humans and inanimate objects. Therefore there is a more trivial freedom that humans possess. Using your words, we can react to things, which gives us the illusion of having choices. But really we are just entities that are more flexible than other entities.

My question is what are the limits to our flexibility? What if we advanced to the point where we could avoid any threat in the universe, seek whatever we desired, and live eternally (if the universe is eternal). Does this have any implications to whether or not free will is an illusion?

an inanimate object is incapable of action. an animate object (human, animal) is capable of action. a human is capable of intellect.

no, it doesn't have any real implications that i can see. it is true that most of our reactions are in direct response to our needs, but we would not eliminate need, and even then we would have desires. we would socialise. the limited number of 'choices' we have is not why we are not free; we are not free because in reality there is no choice, regardless of how many options we have.

The causal chain is based on event-causation. But certain free will proponents advocate agent-causation. As shown here:

"Free will exists. Like all things, it cannot be causeless or literally magical. Yet how could it be subject to causality and remain free? This can seem like a big problem if one accepts the determinist model of causality as a relationship among events. Consider the action on a pool table. The blow of a cue stick on a billiard ball (event 1) causes the motion of the ball (event 2), which causes the ball to reach the pocket (event 3), where it falls into the netting (event 4). In this model, given the properties of the objects to be acted upon and a set of initial actions, the changes in the system that follow are a matter of actions and reactions, or in other words, a chain of events. To trace causes is to trace the chain. An event that cannot be traced back to preceding events is, in this view, an event without a cause.

And there's the rub for free will. After all, if a human being really acts by his own will, deciding his own course of action, then preceding events do not fully explain the course chosen. On this model, free will seems anomalous, sui generis, bizarre, unscientific. Hence determinism.

Event causation is a useful model for analyzing some kinds of actions, but it is not a satisfactory philosophical account. What is causality, after all? It is the way in which entities act. There are no events without entities, the underlying objects that do the acting. There is no explosion without the bomb that explodes. There is no breathing without the body that breathes and the air that is breathed. A causal explanation is an explanation of action in terms of the entity's capacities for action, arising from its properties and relations. Free will is simply a human capacity for action, one that we will understand better in time. A choice is not uncaused. It is caused by the person who chooses. "

How can one refute the argument for agent-causation.

What would be more free: something that has no relationships with anything around it whatsoever, or something that has relationships with everything around it?

onefinity - irrevelent hypothetical. "the self" requires "the other" to define itself. You cannot have one without the other because they are dependent on eachother. In my opinion, the concept of "the self" is really an illusion human consciousness creates in order to function effectively. In reality, we are apart of "the other"

if freedom is an illusion, then neither is free. we simply say that the one with relationships is free because the illusion of freedom is so firmly ingrained in our minds.

I congraulate alteredperception. I had started a thread about free will long ago. After some thinking, I had come to the same conclusion. Free will and determinism are not contradictory ideas. You have the freedom to choose any dress you want. Yes, it has been predetermined that you would choose that dress. But that does not clash with your freedom, since that is what you wanted to do. And in fact, following this futher, we can see that true free will can exist only along with determinism. For, if you are always doing what you want to do ('want to' in the most basic sense), then there is always a reason why you did it. Actually the reason, or rather, cause, is mechanical in nature, but since you, as a being, also have a purpose for your actions, there is a bigger reason for the things you do. So it is possible to predict what you will do, precisely because you have free will. Causality does not interfere with purpose (your personal purpose, not some supreme or universal purpose).

Let's look at a vague analogy. You have to decide on which dress to wear to a party, from the set of dresses that you own. Your friend is there with you, and she/he knows you very well. And she guesses (in her mind) which one you're going to choose, and it turns out that she's right. Okay, we didn't go to the fully mechanical level, and this isn't proper determinism, but it illustrates my point nicely. Your choice was predetermined, and even your friend was able to guess it. Does this mean you have no free will? Not at all. It was because you had free will that you were able to choose the one you liked. And it was because your friend knew what you liked, that she was able to predict it. Free will is being able to do what you <I>want</I> to do. That is always possible (practically). It is what you <I>want</I> that is out of your control. <I>That</I> is decided by universal laws and circumstances. Wow, I had that idea right now. So things are much clearer now, for me at least. And for altered perception too, I hope.

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a Darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.
Variety they say is the spice of life, so if varieties exist then choices must follow somewhere. Random is the same thing as determined because for something to be random it has to be inside a determined event or perspective and vice versa. D (r), R (d). If I roll a ball of dice in anticipation of a six and I get a one it is labeled a random throw because it is surrounded by a determined event. Respectively, if I get my six it is labeled a determined throw because of the randomness surrounding it. The roll and result of the dice is directly proportional to my wrists movement, length, superstition and luck; of cause we are not smart enough to analyze all the kinetics of this approach but the little control we can harness we do it in hope, luck, and “a blow of the dice. In truth randomness is all that really exists because it’s always present, it permits free will and happiness, control gives the illusion of determinism; controlling randomness if you will.

tolstoy explains this pretty well in war and peace and i agree with what he says, which is this:
free will doesn't exist because everything is an effect of something before it. essentially life is a domino chain, there's no possible way that if something falls upon the onepiece, that that piece won't fall and cause the next one to fall. in the end, even if we could go back in time to change our decisions, we would still be in the same circumstance and state of mind, so why would/should we make a different choice?

but then again there is the parallel universe argument, which is that all the choices we make are absolute random chance. and in that case for every choice we make there are infinite numbers of parallel universe in which the results of these choices manifest themselves. consequently there are an endless number of parallel universes because time and decisions can be broken down into an infinite number of moments. i don't really agree with that, but it's a noteworthy concept.

The universe is either random, determined, or both. All entities in the universe are governed by the laws of the universe, ie. they are determined by the causal chain, or are randomly acted upon, but they have NO choice in what happens to them.

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.

Do we really have free will in the sense that we are free from the laws of the universe? We are apart of the universe just as any other entity. The special ability of living things is that they can avoid harm and seek the good. How can we explain being free from the causal chain? If the universe isn't determined, rather it is completely random then that doesn't give us any more freedom. It just makes our actions random.The universe allows freedom, in the form of free will. We exist. We are free to do what we want of what we understand. There are no limits to what we could want. There are limits to what we can do though, though we could overcome these limits in different ways (we could for example build a bridge over the river).

Your will is free in that way that whatever options you have you can choose from, and choose whatever you want. The feelings associated with choosing one option instead of the other is not a hinder of your choice, but rather a suggestion, you could base your decision on other things than that feeling, or just pick a option not basing it on anything. Or you could "move with the wind" picking each option by pure will.

There are no limits to what we could want.

Obviously our brains are so limited by nature that there are many things we can't even think of wanting.

I feel compelled to say that free will exists.

I congraulate alteredperception. I had started a thread about free will long ago. After some thinking, I had come to the same conclusion. Free will and determinism are not contradictory ideas. You have the freedom to choose any dress you want. Yes, it has been predetermined that you would choose that dress. But that does not clash with your freedom, since that is what you wanted to do. And in fact, following this futher, we can see that true free will can exist only along with determinism. For, if you are always doing what you want to do ('want to' in the most basic sense), then there is always a reason why you did it. Actually the reason, or rather, cause, is mechanical in nature, but since you, as a being, also have a purpose for your actions, there is a bigger reason for the things you do. So it is possible to predict what you will do, precisely because you have free will. Causality does not interfere with purpose (your personal purpose, not some supreme or universal purpose).

Let's look at a vague analogy. You have to decide on which dress to wear to a party, from the set of dresses that you own. Your friend is there with you, and she/he knows you very well. And she guesses (in her mind) which one you're going to choose, and it turns out that she's right. Okay, we didn't go to the fully mechanical level, and this isn't proper determinism, but it illustrates my point nicely. Your choice was predetermined, and even your friend was able to guess it. Does this mean you have no free will? Not at all. It was because you had free will that you were able to choose the one you liked. And it was because your friend knew what you liked, that she was able to predict it. Free will is being able to do what you <I>want</I> to do. That is always possible (practically). It is what you <I>want</I> that is out of your control. <I>That</I> is decided by universal laws and circumstances. Wow, I had that idea right now. So things are much clearer now, for me at least. And for altered perception too, I hope.

Awesome! I am surprisingly pleased by this thread. The issue of free will remains confusing for me, but currently I am leaning towards this compatabilist view that me and you have been describing.

I think I should make clear what I mean by being able to do what one wants. I mean that he will be able to try to do it. And is he can't try, then he can try to try, and so on to the most basic level. But even that definition is somewhat pointless. Free will exists by definition. It can't be otherwise. It depends on what you <I>want</I> to do. But if you have the capacity to 'want', then you also have the capacity to try, and that makes free will inevitably tied up with 'wanting'. A machine has no free will because it doesn't want anything. The problem disappears once you have clearly defined free will.

Free will and determinism are not contradictory ideas. You have the freedom to choose any dress you want. Yes, it has been predetermined that you would choose that dress. I would argue that if your dress choice is predetermined then you weren't really free to choose any dress you wanted. If there was only ever one possible outcome for your decision then you weren't really making a choice, since by definition to choose between two options there must be two options available. If the outcome is certain then you don't really have a choice - if the outcome isn't certain then it isn't really predetermined. Perhaps you <i>felt</i> that you could have made a different choice, but that was an illusion; since your choice was predetermined, there was no possibility of you choosing anything else.

Obviously our brains are so limited by nature that there are many things we can't even think of wanting.But still there are no limits to what we could want ;)

The type of free will we have is really not free. It can be more accurately defined as DETERMINED WILL. Compatibalism is illogical because FREE will cannot exist in a determined universe.

Rosnet, I think me and you are both hard determinists now that I think about it.

A clear definition of free will is if an entity has agent-causation. Free will can only exist if a human can be the sole cause of something. But agent-causation is unfounded. Since we already established that the universe is determined, we must acknowledge that our freedom isn't free. We still have "will" but we must call it determined will.

The type of free will we have is really not free. It can be more accurately defined as DETERMINED WILL. Compatibalism is illogical because FREE will cannot exist in a determined universe.

Rosnet, I think me and you are both hard determinists now that I think about it.

A clear definition of free will is if an entity has agent-causation. Free will can only exist if a human can be the sole cause of something. But agent-causation is unfounded. Since we already established that the universe is determined, we must acknowledge that our freedom isn't free. We still have "will" but we must call it determined will.There is no way to establish that the universe is determined. How did you go about to establish that?

We have free will to the best of our understanding, in that we are free to do what we want.

We must seperate humans wants from its needs. That way we still have free will to seek what is needed first then if time and money are prevelant things we want could be achieved. Humans are only seeing things they want today more than what the really need. How much is enough, few really know in a industrialized nation but those from 3rd world countries can tell you.

Nasor, AlteredPerception,

You haven't been paying attention to my last post. It is in the definition of free will that the solution lies. We have the freedom to do what we <I>want</I>. This immediately means that we have free will. From a slightly different point of view, the very fact that we can "want" something means that we have free will. Yes, I think that's it. That uur wants are predetermined, does not alter this. But if you don't accept this, then give a model of the universe which can possibly have entities with free will. You'll see that free will as per any other definition does not exist in <I>any</I> type of universe. The problem is not determinism. If hte universe waws random, so what? Does that mean we have free will? No. If we can do what we want, then we're free. That's my definition. I don't care why I want what I want. For instance, I like a particular type of music. Maybe it's because I've been hearing that music since my childhood, and have been conditioned to it, and also perhaps nostaligically attached to it. So what? I like it, onw way or the other, and what matters is whther I can listen to it when I want.

Rosnet - I know what you are saying, except you are re-defining free will.

Of course we can do what we want. Our "wants" are determined. We don't have choices. It only appears that we do because our brains deliberate between different options, but the option you choose was always determined to be. Therefore we have no real choices, everything we do is determined. This is n't compatible with the free will people normally think we have. But if you define free will as "doing what you want, despite having no control over what you want" then, sure, we have that kind of free will. Except that isn't really free will at all, and calling it free will is extremely misleading, because "free will" implies a certain freedom that is impossible to have in our determined universe.

Thats why I said, "don't call it free will, call it determined will." !!!

alteredperception,

Do we really have free will in the sense that we are free from the laws of the universe?

That depends on whether or not you beleive in God, if you believe, and act upon it, then i believe it is quite possible. If you don't believe in God, and act accordingly, then I believe it to be impossible.

How can we explain being free from the causal chain?

Bhagavad Gita is an excellent book to read, as it deals exactly with this enquiry.

If the universe isn't determined, rather it is completely random then that doesn't give us any more freedom.

From a spiritual perspective, the universe is a maifestation (creation) of unmanifested matter (random), conciosness being the cause of its manifestation.

Jan Ardena.

I define life as entities that have free will But what is your definition of will (free or otherwise)? I see will as want; if someone wants something it is their will that allows them to get it, but I could be wrong.The special ability of living things is that they can avoid harm and seek the good. This brings us back to your original question of determinism etc. How could a fly or some small creature have avoided the web or trap of another animal? It would be interesting to see the results if we could judge an individual on their decisions: imagine we could repeatedly replay an event, and then change the factors involved in that decision. For example what if we took a sub-dominant figure and replaced them with a dominant figure; how much would that change the person's decision? Do all living things avoid harm and seek the good?

We have the freedom to do what we <I>want</I>... That uur wants are predetermined, does not alter this. Remember, your "will" is your intentions/desires/wants. Having "free will" means that we are able to decide for ourselves what we want to do. If our wants are predetermined then by definition they are not "free". Being free to <i>do</i> what we want to do is merely freedom of action, which is not the same thing.

Exactly Nasor, that is why we don't have free will. "We do what we want to do" based on reasons. These reasons ARE the prior causes. Reasoning is the method by which our brain computes things and finally takes an action. This deliberation appears to be free will, but the mere fact that we have to take the time to deliberate (reason), as opposed to just instantaniously taking actions (reasonsing is in the unconcious), does NOT give any evidence for free will.

Lets say our brains were so advanced we didn't even have to weigh the alternatives, or think about problems, rather we just knew the answer instantaniously, because our brain could compute all of this efficiently its in our unconcious or something like that.

Either way, the action we make is still pre-determined.

It really depends on how optimistic you are. Society shapes all, there's no question about that, it comes down to whether or not you see it as society influencing our choices or outright determining them.

Oh, right, either that or you believe in God. :)

It really depends on how optimistic you are. Society shapes all, there's no question about that, it comes down to whether or not you see it as society influencing our choices or outright determining them.

Oh, right, either that or you believe in God. :)It's not just whether society influences our wants, but whether or not ALL our wants are determined in a mechanistic, inevitable manner by a deterministic universe. It’s a question of whether or not determinism applies to our wills in the same way that it applies to the motion of billiard balls.

That's exatly what I said.

We are just one big complicated set of billiard balls. The causal chain is not seen clearly like it is with billiard balls, so it seems free to us.

Alteredperception, Nasor,

I understood what you were saying. Okay, then give your definition of free will. and give an example (a hypothetical one).

Free will relies on agent-causation. Performing and action that you are the sole cause would be free will. You would have a free thought, a thought that you caused to happen by your will alone. It could be anything. But the point is, free will is incompatible with determinism. Free will is also incompatible with randomness (if the universe is based on random events). A universe compatible with free will would be crazy. People would spontaneously do things that no one could predict. The free will people think we have is really something they wouldn't want.

The type of freedom we have in our determined universe is all we really want, we just have to describe it properly. We can do what we want! That is all the freedom we need. Our "wants" are determined by prior causes, so therefore we don't have agent-causation.

Alteredperception, Nasor,

I understood what you were saying. Okay, then give your definition of free will. and give an example (a hypothetical one).I already did.

From my previous post:
Having "free will" means that we are able to decide for ourselves what we want to do.

I cannot give you an example because I do not think that this is possible. Hence the wide-spread opinion that free will does not exist.

We have no free will.

As I don't believe in an animating spirit that exists independently of matter, I don't see how true free will is compatible with universal physical law. At most I can accept some quantum randomness in the workings of our brains, but I think I might actually plump for pure predetermination.

alteredperception, Nasor,

Free will relies on agent-causation. Performing and action that you are the sole cause would be free will. You would have a free thought, a thought that you caused to happen by your will alone. It could be anything. But the point is, free will is incompatible with determinism. Free will is also incompatible with randomness (if the universe is based on random events). A universe compatible with free will would be crazy. People would spontaneously do things that no one could predict. The free will people think we have is really something they wouldn't want.

The type of freedom we have in our determined universe is all we really want, we just have to describe it properly. We can do what we want! That is all the freedom we need. Our "wants" are determined by prior causes, so therefore we don't have agent-causation.

Such a free will as you define is completely impossible even in theory. No, I do not mean that it is imposible in our universe. I mean that it is impossible in any type of universe. That such a universe cannot be. Because we can never want to want. A 'want', by definition, cannot come into being on its own. You cannot want to want candy. No, not only 'you', but any concievable 'you' (in any concievable world). A 'want' is not, and can never be, something that the wanter makes. It is something which already is. I find it unable to think otherwise. Or am I missing something? Or maybe you haven't thought about this.

I agree – if you believe in a deterministic universe, there seems to be no way that genuine free will could exist. However, you seem to be wanting to redefine free will as “the freedom to (try to) do what we want,” which I don’t think is a valid definition. It ignores the will part of “free will.”

I think the notion of free will is ill conceived and doomed to be inconclusive.

There's a bigger notion that I think I nailed in a conversation about this a while back but now I can't remember exactly. Yes, I NAILED it. lol. Colbert cracks me up.

Let me propose a wiggy perspective: The chain of causation ends in the now, but consciousness is more than the instantaneous now of the clock. A person's being seems to them to be across a few seconds or milliseconds or something. In that difference likes the capacity for re-direction via will based on a real-time collapse of a "probability function" (actually, it's more than that but it's easy to think of this way) in mind.

I guess really in general, looking at it statistically, the universe seems to define itself at the macro level with a chain of collapsing probablity functions. As such, determinism is false in an explicit form. By that I simply mean it's like a weather forecast. You can only predict based on probabilities. However, determinism is accurate at the level of a point, in that "this sub atomic particle performs according to a function", but since the function is respective to its reference frame, interacting reference frames can't be seen as deterministic. So it's really a combination.

Several posters have expressed the idea that free will is not possible without aviolation (a miracle) of physical laws or (non material spirits). I was sure this is true for at least 30 years, but now know how Genuine Free Will, may be possible, consistent with physics and free of "spirits"

See my 6 october post in forum biology & genetics thread "about determinism" or the Physics & Math forum thread "black holes and Spooling Rope" (last post of that thread, but both are about a page back now.

To me, the problem with freedom is that, if defined broadly enough, it describes any kind of purposeful action, and if narrowly enough, it properly describes only a very special few kinds of behavior. If we are 'free' in the metaphysical sense (that is, freedom of thought, or will, which is different than freedom of action) then how does this "truly" free part of ourselves interact with (which it necessarily must if they are both 'us') the unfree, deterministic, physically localized aspect of us? I'm all for resolving the contradictions, but we can't just say they're the same, because these two aspects seem qualitiatively different.

The unfree aspect has already been summed up by dr cello in his mention of the fact that we always seem to have or ascribe 'reasons' or 'purpose' to conscious behavior: " in my view, we have no free will. we cannot do something for no reason." The question here becomes: what kind of entity are these 'reasons' anyway? If they can all be reduced to deterministic, causal relations (as he mentions, genetic or environmental factors, social training,) then we are still just talking about the physical universe. But these reasons are theoretical, mental construction which it is ultimately difficult to connect up meaningfully to real-world actions. 'Purpose' is often an imposition ONTO a past behavior of a retroactively derived 'purpose' (and the way these purposes are defined often have metaphysical motivations, i.e., if you believe in God or the Force or whatever, then there's always an ultimate, final 'purpose' to any action, no matter how mundane.) Also, the part of our brain that causes action has been shown to show electrical activity BEFORE the part of our brain which comes up with the explanation.

Is not the question of free will ultimately moot? Perhaps the question itself is ill-conceived. We exist as a product of the moments that preceded the now, and make decisions in what we perceive to be the now regarding what we percieve to be forthcoming nows. In the context of self, we have choice limited by mental and physical circumstance. We can choose to change that circumstance within the confines physics allows. Regardless of the objectivity of our "free will", does not the illusion (if it is illusion) substantiate the reality in a subjective context? As such, what is there to question?

I know I could have chosen not to post this.

Do you know you could choose not to post what you're going to next? If so, are we sure we're asking the right questions here?

The universe is either random, determined, or both. All entities in the universe are governed by the laws of the universe, ie. they are determined by the causal chain, or are randomly acted upon, but they have NO choice in what happens to them.

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.

Do we really have free will in the sense that we are free from the laws of the universe? ....

We are as free as a cell in our body is free to do whatever it wants.
Freedom and choice are just thoughts, like body and universe. There can be no freedom or choice because they are just thoughts, the mind. And the study of thoughts-mind tells us the same story as does physics -- thoughts are totally disconnected and unpredictable so thinking. like choice and freedom, is an illusion just as much as particles-waves are physics' illusions.

I agree – if you believe in a deterministic universe, there seems to be no way that genuine free will could exist. However, you seem to be wanting to redefine free will as “the freedom to (try to) do what we want,” which I don’t think is a valid definition. It ignores the will part of “free will.”

No, No. That issue has already been settled, I believe. I was saying that no type of free will could possibly exist. Agent causation is impossible. As I put it earlier, you can't "want to want".

I define life as entities that have free will. All life has an inherent ability to choose. I have a darwinian approach to free will, where all life has varying degrees of free will, humans having the most.

A character in a computer game, can to an extent, have free will in that he is not always destined to be in the same place at a specific time (unless you program the path). The character can have free will over where in the world to be, and how to interact with the environment. But at no point does he escape the code that we programmed him with.

And the same goes for us. Hence, we have no free will.

Sometimes a few of you people actually amuse me to no end. :D

Apparently there are those here that believe that every single thing that mankind has been involved with was all preprogrammed from the moment of the Big Bang!

Does anyone actually think that ever since the moment time began that there was no way for you to anything other than to pick the shirt the put on this morning?

Sometimes a few of you people actually amuse me to no end. :D

Apparently there are those here that believe that every single thing that mankind has been involved with was all preprogrammed from the moment of the Big Bang!

Does anyone actually think that ever since the moment time began that there was no way for you to anything other than to pick the shirt the put on this morning?

Light,

Strange as it may seem, this is exactly what it means to live in a universe where everything happens because of a cause, as opposed to random events happening in an acausal manner. I suppose its part of the mystery and awe of the universe. All you have to focus on is this... what is happening now is the result of what happened just before now, and it is causing what will happen next to be realized. The chain of events is pretty much unbreakable.

Now, feel free to introduce any amount of randomness that you may wish to. Randomness may allow one to say that the preprogramming to which you refer is in fact "adjusted" by this randomness and so maybe your shirt wasn't determined at "the beginning of time" (as if time had a true beginning).

But the bottom line is that man's will is not free.

Essay on Free Will (http://www.ethicalfocus.org/index.php?mpage=34/Free_Will.htm)

I know I could have chosen not to post this.

You are obviously mistaken.

Is not the question of free will ultimately moot? Perhaps the question itself is ill-conceived. We exist as a product of the moments that preceded the now, and make decisions in what we perceive to be the now regarding what we percieve to be forthcoming nows. In the context of self, we have choice limited by mental and physical circumstance. We can choose to change that circumstance within the confines physics allows. Regardless of the objectivity of our "free will", does not the illusion (if it is illusion) substantiate the reality in a subjective context? As such, what is there to question?

Those that would maintain that in any given situation an individual could have done other than what it is that they did. All NFWists are pointing out is how empty such claims are. Actions taken based on the empty belief that humans act via a free will are illformed actions... better actions are available if the illusion of free will is known.

alteredperception, Nasor,



Such a free will as you define is completely impossible even in theory. No, I do not mean that it is imposible in our universe. I mean that it is impossible in any type of universe. That such a universe cannot be. Because we can never want to want. A 'want', by definition, cannot come into being on its own. You cannot want to want candy. No, not only 'you', but any concievable 'you' (in any concievable world). A 'want' is not, and can never be, something that the wanter makes. It is something which already is. I find it unable to think otherwise. Or am I missing something? Or maybe you haven't thought about this.

Rosnet,

You are exactly right on the money with this statement, "You cannot want to want..." Anyone who believes that a person can want to want is ... in error. Such thinking leads to wanting to want to want... and wanting to want to want to want... forever and ever ad infinitum.

Steve

Light,

Now, feel free to introduce any amount of randomness that you may wish to. Randomness may allow one to say that the preprogramming to which you refer is in fact "adjusted" by this randomness and so maybe your shirt wasn't determined at "the beginning of time" (as if time had a true beginning).

Essay on Free Will (http://www.ethicalfocus.org/index.php?mpage=34/Free_Will.htm)

"Adjusted", eh? If you accept that much then your whole theory is proven false.

in my view, we have no free will. we cannot do something for no reason. every action that we make is determined by various factors: our upbringing, our genetics, our environment, the circumstances that exist during the action.

an example that was made 'in favour' of free will was this: 'I like steak more than liver. but I can choose the liver.' you can. but you choose it for a reason. let's imagine that liver is healthy and steak is not. maybe you're choosing the liver for health reasons. the more common reason would be choosing the liver for the sake of proving determinism wrong. you are not doing so. only by choosing the liver for no reason whatever, would you be demonstrating that our behaviour is not determined. choosing the liver for no reason is, as far as i know, impossible.

my friend, who is an advocate of free will, thinks that he is proving a point by twitching randomly or dancing and saying 'so this was determined?' theologically it seems a bit silly, and that's primarily what he's reacting against. but his actions are motivated by the desire to demonstrate that there is free will. (there is an irony here: a belief in free will is determining his actions.) what random action he chooses likely depends on a number of factors.

choice, in my view, is ultimately an illusion.

I have a friend who does pretty much the same sort of nonsense. Do you get the sense that your friend is emotionally attached to the notion of having a free will? Like, they would have to rethink a lot about their world view if they accepted that their will was not free?

Sir, I concur with your conclusion... a conclusion that you were led to come to by your nature and nurture.

Those that would maintain that in any given situation an individual could have done other than what it is that they did. All NFWists are pointing out is how empty such claims are. Actions taken based on the empty belief that humans act via a free will are illformed actions... better actions are available if the illusion of free will is known.

I agree the claim is pointless. What is past is past, but the question of free will as posed must be "in the moment", so you're criticizing the wrong thing. My point is that it would seem from this that since the question of freewill is pointless, perhaps it's not the right question.

I agree the claim is pointless. What is past is past, but the question of free will as posed must be "in the moment", so you're criticizing the wrong thing. My point is that it would seem from this that since the question of freewill is pointless, perhaps it's not the right question.

But the question of free will is not pointless... that's what I was trying to communicate to you. You are wrong about the question of free will being pointless, it is very "pointed".

As for "but the question of free will as posed must be "in the moment...", I'm not exactly sure what you meaning is. The moment is not, after all, a period of time, but instead merely a demarcation between the past and the future.

"Adjusted", eh? If you accept that much then your whole theory is proven false.

Light I think you misunderstand MY theory. My theory is only that man does not and cannot have a will that is free.

Steve

Light I think you misunderstand MY theory. My theory is only that man does not and cannot have a will that is free.

Steve

Balderdash and poppycock!

If you and everyone else who subscribes to that silly notion really believed it, then you'd have nothing to ever complain about. You'll have to stop bashing Bush, Blair, the French government, Saddam, the cops, people who won't allow you to smoke weed legally, the teachers you don't like - everyone! Simply because they can't help it.

Truthfully, the only reason you want to believe it is because it would mean that you are not responsible for anything that you do.

What a cop out!!

Sometimes a few of you people actually amuse me to no end. :D

Apparently there are those here that believe that every single thing that mankind has been involved with was all preprogrammed from the moment of the Big Bang!

Does anyone actually think that ever since the moment time began that there was no way for you to anything other than to pick the shirt the put on this morning?

I reffer you to my rock solid comparision with characters in a computer game. To upset the mould and to gain free will, the character would have to do something outside of the code I set him, such as pull down his pants.

I reffer you to my rock solid comparision with characters in a computer game. To upset the mould and to gain free will, the character would have to do something outside of the code I set him, such as pull down his pants.

So? People are not characters in your computer game. Are you actually saying that you are not allowed to make ANY choices and are just following a pre-programmed course in every little thing you do? :bugeye:

We may not be characters in a computer game, but it could be remarkably close. I wonder if hundreds of years into the future, characters will also think about free will, and that just because they can walk from one place to another will think they have free will.

But you can't compare characters in a computer game just like you can't compare us to God? So why do we think we have free will?

...But the bottom line is that man's will is not free.
Essay on Free Will (http://www.ethicalfocus.org/index.php?mpage=34/Free_Will.htm)Probably true, but not necessarily true:

Genuine Free Will is Possible

Before the advent of Quantum Mechanics, the future appeared to LaPlace to be exactly determined by the past state of the universe, even if it was clearly unpredictable. Chaos theory and measurement errors plus ignorance about small asteroid orbits, rupture stresses in tectonic faults or vascular systems, etc. makes LaPlace’s future unpredictable, perhaps fatally so in only a few seconds for some individuals. Quantum Mechanics destroyed LaPlace’s deterministic world. Thus, thanks to QM, a “probabilistic will” is at least possible. I.e. we can have the illusion of making “choices” that are actually made by the chance results of QM; however, Genuine Free Will, GFW, i.e. real choices made by one’s self, still appears to be impossible without some violation the physical laws that govern molecular interactions in our complex neuro-physiological processes.

If GFW does not exist, it is perhaps the most universal of all human illusions. This article will show that GFW is physically possible, even probable, without any violation of physics if one is willing to drastically revise the usual concept of one’s self. Furthermore, it argues that the required revision is a natural consequence of a better understanding of how the human visual system functions and the fact that we are highly visual creatures. The possibility that GFW is only an illusion is not excluded, but is made less probable, by the arguments presented in “Reality, Perception, and Simulation: A Plausible Theory”1. This text extracts from that article some aspects related to the existence of GFW.

That article focused almost entirely on the human visual system. How the brain uses a 2 dimensional array of information (neural activity present in the retina) to form a 3 dimensional perception of the environment is the central mystery of vision. The most accepted general concept is that this 2D data array is “computationally transformed” in successive stages neural processing until the 3D perception “emerges.” This processing begins in the retina itself where data is compressed by almost 100 fold. (Retinal photo detectors greatly outnumber optical nerve fibers.) The first cortical processing area, V1, extracts some “features,” (mainly line orientations and intensities) that are present in the visual field. Color, motion, and other primary features are extracted later in entirely separate regions of the brain. These separated features are processed further in other regions of the brain, but no one knows how they are reassembled into the unified 3D perception we experience. I concur with this feature extraction and segregation model, but do not think the 3D perception we experience is the “emerging result” of automatic computational transforms of the retinal data array as the standard theory suggests.

I contend that the visual features extracted in separate regions of the brain are never “reassembled” and do not “emerge” to form our unified visual experience. Instead, I believe that currently available sensorial information and one’s memory are used to construct, probably in the parietal region of the brain, a real-time simulation of the visual world. We experience that simulated world, not the physical world. Evolutionary selection has forced this simulation to be a nearly perfect model of our immediate physical world. (Excepting electromagnetic waves and other features for which we lack neural sensors.) Thus, continuous detailed guidance is required from the senses, but hallucinations and illusions can be, and occasionally are, created in the simulation that conflict with the physical world. These “errors” together with dreams and visual images formed with eyes closed are difficult for the conventional view of vision to explain in terms of automatic transformations of retinal data. Hallucinations, visual dreams, etc. are easily understood with the concept that what we experience is an internal simulation of the world, not an emerging transform of the retinal data.

Now I reproduce three of the several arguments I presented in above cited article to support this simulation concept and to demonstration that the standard concept of 3D perception as the emerging end result of automatic neural computational transformations of retinal data is surely wrong:

1) Our visual experience is uniformly rich in details over a wide area. That is, we see / experience the environment in front of us everywhere with high resolution, but the optical system of the eyes has very low resolution, except for one extremely small (solid angle slightly more than one degree) part, the fovea. How can high-resolution perceptual experiences, spanning a large part of one hemisphere, emerge from such low resolution input data? Clearly what we experience is derived from some inter construction, not the computational transform of retinal data. I am referring to our visual experience, not our ability to perceive fine details far from the point of fixation. Our perception of fine details is limited to that part of the image falling on the fovea. If our visual experience emerged from successive neural transforms of the retina data, it would be like looking through a lightly frosted sheet of glass, which had only one small spot completely clear (without frosting).

2) One’s perceptual experience when viewing a movie can also prove that the conventional view of visual processes is simply wrong. Imagine that a motion picture camera, held by someone seated in an extreme left seat of a theater, is filming actors on the stage and that doors on the left and right sides of the stage are equally large. Now suppose that this film is projected in a movie theater from a centrally located projection booth. The image projected on the screen will have doors of different size. Assume the left one is 25% larger. If you are seated on the right side of the movie theater in a location that is exactly symmetric to the location of the camera that filmed the movie, then the two doors will form equally large images on your retinas, but the standard theory’s “automatic computational transforms” will compensate for the 25% greater distance to the screen image of the left door and you will correctly perceive that the left door image is 25% larger. (This is correction for distance called “perceptual size constancy”) 2 Likewise if a movie character, who is 80% as tall as the real stage doors, should enter right door, and exit the left one, his height should be perceived as changing by 25% as he walks from one door to the other, according to the convention theory. Regardless of where they are seated, people never perceive an actor’s height as changing as his movie image moves from one side of the screen to the other. If one of the stage actors had walked from the extreme right rear of the stage to the extreme front edge, directly towards the camera making the movie film, the size of his film image could easily have increased by 50%. When you see this walk in the movie, his image on the screen will grow larger by 50%, but its distance from you remains constant so that the automatic computational transforms applied to this retinal image also remain constant. (The convergence angles of your eyes, etc. do not change during his walk.) Consequently, if the standard theory were correct, his perceived size should increase by 50% as he walks, but his perceived size is constant regardless of where he walked on the stage. Clearly the conventional view of how visual perceptions are produced (emerging end result of automatic computational processes) is simply wrong and needs to be replaced. My JHU/APL article gives several other reasons why I believe we experience the results of an internal simulation of our environment, not automatic transforms of our retinal images. It also explains, at the neural level, how we segregate objects (parse them) from the continuous visual field and how we then identify these parsed objects, but these processes are not discussed here because this article concerns only the existence, or not, of GFW.

3) The primary task of living organisms is to stay alive, at least long enough to reproduce. Neural computations require time. The world we would experience, if our experiences were the emergent results of many successive stages of neural transformations would be delayed by a significant fraction of a second. During our evolutionary history nothing truly discontinuous ever happened in our visual environment. (The discontinuous changes in movie and TV scenes did not exist.) None the less, it was essential for our ancestors to have a real-time understanding of their surroundings despite nature’s temporal continuity and our neural delays. - Try ducking a rock thrown towards your head if your only visual experience of it is a display projected into the eyes (electronic goggles) that delay the image by 0.1 seconds! A real-time simulation of the environment, can be achieved in a neural simulation by slightly projecting ahead the sensory information to compensate for neural processing delays.

A real-time simulation would have great survival value. Perhaps the Neanderthals still experienced slightly delayed “emerging transforms” of retinal data when our smaller brained and weaker ancestors perfected a real-time simulation of their environment. (Ecological pressure from the larger and stronger Neanderthals would have accelerated the rate of evolution in our ancestors.) Likewise, the “Out of Africa” mystery, (Why one branch of hominoids, expanded and dominated all others approximately 50,000 years ago.), which is often assumed to be related to the acquisition of “autonomous language” (no gestures required - hands free and education facilitated), might better be explained by the development of the real-time simulation of the environment.

Furthermore, I think everything we perceive as being “real” in our environment, including our physical bodies, is a part of this same simulation, not an emerging result of neural transformations of sensorial data from any of our neural transducers. That is, all of the senses only guide the simulation, feature by feature, to keep it highly faithful to the current external reality. When an abrupt external event unexpectedly occurs (hidden firecracker exploding, etc.), it significantly conflicts with the events projected in our simulation for that moment. We are startled and the simulation must be quickly revised to conform to the unanticipated external reality. This revision requires approximately 0.3 seconds. I think it probable that the simulation is paused while the revision is in progress, but we do not notice as we are also “paused” during this brief interval, just as we are not aware of hours passing while we sleep. I think the unusual electrical activity in the brain associated with the re-initiation of the simulation produces the EEG signal commonly called “P300,” or the “startle spike.” P300 is strongest over the parietal region.3

Why the continuous natural environment should be dissected into “features” and separately processed as a means of achieving a unified perception of the world is a great and unexplained mystery for most cognitive scientists, but easily understood if a simulation of the world is constructed by the brain. The physically sensed world is dissected into “features” for the same reason that a pilot uses a checklist before takeoff. Dividing a complex task into its component details and separately checking each, item by item, feature by feature, improves task performance accuracy. Thus, both the real-time simulation and the dissection of the visual field into features have significant survival value and consequently are probable natural developments in the evolution of creatures as complex as man.

In order to compare the features derived from retinal data with those derived from the simulation, they must be brought to the same neural tissue. Clearly it would be advantages to make this comparison as early as possible in the sequential stages of “computational transforms” of the retinal information. If the simulation is constructed in the parietal region of the brain, then one would expect that the number of neural fiber leaving the parietal cortex and returning to the visual cortex would at least equal those coming there, via the LGN, from the eyes. In fact they are somewhat more numerous. They are called “retrograde fibers” and no plausible reason for their existence has been suggested. Some of the comparison may be made even earlier in the LGN, which is usually considered to be mainly a “relay station” between the eyes and visual cortex. (Both areas have large projections into the parietal cortex, so it can easily “know” when, where and what difference has been detected.) The quantity of retrograde fibers from the visual striate cortex to the LGN slightly outnumbers the number of fibers coming there from the eyes. About this second set of retrograde fibers, DeValois4 states: “It is by no means obvious what function is subserved by this feedback.” (from V1 to LGN) About the retrograde set from the parietal to V1, they state: “Even less is understood (if that is possible) about these feedback connections...” They also note that both sets are “strictly retinotopic,” which is the neuro-physiologist’s way to compactly state that each small part of the visual field is mapped in one-to-one correspondence with neural tissue. That is, the retrograde fibers return to the same small area of processing cells that the prograde fibers enter and these cells are concerned with only a small part of the image on the retina. This approximately equal number of retinotopic retrograde fibers entering the visual cortex, is not only explained by the theory I am suggesting; they are required for the simulation to rapidly correct for unpredictable external events!

If a buzzer sounds while one is watching the steady predictable movement of a small light spot and one is asked: “Where was the light spot when the buzzer first began to sound?” the location indicated is later than the true location. Thanks to the predictive simulation, the subject is continuously aware of the true location of the light in real-time but he only becomes aware of the sound later after the simulation has been revised to include the sound of the buzzer and he associates it with that later location of the light. Retrograde fibers project back to early sensory processing stages for all of the senses to make correction of the simulation as rapid as possible but perception of new events is still delayed enough to be easily demonstrated in this type of psychological test. - For example, a reasonable competent computer programmer can program his computer to move a light pixel across a stationary grid displayed on the monitor and to randomly make a brief sound. With fine pointer, he quickly points to the light spot location where the light was when the sound started. A few seconds later, the computer displays where the light pixel actual was when the sound started. Note how quickly he moves the pointer (his reaction time) does not matter. The delay measured is the time required to revise the simulation to include the new sound. This small revision will not produce a “P300” EEG signal because the simulation is not paused while it is made. Only major environmental discontinuities, usually sudden unexpected loud noises, pause our existence (startle us).

Thus the only reality we directly experience is this simulation and we are part of it. That is, we are an informational process in a simulation, not a physical body. When we are in deep dreamless sleep the simulation is paused and we do not exist - only our physical bodies exist. Our bodies are at all times completely governed by physical laws, like any other physical object; but if we are only an informational process in a slightly imperfect simulation of the physical world, then we need not be deterministic (or quantum mechanical) beings. That is, we may not exactly follow physical laws just as the creatures modeled in modern computers making movies, pixel by pixel, without actors or optical cameras do not exactly follow the physical laws. The meaning of symbols manipulated in a computer does not depend upon the physical construction or deterministic details of the computer. The human brain is a parallel processing computer, much more advanced than any man has yet conceived, and is fully capable of making a real-time simulation of the world we experience.

Other humans, some of the more advanced animals, and ourselves are modeled in this simulation as having wishes and making choices, not as bio-mechanical creatures governed by physics. That is, the simulation in which we live and exist assumes GFW exists for some of the more advanced creatures. Thus, GFW does exist in the only world we exist in and directly experience. Neither we, nor GFW exists in the physical world. From our direct experiences in the world we exist in, the simulation, we infer (I think correctly) that the physical world does exist, but as Bishop George Berkeley noted, the existence of a physical world may be only an erroneous belief, commonly deduced from our direct experiences. That is, the directly experienced GFW has a stronger claim to “reality” than the inferred physical world!

Summary: This definition of one’s self as an informational process in a simulation, not a physical body, permits you to have GFW and make other violations of physical laws, especially in your dreams, when sensory guidance of the simulation is weak or absent. For example, some people sincerely report “out of body” experiences etc. These physically impossible experiences and GFW are directly experienced and thus have a strong claim to being “real.” In contrast, the existence of a physical world is only inferred from these direct experiences. Bishop Berkeley argued consistently that it may not exist, but he required a God to give him his experiences. My view is similar to his in some aspects (I do not exist as a physical object in the material world.) but it makes no reference to God. Instead, a brain-based simulation is creating both my experiences and me. Being non-physical is the price one must pay for GFW if one rejects miracles that violate physics.

Question: Are you a complex bio-mechanical machine without GFW or only an informational process that has GFW in a simulated world? If you believe the former and that belief is correct, you must. I.e. you can make no real choices without postulating a “soul” or other miracles that violate physics, but if the latter is correct, I can chose to believe it (or not) and still be consistent with physics and logic. Some who believe they have free will and yet reject the second alternative of the question may find in this dilemma a strong argument for the existence of God and miracles, but if they do their “free will” is not GFW. Instead it is the potentially capricious and reversible gift of a greater being, whose postulated existence is not supported by any physical evidence. In contrast, there is a large body of physical evidence (some given above) supporting the simulated world in which I postulate we exist with GFW. See the first reference for more of this evidence. Consider also how many of the strange aspects of human psychology easily fit within the framework of a simulated world and being (phantom limbs, multiple personalities, false memories, sincere denial, déjà vu, hallucinations, etc.).
References and Notes:

1) For reprint, contact the Johns Hopkins University / Applied Physic Laboratory (helen.worth@jhuapl.edu). "Reality, Perception, and Simulation: A Plausible Theory" appeared in the JHU/APL Technical Journal, volume 15, number 2 (1994) pages 154 - 163. The last two pages (Philosophical Implications and Speculations) give the above solution to the freewill vs. determinism problem.

2) For example, if a father is standing three times farther from you than his half grown son, his image on your retina is smaller than that of his son, yet you perceive their relative sizes correctly. Standard theory suggests that we automatically correct retinal image sizes to compensate for distance. “Perceptual size constancy” is usually reasonably accurate. The most notable natural exception is the moon illusion. The near horizon moon appears to be larger than the overhead moon because humans conceive of the “sky dome”, on which the moon and stars appear to move, as more distant near the horizon than at the zenith. Why this is so, is partially caused by the slowing of the angular rate of movement of clouds, birds, etc. we watch as they move towards the horizon.

3) There are many other reasons to suspect the simulation takes palace in parietal cortex, but I will only briefly mention two. First is the geometric efficiency of the brain’s structure for a parietal simulation. The simulation requires four main inputs. Tactical sensory cortex contacts the anterior parietal; Visual cortex contacts the posterior, Auditory input contacts it laterally and the primary tissue associated with memory is directly below the parietal cortex. This minimizes neural conduction delays and “white tissue” (nerve fibers) brain volume requirements. Even stronger support is found in the sequela of parietal strokes, which result in “unilateral neglect.” Victims of these strokes do not recognize the existence of the contra lateral half of the physical world. They eat only the food on one side of their plate, etc. Their visual system can be shown to continue functioning perfectly. For example, if one briefly flashes a small light in that part of the world that does not exists (for them), and then demands that they guess whether this non-existent light was red or green, they perform far above chance, while complaining that it is silly to name the color of something that did not exist. This proves their visual system is functioning well, at least through the stage where small color features are extracted. I explain unilateral neglect sequela by postulating that the undamaged side of the parietal brain is continuing to make a simulation, but only of its half of the world. Because their personality is not drastically changed, I believe frontal cortex is utilized to construct much the “psychological self” included in the simulation but their physical body image is a parietal construct. - If they happen to turn their head and see their leg, whose existence is no longer represented in the simulation as part of their body, they may try to throw this “foreign leg” away – it is disgusting close to them.

4) Page 101 of Spatial Vision, first edition, Oxford Psychology Series No. 14, by R.L. & K.K. DeValois Oxford University Press (ISBN 0-19-505019-3)

But the question of free will is not pointless... that's what I was trying to communicate to you. You are wrong about the question of free will being pointless, it is very "pointed".

As for "but the question of free will as posed must be "in the moment...", I'm not exactly sure what you meaning is. The moment is not, after all, a period of time, but instead merely a demarcation between the past and the future.

(btw, welcome to sci)

It's always right now. The past and future are abstracts. We live in the moment, though we may be distracted by said abstracts. You are wrong about me being wrong about the question of free will. :) I'm just saying that, pardon. I do however, think it is indeed a pointless question. I think the concept of "free will" is simply ill-conceived.

philosopherknight...not only does man have free will. so does every scintilating 'particle/wave' of universe...so does universe
ypu are locked in the old debate of free will vs determinism, andseem to take the latter side. but wit any seeming 'opposites' or polar coordinates therer always is an EXcluded middle which connects the seeming extremes of experience

we also have the POWER of choice. for example...no matter how miserable a persons life may seem, and determined--at ANY time they can change it. walk away---ultimately commit suicide. the eternal escpae clause?

allllso. the stories we tell ourselves DETERMINES how we may experience. so, the one wit the determistic story of the universe....now HOW do you THINK S/he's gonna EXPERIENCE it....Universe is very accomadating....and is also mutidimensional. you choose

My view is this

1- If god exists then free will is just an illusion, in this view god knows everything before it happens, and therefor it is pre planned and cant be changed, meaning everything we do is planned out and will remain the same no matter what, if it did change than god would be wrong, if god is wrong then what kind of god would we have?

2- If god doesnt exist, then everything we do is under our own power, with no force to guide our decision we are left on our own to make decisions in everyday life.

I tried to make this short and to the point

Probably true, but not necessarily true:

Genuine Free Will is Possible

Before the advent of Quantum Mechanics, the future appeared to LaPlace to be exactly determined by the past state of the universe, even if it was clearly unpredictable. Chaos theory and measurement errors plus ignorance about small asteroid orbits, rupture stresses in tectonic faults or vascular systems, etc. makes LaPlace’s future unpredictable, perhaps fatally so in only a few seconds for some individuals.
...
Quantum Mechanics destroyed LaPlace’s deterministic world. Thus, thanks to QM, a “probabilistic will” is at least possible.
...
I.e. we can have the illusion of making “choices” that are actually made by the chance results of QM;
...
however, Genuine Free Will, GFW, i.e. real choices made by one’s self, still appears to be impossible without some violation the physical laws that govern molecular interactions in our complex neuro-physiological processes.
...
If GFW does not exist, it is perhaps the most universal of all human illusions.
...


Billy T,

Thanks for the reply. But please why waste everyone's time? The illusion of making [free] "choices" is still an illusion. And there's no real reason to think that what is happening on the QM level even effects anything up on a higher level... but you know, that randomness does not grant freedom to will, only randomness and unpredicability. A "probabilistic will” is not the issue at hand, FWists claim libertarian free will... this and only this is what NFWist deny exists. In other words, "probabilistic will” is still NFW.

Hey... if one reads what you write one sees, "GFW, i.e. real choices made by one’s self, still appears to be impossible without some violation the physical laws that govern molecular interactions in our complex neuro-physiological processes", so you concede that case.

"If GFW does not exist, it is perhaps the most universal of all human illusions. "

You are absolutely correct! It's the grandaddy of all illusions.


Steve

you are very selective and distorting in your quotes of my article. I made bold few things so you must have seen:

This article will show that GFW is physically possible, even probable, without any violation of physics if ....

I only acknowledge that one can not dis prove the possibility that free will is only an illusion, but The point of the article was to show how it can be possible and consistent with physic. You have distorted the point by selective qouting.

Billy T,

Thanks for the reply. But please why waste everyone's time? The illusion of making [free] "choices" is still an illusion. And there's no real reason to think that what is happening on the QM level even effects anything up on a higher level... but you know, that randomness does not grant freedom to will, only randomness and unpredicability. A "probabilistic will” is not the issue at hand, FWists claim libertarian free will... this and only this is what NFWist deny exists. In other words, "probabilistic will” is still NFW.
Hey... if one reads what you write one sees, "GFW, i.e. real choices made by one’s self, still appears to be impossible without some violation the physical laws that govern molecular interactions in our complex neuro-physiological processes", so you concede that case.
"If GFW does not exist, it is perhaps the most universal of all human illusions. "
You are absolutely correct! It's the grandaddy of all illusions.
SteveI also stated that I would prefer to be a well developed biological machine, prefected by nature over eons, than to have a random QM based "will"