Fraggle Rocker
08-18-08, 09:17 PM
Michael Dobbs has traveled in Georgia and South Ossetia, and writes about the conflict there in Sunday's Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/14/AR2008081401360.html) from a more informed perspective than most of the commentaries. Some of his key points:
Americans are comparing Putin's attack on Georgia with Hitler's grab of the Sudetenland, or with the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the events of the past week have little in common with either, when you understand the politics of the Caucasus.
Dobbs was in Tshkinvali in 1991 when it was occupied by the Georgian militia. One of Gamaskhurdia's first acts as the democratically elected president of Georgia was to cancel the political autonomy that the Stalinist constitution had granted to the Ossetian minority of 90,000 in Georgia. His militia had ransacked the town, destroying the Ossetian national theater, decapitating the statue of its beloved poet and pulling down monuments to Ossetian soldiers who had fought with the Russians against Hitler.
The Ossetians view the Georgians in the same way that the Georgians view Russians: aggressive bullies bent on taking away their independence.
When it comes to apportioning blame for this conflict, there's plenty to go around. The Russians have clearly been itching for a fight. But Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has been erratic and provocative. And the USA has stoked the conflict by encouraging him to believe he enjoys American protection, when in fact the West's ability to impose its will in the Caucasus is quite limited.
The USA views Saakashvili as a pro-Western modernizer. Yet he presents himself as the successor to the medieval Georgian king David the Builder, sending riot police to crush an opposition protest, closing down the opposition TV station, and responding disproportionately to Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages with an artillery barrage and the military occupation of an entire town.
Since the South Ossetians consider Russia the lesser of two evils, most of them have opted for Russian citizenship, giving Russia all the rationale it needs to speed to the defense of "its loyal citizens," and a handy excuse to push Georgians toward installing a more Moscow-friendly leader. Playing one ethnic group against another has been Russia's standard tactic for keeping the Caucasus weak ever since the days of the Czars.
Yet Russia's incursion into Georgian territory has been even more "disproportionate," attacking the Black Sea port of Poti more than 100 miles from South Ossetia. Russians bitterly resent the eastward expansion of NATO into Poland and the Baltic countries. Now that Russia is stronger and America is weaker, having dissipated our energy in Iraq, they hope to stop NATO from expanding into the Ukraine and Georgia, Russia's back yard.
For its part the USA has been sending mixed signals to Georgia. Our leaders claim that they did not encourage Saakashvili to attack south Ossetia, but they have demanded the restoration of Georgian territorial integrity, which amounts to the same thing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We have military advisors in the country, just like we did in Vietnam fifty years ago.
American leaders have paid little attention to Russian diplomatic concerns. It is difficult to explain why we championed Kosovo's right to declare independence from Serbia, but deny that right to the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The USA is overextended militarily, diplomatically and economically. Our loudest hawks have no interest in an actual shooting war with Russia. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, we're going to need Russia's cooperation in dealing with Iran.
Our ideological ambitions have exceeded our military reach in an area like the Caucasus, which is of vital interest to Russia and of almost no importance at all to us.
Americans are comparing Putin's attack on Georgia with Hitler's grab of the Sudetenland, or with the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the events of the past week have little in common with either, when you understand the politics of the Caucasus.
Dobbs was in Tshkinvali in 1991 when it was occupied by the Georgian militia. One of Gamaskhurdia's first acts as the democratically elected president of Georgia was to cancel the political autonomy that the Stalinist constitution had granted to the Ossetian minority of 90,000 in Georgia. His militia had ransacked the town, destroying the Ossetian national theater, decapitating the statue of its beloved poet and pulling down monuments to Ossetian soldiers who had fought with the Russians against Hitler.
The Ossetians view the Georgians in the same way that the Georgians view Russians: aggressive bullies bent on taking away their independence.
When it comes to apportioning blame for this conflict, there's plenty to go around. The Russians have clearly been itching for a fight. But Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has been erratic and provocative. And the USA has stoked the conflict by encouraging him to believe he enjoys American protection, when in fact the West's ability to impose its will in the Caucasus is quite limited.
The USA views Saakashvili as a pro-Western modernizer. Yet he presents himself as the successor to the medieval Georgian king David the Builder, sending riot police to crush an opposition protest, closing down the opposition TV station, and responding disproportionately to Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages with an artillery barrage and the military occupation of an entire town.
Since the South Ossetians consider Russia the lesser of two evils, most of them have opted for Russian citizenship, giving Russia all the rationale it needs to speed to the defense of "its loyal citizens," and a handy excuse to push Georgians toward installing a more Moscow-friendly leader. Playing one ethnic group against another has been Russia's standard tactic for keeping the Caucasus weak ever since the days of the Czars.
Yet Russia's incursion into Georgian territory has been even more "disproportionate," attacking the Black Sea port of Poti more than 100 miles from South Ossetia. Russians bitterly resent the eastward expansion of NATO into Poland and the Baltic countries. Now that Russia is stronger and America is weaker, having dissipated our energy in Iraq, they hope to stop NATO from expanding into the Ukraine and Georgia, Russia's back yard.
For its part the USA has been sending mixed signals to Georgia. Our leaders claim that they did not encourage Saakashvili to attack south Ossetia, but they have demanded the restoration of Georgian territorial integrity, which amounts to the same thing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We have military advisors in the country, just like we did in Vietnam fifty years ago.
American leaders have paid little attention to Russian diplomatic concerns. It is difficult to explain why we championed Kosovo's right to declare independence from Serbia, but deny that right to the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The USA is overextended militarily, diplomatically and economically. Our loudest hawks have no interest in an actual shooting war with Russia. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, we're going to need Russia's cooperation in dealing with Iran.
Our ideological ambitions have exceeded our military reach in an area like the Caucasus, which is of vital interest to Russia and of almost no importance at all to us.